Predictions of regime collapse in Iran often misunderstand the Islamic Republic’s internal mechanics, says Williamkery Gaddam. Authority is not centralised but distributed among clerical bodies, security organisations, and political institutions. This enables the regime to manage elite competition and absorb external shocks, making externally driven transformation far harder than many observers assume
Advocates for regime change often believe that sustained military or economic pressure will eventually break the Iranian system. However, this assumption fails to take into account the structure of the Islamic Republic. Power in Iran does not rest on a single ruler but on a layered set of institutions designed to manage elite competition.
During policy debates, the fall of Iraq in 2003 under Saddam Hussein, and Libya in 2011 under Muammar Gaddafi, are often held up as examples. In those systems, the dominant leader centralised authority. Once that leader was removed, the political order quickly fragmented, leading to power struggles among factions, and increased instability.
Iran differs fundamentally. Its structure is institutionalised. It is therefore unhelpful to compare it with Iraq under Saddam or Libya under Gaddafi. The Islamic Republic distributes authority across several institutions that share responsibility for governing the state. Understanding this institutional architecture is essential for predicting how external pressure might affect regime stability.
Iran's institutional design makes externally driven regime change far more difficult than observers commonly assume. The interplay between various institutions creates a resilient framework that can absorb external pressures without collapsing.
Comparative political scientists, including Barbara Geddes, distinguish personalist regimes from those organised around institutions. In personalist systems, power rests heavily with a single dominant ruler. When that leader disappears, the institutions around him often weaken or collapse.
Iran’s system works differently. Clerical bodies, political institutions, and security organisations share authority. The Guardian Council reviews legislation and controls who may run in elections, while the Assembly of Experts appoints and supervises the Supreme Leader. At the same time, the regime’s principal defender, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), holds significant military and economic influence.
In personalist regimes, institutions collapse when the leader falls. In Iran, the institutions themselves sustain the Supreme Leader's authority
The Supreme Leader is often portrayed as a classic personalist ruler. In practice, his authority is mediated through the institutions that sustain the regime. He acts as the ultimate arbitrator when interests among clerical elites, political actors, and security organisations diverge. By distributing authority and patronage across these pillars, the leadership binds different elite groups to the system's survival.
Together, these institutions create several veto points within the political system. Power thus operates through a network of organisations rather than a single ruler. This institutional layering helps explain why the removal of leadership does not automatically trigger regime collapse.
This structure serves as a buffer against political shocks. Multiple institutions check and reinforce one another. Together they absorb pressure and resist collapse.
Critics often dismiss these institutions as symbolic 'rubber stamps' for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). However, even when security forces dominate, formal bodies perform vital roles: they structure elite bargaining, distribute resources, and provide arenas to manage internal conflict.
When external pressure targets one institution, others absorb the shock. The regime holds together precisely because no single institution carries everything alone
In this system, power is negotiated across competing bureaucratic and ideological pillars. This layered administrative architecture creates a built-in redundancy; if external pressure targets one institution, others can absorb the shock, thereby ensuring the stability and continuity of governance even in times of crisis. As Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have shown, regimes embedded in these institutional networks endure far longer than personalist systems built around a single ruler.
The killing of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, during US-Israeli airstrikes in February 2026 is a real-time test of the regime's institutional strength. Rather than collapsing immediately, Iran activated its constitutional succession mechanisms. An interim leadership arrangement emerged, and the Assembly of Experts later stepped in, choosing Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran's new Supreme Leader.
This response illustrates a central feature of institutionalised authoritarian systems. Leadership decapitation does not automatically dismantle the regime because authority is embedded within organisations rather than concentrated in a single individual.
Yet succession also exposes the system’s main vulnerability. Research by scholars like Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz suggests that autocracies' Achilles’ heel is internal elite fragmentation, not external pressure alone. In institutionalised regimes, divisions often arise during leadership transitions.
Leadership change alone will not decide Iran's fate. What matters is whether the elite stay united when political and military pressure mounts
The recent transition following Ali Khamenei’s death shows how these institutions can manage leadership change even under severe external pressure. A successor was selected through the constitutional process, allowing the regime to maintain continuity despite ongoing conflict. Yet succession also exposes underlying tensions with the governing coalition, particularly regarding differing views on how to respond to external threats and manage internal dissent. As the conflict with Israel and the US continues, the durability of the regime will depend less on the leadership change itself and more on whether elite cohesion holds under sustained political and military pressure.
Debates about Iran’s future often focus on sanctions, military escalation, or diplomatic isolation. These discussions assume that weakening the regime’s leadership will eventually produce political transformation.
Institutional analysis points to a more cautious conclusion. Iran’s political system distributes authority among clerical bodies, security organisations, and political elites rather than concentrating it in a single ruler.
Such systems are not immune to collapse. Yet their breakdown typically follows internal fragmentation rather than external coercion alone.
External pressure may weaken the Iranian state and reshape regional geopolitics. However, the layered institutions of the Islamic Republic function to absorb shocks and regulate elite competition. Without a fracture among the elites who sustain these institutions, external pressure alone is unlikely to transform the regime’s structure, because existing power dynamics, and loyalty among the elites, will likely maintain stability despite external challenges.
