EU enlargement, without credible enforcement of democratic standards, threatens the Union’s integrity. Cases like Hungary and Serbia expose the dangers of performative reforms and weak accountability. Rafaela Gonzalez Lucioni argues that to remain a values-based project, the EU must reform internal mechanisms and adopt a phased, conditional approach to accession
As Russia’s war in Ukraine drags on, Brussels is doubling down on its goal of EU enlargement by 2030. But the urgency to expand exposes a deeper vulnerability: the erosion of liberal democracy from within. When states that violate core norms are allowed to join — or remain in — the Union without consequence, the EU risks becoming a transactional bloc rather than a community of shared values. This shift threatens not only the EU’s credibility as a model of liberal governance, but its internal cohesion.
The problem is not enlargement per se, but the illusion that it can proceed without stronger enforcement or a recommitment to foundational principles. As Jelena Džankić argued in this series, enlargement must be transformative, not merely symbolic. Yet governments that restrict media freedom and undermine judicial independence continue to benefit from EU funding and legitimacy. The result is a clear signal: democratic resilience is no longer the price of entry — geopolitical alignment is.
Democratic resilience is no longer the price of entry to the EU — geopolitical alignment is
Hungary and Serbia exemplify this trend. They are not outliers, but symptoms of a broader pattern of backsliding across Europe. We see it in Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and even within founding members. But what sets Hungary apart is the durability of its illiberalism and the impunity it has enjoyed since accession.
Hungary’s shift from reformist democracy to entrenched illiberal state illustrates the EU’s limited influence once a state joins. In the early 2000s, Hungary met accession benchmarks through formal reforms that proved fragile. After joining the Union in 2004, however, these reforms were steadily reversed. Since 2010, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government has centralised executive power, weakened judicial independence, and imposed restrictions on press freedom. Hungary now ranks 68th in the World Press Freedom Index, down from 23rd place in 2010.
Yet Hungary remains a net recipient of EU funds and a frequent veto player in Brussels. Article 7 proceedings begun in 2018, for instance, stalled due to unanimity rules. A partial freeze of cohesion funds in 2022 was reversed after cosmetic reforms. As Beáta Bakó notes in this series, this cycle of 'endless conditionality' exposes the EU’s vulnerability to political bargaining.
Serbia, though still a candidate, mirrors many of these patterns. Under President Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia has adopted formal reforms to satisfy EU benchmarks while consolidating authoritarian control. Media pluralism has declined, civic space narrowed, and judicial independence remains weak. Serbia now ranks 91st in the 2024 Press Freedom Index and 64th in the Democracy Index — ten spots below Hungary.
Vučić’s party dominates the political system. The country's elections remain formally competitive but fundamentally unfair. At the same time, Serbia maintains close ties with Russia and China. Vučić’s appearance at Russia’s 2025 Victory Day parade, for instance, offered further evidence of his divergence from EU foreign policy. In many ways, Serbia today bears a striking resemblance to Hungary two decades ago: a candidate simulating alignment while resisting transformation.
Despite this, the EU continues to fund Serbia generously. The €6 billion Western Balkans Growth Plan, running until 2027, includes limited mechanisms to enforce democratic benchmarks. In this series, Miruna Butnaru-Troncotă warns that such wartime politicisation risks turning enlargement into symbolism over substance. It rewards strategic ambiguity rather than democratic reform.
Hungary, already in the EU, uses its position to entrench illiberalism and block EU consensus. Serbia, still outside, exploits its strategic relevance to secure benefits without transformation
The parallel is worrisome. Hungary, already inside, uses its position to entrench illiberalism and block EU consensus. Serbia, still outside, exploits its strategic relevance to secure benefits without transformation. One reveals the consequences of premature accession; the other, the dangers of weak conditionality.
Hungary and Serbia expose a structural contradiction at the heart of EU enlargement: the Union demands democratic standards from candidates but lacks the tools to enforce them once membership is granted. Enlargement, once a driver of democratic consolidation, now risks embedding illiberalism and weakening the EU from within.
To restore credibility, enforcement must start at home. The European Council should reform Article 7 to allow qualified majority voting for graduated sanctions based on clear criteria. While this requires Treaty change, the Council could, in the meantime, pursue an interinstitutional agreement to improve rule-of-law decision making.
The Union demands democratic standards from candidates but lacks the tools to enforce them once membership is granted
A standardised rule-of-law index — tracking judicial independence, media freedom, civic space, and electoral integrity — should underpin a tiered response system: from suspending non-essential funds to restricting voting rights and applying broader sanctions.
On enlargement, a phased compliance model offers a viable path. Frank Schimmelfennig’s differentiated membership framework would link gradual access to EU benefits with measurable democratic milestones. It would deter superficial reforms and reward substantive progress.
An independent monitoring body should complement these efforts. As the European Court of Auditors has noted, current enforcement is inconsistent and opaque. A neutral authority could enhance transparency, flag early warning signs, and bolster the legitimacy of conditionality.
These reforms will face resistance. Institutional inertia, legal complexity, and political pushback are real obstacles. But without meaningful change, the EU risks becoming a larger Union in territory, yet weaker in principle. Hungary and Serbia are not anomalies — they are warnings. They reveal what happens when strategic urgency overtakes democratic conditionality, and when values are invoked but not enforced.
The EU cannot afford to drift into a model of symbolic enlargement paired with hollow enforcement. Geopolitical urgency must not become an excuse for institutional neglect. To preserve its credibility, legitimacy, and cohesion, the EU must confront contradictions in its current approach. That means enforcing its own standards — consistently, transparently, and credibly.
To preserve its future, the EU must first reckon with its present. It must enforce its values — or risk redefining them by default.
