Next year’s UN study on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones offers non-nuclear states a rare chance to reshape the global disarmament agenda. Jorge Alberto López Lechuga says they must use this moment to strengthen, connect, and expand NWFZs — turning regional commitments into a coherent global force against nuclear proliferation
As nuclear threats persist in global politics, an often-overlooked, powerful instrument for disarmament deserves renewed attention: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs).
One hundred and fifteen countries have chosen to keep their territories permanently free of nuclear weapons through legally binding agreements. In so doing, they have institutionalised regional norms that prohibit the possession, testing, and use of nuclear arms.
Each NWFZ reflects its own geopolitical and historical context — the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the Caribbean, Pelindaba in Africa, Bangkok in Southeast Asia, Rarotonga in the South Pacific, and the Central Asian NWFZ. All, however, converge on the same logic: collective restraint reinforced by verification. Together, these agreements have kept vast regions free from nuclear weapons. Their direct influence on nuclear-armed powers remains limited, yet they exert steady normative pressure that constrains legitimising narratives around deterrence.
Yet their collective potential remains underexploited. The challenge today is not only to establish new zones but to connect existing ones. The existing patchwork of regional initiatives must be transformed into an interlinked framework capable of amplifying their normative and political weight within the global disarmament regime.
The world has changed profoundly since the first zone was established in 1967. Rivalries among nuclear-armed states have intensified; arms control frameworks have eroded, and confidence has faded. Strengthening and expanding NWFZs thus offers a pragmatic pathway to restore trust, by demonstrating that legally binding commitments to non-possession remain possible even when global consensus falters.
Strengthening Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones demonstrates that legally binding commitments to non-possession remain possible, even when global consensus falters
Parties to NWFZ treaties can act as norm entrepreneurs within the disarmament regime. They can revive stalled negotiations, share regional verification practices, and broaden participation in a domain long dominated by nuclear states. There is no universal model for a NWFZ. Accumulated experience across regions, however, provides a valuable repository of lessons on verification, compliance, and regional diplomacy.
In 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 79/241, mandating a new study on NWFZs. A group of up to 25 experts will meet in 2025–2026 to assess existing zones, explore new ones — including in the Middle East — and suggest ways to strengthen them. This UN process offers a timely window to consolidate and interlink NWFZs.
For any NWFZ to endure, verification and control mechanisms are indispensable. They convert pledges into credible commitments and make compliance observable to all parties.
Existing treaties embed IAEA-backed verification provisions, complemented by regional bodies such as OPANAL and AFCONE that monitor compliance and build trust.
Yet a structural imbalance persists. NWFZ members undertake far-reaching prohibitions on nuclear weapons while also fulfilling their NPT obligations. Nuclear-weapon states, by contrast, participate only through additional protocols — and often attach reservations to their negative security assurances. This limits, or qualifies, the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NWFZ members.
The forthcoming UN study's guiding principle must be mutual responsibility: unconditional respect from nuclear states must match the rigorous obligations of the non-nuclear
Such asymmetry undermines both credibility and reciprocity. The forthcoming UN study should avoid imposing new control obligations on NWFZ states while leaving the reservations of nuclear powers unchallenged. The principle must be mutual responsibility: unconditional respect from nuclear states must match the rigorous obligations of the non-nuclear. OPANAL members have already advanced proposals in this direction; extending coordination to other zones could reinforce their leverage within global disarmament diplomacy.
Efforts to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East have long been obstructed by entrenched rivalries and divergent security perceptions. Yet existing zones offer instructive precedents. The Treaty of Tlatelolco illustrates how flexible, region-led negotiations — rather than externally imposed blueprints — can generate the legitimacy and ownership necessary for durable commitments.
The UN study should therefore promote gradual, region-driven dialogue as the foundation for new zones, allowing actors to tailor obligations to their contexts. It should also highlight innovative models such as Mongolia’s single-state NWFZ, which shows that even unilateral declarations, when internationally recognised, can strengthen the global norm against nuclear possession.
The expert group must distil and disseminate these lessons into adaptable global guidelines. By so doing, they could enable future zones to emerge organically while maintaining consistency with established legal and verification standards.
NWFZs have demonstrated that disarmament can yield durable security outcomes. They have fostered trust in once-hostile regions, curbed the spread of nuclear weapons, and provided legally binding guarantees that reinforce non-proliferation norms.
NWFZs have fostered trust in once-hostile regions, curbed the spread of nuclear weapons, and reinforced non-proliferation norms.
Yet their collective influence remains underutilised. Stronger coordination among existing zones could transform dispersed regional achievements into a coherent multilateral constituency for disarmament. Acting together, the 115 NWFZ states constitute not only a legal community but a political coalition capable of shaping global agendas and norm-setting processes. Linking these efforts more explicitly to complementary regimes — such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons — would further integrate NWFZs into the wider arms control architecture.
The UN study should explore mechanisms to institutionalise inter-zonal cooperation — through shared verification dialogues, cross-regional assistance, and joint statements in multilateral fora. Reviving NWFZ conferences of states parties and signatories — with rotating chairs and participation of nuclear-weapon states — would sustain dialogue, enhance continuity, and amplify their collective voice.
Nearly 50 years after the UN’s last comprehensive study on NWFZs, the world stands at a strategic crossroads. Nuclear rhetoric has intensified, modernisation programmes accelerate as the architecture of arms control erodes.
Yet this moment creates space for renewed leadership — particularly from states and regions that have long championed disarmament. By reinforcing and interconnecting NWFZs, they can demonstrate that progress is achievable through incremental, legally grounded cooperation, even when great-power negotiations stall.
The forthcoming UN study offers a rare opportunity to turn that principle into policy. It could reconnect fragmented regional efforts, rebuild confidence in multilateral disarmament, and affirm that nuclear-weapon-free security is viable and growing.
The proliferation of NWFZs remains the most credible path to reversing the logic of nuclear proliferation.
