🧭 Differentiated democratic enlargement to sharpen EU accession process

EU enlargement is often hailed as a tool for spurring political reform and countering Russian influence. But Richard Youngs argues that its democratic dimensions are more complex than conventional wisdom suggests. He proposes the concept of differentiated democratic enlargement to address varied pre-accession dynamics and refine EU strategies

The case for continuing with EU enlargement has been convincingly articulated by European leaders and analysts, and by contributors to this blog series. One of the most prominent arguments in favour of enlargement is its potential to spur political reforms in candidate countries. A closely related claim suggests that the post-2022 enlargement framework offers a strategic opportunity to promote democratic reform and weaken Russia’s geopolitical influence.

While compelling, these arguments often oversimplify the complex interplay between enlargement and democracy. To address this, I suggest differentiated democratic enlargement as a more nuanced framework for understanding and shaping the EU’s approach towards candidate states.

Varied political trajectories

Recent developments in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) region and the Balkans underscore the diversity of political dynamics among EU candidates. These regions have experienced contested elections, mass protests, and political crises. To address these distinct challenges, the EU must adopt tailored democracy strategies.

  • Moldova The EU has made notable progress in countering Russian influence but risks conflating support for a pro-European government with broader democratic principles.
  • Georgia Autocratic trends have prompted European criticism, but the EU’s response remains equivocal, reflecting uncertainty over whether to engage with the Georgian Dream government.
  • Ukraine War has shifted the focus to corruption and emergency governance. However, the broader democracy agenda has been sidelined, and Ukrainian civic actors increasingly complain about the president’s centralisation of power.
  • The Western Balkans Here, trends vary widely. Albania and Montenegro currently show reformist tendencies, whereas Serbia continues to backslide democratically. Meanwhile, Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo face unique constitutional and sovereignty challenges that impede deeper reform.

This divergence challenges the conventional grouping of the Balkans and the EaP3 as distinct blocs. For instance, Georgia’s autocratic trajectory increasingly resembles Serbia’s, while Moldova’s reformist but capacity-weak governance parallels Montenegro’s to some extent. This further highlights the need for a differentiated approach to democratic reform.

Refining democracy support

The diversity of regime dynamics calls for a recalibration of the EU’s democracy strategy. The prevailing narrative insists that democracy, security, and geopolitical interests align seamlessly within the enlargement process. Yet, this idealised vision often obscures the inherent tensions between these goals. The messy reality is that the security and democracy elements of enlargement are neither perfectly aligned nor mutually exclusive. This calls for a more tailored policy framework to balance these objectives effectively. Crucially, the 'differentiated integration' proposed by Frank Schimmelfennig in this series requires support for more differentiated patterns of democratisation.

The messy reality is that the security and democracy elements of enlargement are neither perfectly aligned nor mutually exclusive

  • Integrating democracy and security While the EU rhetorically links democracy with security, practical implementation often lags. The Union must focus on building institutional capacities that enable candidates to resist external threats. Resilient state-building — encompassing both effective governance and democratic accountability — should become a core metric for accession progress.
  • Actor-level differentiation Beyond inter-state differentiation, the EU needs to distinguish between various domestic actors within candidate countries. Civil society, often under-valued in accession processes, can play a critical role in driving democratic reforms. Recent EU commitments to double civil society support represent a step in the right direction, but more is needed to shift the balance of power away from autocratic forces and toward pro-democratic actors.
  • Targeted support and sanctions The EU should identify and bolster democratic drivers while imposing restrictions on entities undermining democratic progress. This granular approach recognises the fluidity of political contestation and avoids treating candidates as monolithic entities: the EU needs to differentiate more between actors within candidate states, not just between these states as a whole.

Re-sequencing reforms

The complexity of current enlargement dynamics suggests that the EU may be simultaneously under- and over-focused on democracy. On the one hand, stringent political conditions can stall accession progress. On the other, geopolitical expediency may lead to the neglect of democratic standards. A differentiated democracy strategy would entail a more flexible sequencing of reforms, ensuring that democratic benchmarks are met without unduly delaying integration.

While stringent political conditions can stall accession progress, geopolitical expediency may lead to the neglect of democratic standards

Differentiated democratic enlargement offers a framework for refining EU policy and analytical debates. By tailoring its approach to the specific political contexts of candidate countries, the EU can better align its democracy and security objectives. This strategy would:

  • Reinforce democratic resilience, strengthening institutional and societal capacities to resist external manipulation and autocratic tendencies.
  • Enhance civil society engagement, elevating the role of emerging non-state actors as agents of reform.
  • Optimise accession processes, pursuing and encouraging rigorous democratic standards in redefined reform sequences that better seize the urgency of geopolitical realities.

Accelerating accession processes

The concept of differentiated democratic enlargement offers a refined lens through which to examine policy formulation and analytical discourse on the democratic dimensions of EU accession. While the enlargement process remains dynamic and far from complete, this approach might provide a framework for navigating the complex realities of candidate countries.

The EU has undoubtedly drawn lessons from previous rounds of enlargement, adjusting its democracy promotion strategies to evolving political landscapes. However, significant challenges persist.

The EU has adjusted its democracy promotion strategies to evolving political landscapes, yet significant challenges persist

Institutional reform, geopolitical pressures and the complex interaction of democratic principles and security imperatives demand a strategically sharper approach. Differentiated democratic enlargement advocates tailoring strategies to each candidate’s unique political trajectory while fostering alignment with EU democratic norms.

If implemented effectively, this approach could help accelerate accession processes and ensure that democracy becomes a cornerstone rather than a blanket checkbox, reinforcing the Union’s resilience and coherence.

This article is part of the project InvigoratEU: Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe

Sixth in a Loop series on 🧭 EU enlargement dilemmas

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

photograph of Richard Youngs
Richard Youngs
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe / Professor of International Relations, University of Warwick

Richard is cofounder of the European Democracy Hub in Brussels.

He is the author of seventeen books, most recently

Democratic Crossroads: Transformations in Twenty First-Century Politics

Democratic Crossroads: Transformations in Twenty First-Century Politics
OUP, 2024

Geoliberal Europe and the Test of War

Geoliberal Europe and the Test of War
Agenda, 2024

@YoungsRichard

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