From Ukraine to global finance, informal organisations are stepping into gaps left by traditional institutions or helping circumvent them in a time of great power competition. With speed, flexibility, and confidentiality, these informal bodies are quietly reshaping international order write Steve Biedermann and Matthew Stephen
In February 2022, Russian tanks poured across the Ukrainian border. The United Nations Security Council, the institution charged with maintaining international peace and security, was powerless to stop them. The reason was the Russian veto. The paralysis of the Security Council led to the creation of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group in April 2022. Comprising 57 member states and the European Union, the so-called Ramstein Group has become the central coordinator for supporting Ukraine’s national defence. The Group is just one recent example of states’ turn to informal intergovernmental organisations (IIGOs). Others include the Group of Twenty (G20), the Group of Seven (G7) and the BRICS.
In recent years, formal organisations such as the UN and World Trade Organisation have fallen prey to international power shifts and geopolitical conflicts. This has reinforced the proliferation of IIGOs. Estimates suggest that there are today more than 200 active IIGOs, engaged in all issue areas of international politics. While they share some features of formal international organisations, IIGOs are not based on an international treaty and posses no, or only very limited, bureaucratic structures.
While informal intergovernmental organisations have no legal authority, they still shape international politics through informal governance
While IIGOs possess no legal authority, they still shape international politics through informal practices of governance. They allow their members to build consensus and make self-binding commitments. Further, they frequently interact with various other actors through so-called 'outreach activities'. Some IIGOs, such as the G7 and G20, even have members powerful enough to dominate decision-making processes in formal organisations (a process known as 'orchestration').
What explains the growing appeal of informal institutions? Part of the explanation lies in states' functional demands. During rapid changes and recurring crises, informal institutions are seen as offering flexibility, speed, and confidentiality. By avoiding legal commitments and international bureaucracy, they may be cheaper and easier to manage, especially for handling international crises. However, not all IIGOs are engaged in crisis management, and many formal organisations have mechanisms to address uncertainty and crises.
An alternative explanation is the resurgence of power politics. This diminishes the roles of formal institutions and international law. Powerful states tend to prefer informal forms of cooperation to avoid restrictions on their scope for action. As they see it, binding commitments constitute concessions to less powerful states in exchange for their support. The numerous IIGOs established by the US and its allies — including the G7, the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, and the Ramstein Group — exemplify this affinity of powerful states for informal organisations. Likewise, China has been involved in creating informal organisations such as the BRICS, the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, and several regional forums.
Informal institutions can pick up some of the slack generated by the failures of formal, rules-based institutions
The resurgence of power politics favours informality in a second sense. As power has diffused beyond the West, many international organisations have suffered deadlocks. The UN Security Council, for example, remains largely immune to fundamental reform and its five permanent members have failed to agree on many of the key issues of international security. It has also been sidelined in major armed conflicts, such as in Ukraine and Syria. The WTO — which successfully incorporated the emerging economies of China, India, and Brazil — has fallen victim to deadlock among its powerful members and appears helpless to stop the US’ current trade wars. Informal institutions may be able to pick up some of the slack generated by the failures of formal, rules-based institutions
Against this backdrop, IIGOs can assume several roles. They can serve as exclusive clubs of major powers and their allies, like the G7 and the BRICS. As with the Ramstein Group, they may also offer a second-best solution whenever formal organisations are gridlocked or unable to act. And finally, IIGOs can mediate global power shifts by bringing together established and emerging powers, such as the G20.
Informal organisations can be both exclusive clubs of major powers, and mediators of power shifts that bring together established and emerging powers
Is this a cause for concern or celebration? While promising some functional benefits, the turn to informality is at odds with the idea of an international order guided by binding rules and institutions. The non-binding character of informal agreements makes it easy to opt out of cooperation. While this increases flexibility, it limits the potential for global and authoritative rules. While this might better reflect the new reality of world politics, it also signals a shift away from the once vaunted ideals of global governance.
