Donald Trump’s sabre-rattling over Greenland has alienated allies and weakened, not strengthened, the US’ position in the Arctic. If the US is serious about solidifying its Arctic position and rebuild bridges, it should draw some lessons from the EU’s experience, argues Aslak Veierud Busch
What many brushed off as a clumsy, offhand remark in 2019 has now turned serious. In January 2025 and over recent weeks, Donald Trump has doubled down on his designs to acquire Greenland. Orchestrated to appear on the agenda shortly after the US operation in Caracas, Trump warned economic and military means were on the table.
The motivation for acquiring the world’s largest island is dubious. The US already has military access to Greenland through a 1951 agreement with the Kingdom of Denmark. In 2004, this was updated to include Greenland’s signature. If Trump's priority were indeed to defend Greenland and the US’ Arctic approach, the US could simply upgrade its existing presence.
Greenland’s minerals are no easier to exploit under American sovereignty. Nuuk is not opposed to foreign investments in mining, but the inhospitable conditions make projects difficult to initiate, with challenges to extraction and exports of resources.
In calls to annex Greenland, Washington has treated Greenlanders as voiceless subjects
For Trump, acquiring Greenland is a step to dominate the Western Hemisphere and bolster US Arctic presence beyond Alaska. This drives a wedge into the US’ greatest strength: its web of allies. In this expansionist discourse, Washington has treated Greenlanders as more or less voiceless subjects.
The US has positioned itself unnecessarily belligerently in what – despite increased global attention – has been a remarkably cooperative region. It has also replicated mistakes the EU has made previously, failing to take Arctic sensitivities on board. While the EU never threatened to annex an ally, its story as an Arctic actor includes two infamous faux-pas.
The first blunder was a poorly timed European Parliament resolution in 2008. This called for an 'Arctic Treaty' despite warnings from Arctic states and the Commission that it was founded on a misunderstanding of Arctic geopolitics. The resolution built on an idea of a conflictual Arctic rather than a site of delicate trust-building in institutions and scientific cooperation that had contributed to (post-)Cold-War reconciliation.
The second blunder, too, stemmed from difficulty with understanding Arctic sensitivities. Introducing a ban on products derived from seals, the EU hurt – economically and reputationally – small Inuit communities. Inuit organisations, supported by Canada, Greenland, Nunavut and Norway, reacted critically. In response, Canada barred the EU’s application for Arctic Council observer status until a 2014 WTO decision resolved the seal ban issue.
Though a Russian veto blocks the EU from observer status at the Arctic Council, the EU has overcome initial difficulties to become an Arctic actor
Despite these blunders, the EU has become an Arctic actor. Only a Russian veto, spilling over from the wider geopolitical context, now blocks the EU from observer status at the Arctic Council. Its continued presence as a 'permanent guest' at the Council and its participation in the 2018 Central Arctic Oceans fisheries agreement show that the EU is a part of the Arctic scene.
If Trump’s Davos admission that he would not use force to acquire Greenland is a signal that the US wants to cooperate in the Arctic, the EU’s redemption arc can serve as a playbook for rebuilding trust in a threadbare transatlantic partnership.
Geographically, the EU is an awkward fit. Sweden and Finland are EU-Arctic states without an Arctic coastline. Norway and Iceland have Arctic coastlines, but are non-members. Greenland, after joining alongside Denmark, left the EU in 1985. So how did the EU, in spite of political blunders and a lacking geographic foothold, find its Arctic role?
My research finds that the EU has established its Arctic role by stressing its practical capabilities. The EU cannot project military force in the Arctic, nor has it threatened to annex Arctic territory. Instead, it has demonstrated its presence by articulating its concrete contributions to resolving tangible Arctic problems.
The EU points to research funding to fill Arctic knowledge gaps. It highlights satellite services like Galileo, EGNOS and Copernicus as ways to support connectivity and monitoring. To overcome demographic and civil preparedness challenges, the EU has highlighted support for transport corridors and green post-Covid recovery funds.
If the US wants to return to Arctic cooperation, it should put an American spin on the EU's contributions-first strategy
When taking a more oppositional stance, the EU relies on its market footprint. The 2021 Arctic Policy’s clause on not buying Arctic oil and gas, and the stance against Norway’s consideration of deep-sea mining around Jan Mayen, show that constructive contributions can coexist with political disagreements.
Even more importantly, the EU has attempted to learn. While work remains, the EU attempts to listen to indigenous voices in its annual EU Arctic Forum and Indigenous People’s Dialogue. The most recent EU Arctic policy from 2021 – due an update in 2026 – contains few references to legislative issues and solutions: a far cry from early calls for an Arctic Treaty.
The US can put an American spin on the EU’s contributions-first approach. First, NATO states lag dramatically in icebreaker numbers, which the US has the muscle to address. Second, Greenland’s minerals remain accessible through established licensing procedures, open also to US companies. Third, funding American universities, with world-leading expertise on snow and ice, can strengthen the US’ competitive edge as a powerhouse of Arctic expertise. The list could go on; like the EU, the US can be creative in identifying capabilities.
By stressing its need for Greenland in order to act, the US paints itself as a weak actor
The alleged need for seizing Greenland for security paints the US, incorrectly, as a weak Arctic actor. It suggests the US lacks something to be able to act. The US is an undeniable Arctic actor through Alaska, and has significant manoeuvrability on Greenland. Wresting territory from an ally would drastically diminish the US’ role in the Arctic.
Annexing an island with 56,500 inhabitants over an area equal to Saudi Arabia is not a show of strength. Showcasing what the US can contribute to resolving Arctic issues is. To rebuild relations and to strengthen the US’ role in the Arctic, Trump could take a leaf out of the EU’s book, leading with what it can already do, rather than what it lacks.
