Populist radical-right parties are forging cross-border ties. Yunus Poblome's research into Conservative Political Action Conferences in Hungary reveals how inter-and transnational populists have established international alliances
On 12 April 2026, the 16-year reign of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán ended with electoral victory for Péter Magyar. Orbán’s exit constitutes a blow to the populist radical right (PRR). It doesn't, however, mean his political movement will fade into obscurity.
Indeed, until Magyar’s victory, the cooperation of actors from the European radical right and the American MAGA movement was becoming increasingly clear. Its most obvious manifestation was a couple of weeks before the Hungarian election, on 21 March 2026. On that date, 3,000 international allies of the Hungarian right convened for the Conservative Political Action Conferences (CPAC) in Budapest. Along with Orbán himself, high-profile speakers included Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of Brazil's former president Jair, Alice Weidel of Germany's Alternative für Deutschland, and Argentinian President Javier Milei.
Inter- and transnational populist discourse dominated this year's CPAC in Budapest. PRR actors used exceptionally broad conceptions of ‘the people’ to justify cooperation
However, what is most interesting about the conference is not its failure to sell Orbán to Hungary's electorate. Rather, it is the prevalence of the inter- and transnational populist discourse running through it. During CPAC, the international PRR network used exceptionally broad conceptions of ‘the people’ to justify cooperation.
The convention’s war-cry slogans read: ‘On to victory!’ and ‘Brussels and Kyiv may stand on the sideof [sic] the Tisza Party, but Europe and the world stand with Viktor Orbán’. The CPAC movement originated in America, but annual conventions occur in countries as far afield as Brazil, Japan, and Mexico. CPAC Hungary has become one of its most prominent stages. Orbán in particular has sought the attention it brings in his efforts toward transnational legitimation and re-election.
CPAC Hungary's international character has made it a data goldmine for studying inter- and transnational populism, which define 'the people' in terms beyond the nation state. International populism occurs when a populist claiming to represent ‘the people’ of his own nation-state articulates the grievances of a ‘people’ from another nation-state. Transnational populism goes even further, formulating an identity above the level of the nation, with a shared vocabulary. Both these forms of populism run throughout CPAC events.
This shared vocabulary constructs a transnational identity which these actors use to justify cooperation between separate national PRR movements. PRR actors use a variety of signifiers for this transnational articulation of ‘the people’. CPAC speakers refer to ‘Western’, ‘European’ or even ‘Judeo-Christian’ people, always in antagonistic relation to some idea of an ‘elite’.
This is not entirely new. Geert Wilders and Steve Bannon in particular have used such expressions for nearly a decade. But consolidation of the international PRR network means that transnational populism is now far from a fringe concept.
This consolidation is not, however, a sign that the PRR is constructing some massive transnational political movement. Rather, it shows how transnational populist identities foster international alliances between PRR actors. As the website for last year's event reads:
CPAC Hungary 2025 was not just another event — it was a new beginning, further strengthening the global coalition of anti-globalist forces
The website emphasises the heterogeneous concept of a coalition, and repeatedly expresses a desire for ‘sovereignty’. Clearly, its goal is not a transnational political movement, but the embedding of separate national(ist) movements into a broader imaginary of struggle.
Transnational populism uses one homogeneous articulation of ‘the people’ above any single nation. International populism, by contrast, sticks to the familiar boundaries of 'the nation'. It articulates how the peoples (plural) of separate nations are united in their shared struggle against a common enemy. International populists point out these peoples' ‘unity in diversity’, and emphasise how each nation knows what's best for their individual peoples. In so doing, the PRR manages to pursue sovereigntist agendas using transnational identities.
Orbán has been ousted, along with much funding for his favoured think tanks and other ideologically aligned organisations. But this doesn't mean the broader PRR coalition faces the same fate. Magyar's victory could merely be a temporary setback that allows the PRR time for reflection and strategising. Indeed, one reason the PRR network has achieved such a global reach is because the MAGA movement spent the Biden years preparing the current wrathful comeback.
Péter Magyar's victory in Hungary could merely be a temporary setback that allows the PRR time for reflection and strategising, just as MAGA did during the Biden years
Since Trump’s return, this buddy-network has functioned through opportunistic bilateralism. In the coming years, if elections go the PRR's way, we may face ever-more daring forms of such cooperation. Alternatively, we may yet see more pressure on the national cordon sanitaire agreements currently keeping the PRR out of power.
If that happens, the PRR’s flexibility in defining ‘the people’ across borders, and even continents, will be crucial to justifying these actions.
