Gülşen Doğan argues that Türkiye’s long crisis reveals a new way of governing that stretches liberal rules without fully abandoning them. Cities like Istanbul can keep democratic options alive even as national politics turns in a more authoritarian direction
Many commentators describe today’s political turbulence simply as 'democratic backsliding'. In Türkiye, liberal democracy is indeed under threat. But something deeper is also at play. Over the past decade and a half, formal elections have continued, courts still sit, parliaments still meet. Yet the country's government is increasingly exercising its power through security bargains, emotional polarisation and by declaring repeated states of emergency. This is less a clean break with liberal democracy than a shift towards governing through perma-crisis.
The liberal order that shaped the late 20th century promised individual rights, rule-bound institutions and open markets. The system worked tolerably well in relatively stable times. During recent years, however, it has struggled with cascading shocks: the 2008 financial meltdown, the Covid-19 pandemic, climate disasters and renewed geopolitical rivalry.
In many countries, these crises empowered new business coalitions, and centralised executives. In Türkiye, construction-led growth, public–private mega-projects and export-oriented 'Anatolian tiger' firms thrived on cheap credit and state support. They anchored a governing bloc that fused conservative values with deep economic dependency. Instead of prompting reform, crises made the system more reliant on discretionary deals and loyal networks.
Türkiye's governing bloc fused conservative values with deep economic dependency, fuelling clientelism in the country
Something similar has happened at the international level. The European Union’s reliance on deals with Türkiye and other neighbours to control migration evidences its move from value-laden promises to transactional bargaining. Refugees who were once rights-bearing subjects have now become tools in negotiations. The EU has not formally abandoned norms, but it is enforcing them selectively.
Across regime types, a shared style of governing has emerged. It privileges flexibility over predictability, security over deliberation and executive discretion over institutional restraint.
One pillar is affective politics. Populist leaders claim to embody 'the real people' against corrupt or cosmopolitan elites. They do not necessarily abolish democracy; instead, they hollow it out, turning elections into plebiscites on loyalty. In Hungary, for example, elections take place and opposition parties exist, but media capture and online harassment make competition 'free but not fair'.
Another pillar is normalised emergency. Successive crises like terrorist attacks, pandemics, and currency crashes justify exceptional measures: curfews, decrees, fast-track laws. Each may look temporary. Taken together, they habituate citizens and institutions to rule-bending, while formal checks and balances remain on paper.
Türkiye offers a particularly revealing case because its authoritarian turn has been gradual rather than sudden. Under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), power has been centralised step by step: through constitutional change, control over the judiciary, and the neutralisation of veto players such as the European Union.
Moments of opposition strength have often intensified rather than halted this process. The 2013 Gezi Park protests, for example, were a mass revolt against crony urbanism and shrinking pluralism. The protests shook the government but did not change who ruled. Instead, they led to a securitised response, a harsher enemy discourse and institutional reforms designed to prevent similar mobilisations.
Türkiye's 2013 Gezi Park protests may have been a mass revolt, but they failed to change the people in charge of the country
Authoritarian learning continued after the 2016 coup attempt, when emergency rule and mass purges restructured the state. Since then, calibrated repression and selective tolerance have coexisted. Journalists, activists and mayors face constant pressure, yet elections still offer limited openings.
At the same time, policy continuity across government and opposition on issues such as migration diplomacy has reassured external partners. For the EU, Türkiye remains a difficult but indispensable counterpart for border control and regional security. This external reliance, in turn, strengthens a domestic strategy built on crisis narratives and discretionary power.
The story, however, is not only one of closing space. Cities – especially opposition-run cities – have become laboratories of democratic and diplomatic innovation under constrained conditions.
Istanbul is one such city. Home to millions of internal migrants, refugees and foreign residents, it faces everyday challenges in the realms of housing, transport and social cohesion. Yet municipal powers over migration and welfare remain limited, and central government frequently restricts funding and legal authority for opposition-controlled municipalities.
Despite this, since 2019 the city has expanded its international engagement, joined transnational city networks and developed new social programmes for vulnerable residents. Partnerships with European municipalities and international organisations have helped support services for refugees and low-income households, even when national rules do not formally recognise them as rights-holders. Civil society groups and youth movements have used urban spaces to press for climate action, gender equality and more inclusive planning.
In systems where central institutions are captured or weakened, cities can keep democratic practices alive
Such initiatives cannot by themselves reverse authoritarian drift. But they show how political authority is being recalibrated. In systems where central institutions are captured or weakened, cities can keep democratic practices, and alternative visions of security and solidarity, alive.
Türkiye’s experience suggests that the key divide today is not simply between democracy and authoritarianism, or between liberal and illiberal states. It is between modes of governing that entrench permanent crisis from above and those that seek to turn conflict into open, pluralistic contestation.
International organisations such as the EU cannot rebuild a credible rules-based order by relying primarily on security deals with central governments while neglecting social justice and local democracy. Domestic opposition forces, for their part, need more than promises of 'returning to normal'. They must articulate economic and social solutions that speak to those left behind by both neoliberal reforms and nationalist retrenchment.
Post-liberal governance is not a stable end point. It is an unsettled field of struggle. Whether it solidifies into entrenched authoritarianism, evolves into a managed but more pluralist order, or opens space for renewed democratic projects will depend on choices made now in Ankara and Brussels, but also in city halls, neighbourhoods and workplaces. Türkiye’s long crisis is a warning, but it is also a reminder that the future of democracy will be decided in how we govern through, and not just after, crisis.
