Péter Magyar poses an unprecedented threat to Viktor Orbán’s rule. Kinga Korányi argues that Magyar’s sudden success is the result of his agenda-setting capabilities as a former Fidesz affiliate who caught Orbán’s government by surprise. However, she warns that Magyar’s lasting success is still contingent on several factors
In the lead-up to the 2022 Hungarian elections, six opposition parties joined forces behind Péter Márki-Zay to end Fidesz’s twelve-year reign. This ‘United for Hungary’ coalition, consisting of centre-left, pro-European, and right-wing Eurosceptic parties like Jobbik was, however, anything but united. Coalition support for Márki-Zay proved fragile – and this quickly became apparent to the electorate.
United for Hungary suffered a brutal defeat, securing only 28.14% of parliamentary seats. The Fidesz-KDNP coalition, meanwhile, won 67.8% of seats, awarding Orbán another two-thirds majority term. After the elections, United for Hungary succumbed to in-fighting, and disintegrated. Hungarian opposition stood at an all-time low until, in spring 2024, a surprising challenger emerged.
In 2023, then-President Katalin Novák granted a pardon to the deputy director of a children’s home who had been jailed for concealing child sex abuse. When the scandal emerged in early 2024, it rocked Hungary. Novák and then-justice minister Judit Varga were forced to resign. Immediately afterwards, Varga's ex-husband Péter Magyar, until that point head of the state-owned non-profit for facilitating student loans, also announced his resignation.
Magyar was bitterly critical of the Fidesz government's handling of the scandal. In a Facebook post that went viral, he accused the government of mass corruption. Around a quarter of Hungary's population, 2.6m viewers, streamed Magyar's subsequent interview with major independent news channel Partizán. Magyar claimed he had proof of the government’s role in covering up high-level corruption, and expressed total disillusionment with Fidesz.
Magyar claimed he had proof the government covered up high-level corruption, and expressed total disillusionment with Fidesz
This opened up a new angle of opposition to Orbán. If a staunch member of Fidesz dared speak out against the regime, how many disgruntled Fidesz voters might? Initially, Magyar claimed to harbour no political ambitions. But one month later, he announced he was forming a new party, Tisza. Magyar's immediate ambition was to win seats in the imminent European Parliamentary election, for which he promptly began a country-wide campaign.
At the end of March, Magyar delivered on his promise to ‘drop nuclear bombs of evidence’ on Fidesz by releasing a voice recording of his ex-wife in her capacity as justice minister. In it, she revealed that Orbán’s right-hand man, ‘propaganda minister’ Antal Rogán, tampered with evidence in a high-profile corruption scandal involving senior Fidesz functionaries. This proof of the obstruction of justice and corruption resonated with the electorate.
By exposing a high-profile corruption scandal involving senior Fidesz functionaries, Tisza rose to become the most popular opposition party
Subsequently, Tisza rose to become the most popular opposition party. By April, surveys showed that 24% of voters would lend the party their support.
Until that point, Fidesz had cultivated a culture of reactionary politics for opposition parties to pursue. Suddenly, it found itself on the defence. Polls predicted Tisza would win four or five seats in the EP. In the event, it managed to gain a staggering seven. By July, the gap between the parties was closing: according to IDEA, Tisza trailed Fidesz by only 9%.
Weeks after Magyar burst onto the scene, Judit Varga gave an interview, which has since been viewed 1.2 million times, in which she detailed domestic abuse at Magyar's hands. Magyar’s supporters rushed to his defence. They argued that Varga, backed by Fidesz, was merely orchestrating a smear campaign against him. Despite Varga's accusations, Magyar’s popularity remained unshakeable.
However, Magyar failed to drop any further ‘evidence bombs’ on Fidesz. And although on 15 May Tisza published a 21-point manifesto, it failed to elaborate on its ambitious, yet vague, goals. Macroeconomic objectives, taxation, and foreign policy all remain unclear.
Now, Magyar finds himself embroiled in a newer scandal. Evelin Vogel, the ex-girlfriend he dated on-off after his separation from Varga, has doubled down on the allegation that Magyar is aggressive. In response, Magyar revealed that Vogel possessed more than ten hours' of voice recordings involving Magyar, with which she was blackmailing him for €70,000.
Multiple voice recordings have indeed leaked, presumably with the help of Fidesz. Since September, Magyar has had to dedicate a significant portion of his public speeches to self-defence. In one incriminating recording, Magyar calls his MEPs ‘brain dead’ and accuses one of being a ‘Soros agent’. In another, he threatens to push members of the press ‘into the Danube’.
Since September, Magyar has had to dedicate a significant portion of his public speeches to self-defence
Magyar alleges the recordings have been manipulated. Since Trump’s re-election, attacks on Magyar have amplified, and although his popularity is still increasing, Fidesz’s long-term goal is clearly to ‘gossip-columnise’ Magyar to deter undecided voters.
According to recent surveys, Magyar is now Hungary's most popular politician; 10% more popular than Orbán. But he has many challenges to address before the 2026 elections. Fidesz has just re-drawn some electoral districts, subtracting two from Budapest, and giving them to Pest County. According to past voting records, this puts opposition parties at a disadvantage.
Tisza needs to secure more votes than Fidesz just to obtain an equal number of seats. And rather than cooperating with existing opposition parties, it has instead decided to enlist its own parliamentary representatives in all 106 voting districts. This creates a de facto two-party system in which Tisza must compete with like-minded parties, too. Tisza will also have to attract undecided voters – a task no opposition party has thus far accomplished. In particular, it must win the support of older, rural women, a crucial voter base that Magyar has yet to attract.
Can Tisza grow into a real party with popular politicians country-wide? Will Magyar’s one-man show still be popular in eighteen months' time? Much depends upon these questions. But the stakes have never been higher. If Magyar chooses to play a solo game and stumbles, hopes for a viable opposition in Hungary could be thwarted for several subsequent election cycles.
