The theory of cultural backlash argues that opposition to progressive politics has given us the populist radical right. Christian Kloetzer writes that we may have turn this logic on its head. The electorates of this party family are not consistently socially conservative. But as the German state elections in Sachsen-Anhalt show, the radical right's countercultural assault increasingly channels a comprehensive rejection of all facets of cultural liberalism
It is more than conventional wisdom that today's populist radical right feeds off cultural discontent. Research consistently links grievances with cultural change to voting for this party family. The cultural backlash theory provides a theoretical account of how the radical right became a powerful political force on the back of resistance against liberal values, such as the emancipation of women and the tolerance of homosexuality. Some people, threatened by rapid cultural change, want to turn back the clock.
But my recent research in Electoral Studies questions this theory. On issues like access to abortion or same-sex marriage, radical-right electorates in Western Europe and Scandinavia lean fairly progressive. Data going back to the turn of the century show that here, attitudes towards such issues hold little explanatory power for radical-right support. Radical-right voters do not seem driven by fury against all aspects of past cultural change.
On issues like access to abortion or same-sex marriage, radical-right electorates in Western Europe and Scandinavia lean fairly progressive
These findings challenge the cultural backlash theory as an explanation for the rise of radical-right parties in many European countries. But what about its future trajectory? Recent state elections in Sachsen-Anhalt may offer a clue. At the national level, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has the characteristic profile of a party engaging in selective tolerance. It accuses established parties of throwing homosexuals under the bus by allowing migration from Muslim countries into Germany. The party's co-leader, Alice Weidel, who is herself lesbian and raising two children with her partner, has driven home the message. And in survey data from the European Social Survey, conservative attitudes towards homosexuality show very weak links to support for the party. This holds in both East and West Germany.
But you couldn't tell this by looking at the AfD's state association in Sachsen-Anhalt. Their party manifesto channels a radical and comprehensive cultural critique. The party blames abortions on too much public acceptance of 'sexual deviations and non-reproductive lifestyles', and refers to families as consisting of 'a father, a mother and as many children as possible'.
Germany's far-right AfD party claims there is an 'identity disorder' in the wider population, driven by mainstream parties which propagate a 'messed-up and unattractive' German identity
AfD blames a long list of social ills on a diffuse 'rainbow ideology'. Such ideology, it claims, causes an 'identity disorder' in the wider population that only a new type of 'patriotic cultural politics' can heal. To blame are Germany's established parties which, insist AfD, propagate a 'messed-up and unattractive' German identity. This does not sound like a party that seeks to protect the hard-fought rights of women and sexual minorities from foreign threats. The enemy, for AfD, is Germany's societal mainstream.
And yet, the party scored a record 43.8% in state elections held in early September 2026. It had already been leading in state polls since 2025. Manifestly, the party's radicalism has not deterred voters.
There are two stories in this development; one about the party and one about its voters. For the state party, a lesson from the election is that it can launch a full broadside on liberal German culture and still win elections. Having grown out of its underdog rule and being firmly implanted locally, AfD can openly campaign on its conservative countercultural ideology. And it feels emboldened to challenge its own party's messaging of selective tolerance at the national level.
For voters, none of this is a dealbreaker. Some voters may not share this radical outlook, but they did not punish the party for its ongoing radicalisation. This aligns with existing research on voters strongly opposed to immigration. They may express liberal attitudes on socio-cultural matters, but attach low importance to them. The party's hard line on immigration, including calls for mass deportations, overrides all other concerns.
AfD voters may express liberal attitudes on socio-cultural matters, but it is immigration, including calls for mass deportations, that overrides all other concerns
Can we expect AfD to push back at the national level? After all, the state party's manifesto implicitly also attacks Alice Weidel's relationship. We probably shouldn't hold our breath. At the recent party convention of Italy's far-right Futuro Nazionale (FN), AfD MEP Marc Jongen was among the attendees. Jongen conveyed a personal message from Weidel in support of FN leader Roberto Vannacci's intention to become Prime Minister of Italy.
Vannacci, founder of Italy's newest radical-right party, became politically active only in 2023. In The World Upside Down, the book with which he launched his venture into politics, Vannacci declares homosexuality 'abnormal'. This does not keep Weidel from endorsing him. She knows this is the direction in which the wind is blowing.
So where does this leave us? Maybe the cultural backlash theory gets the story backwards, at least in parts of Europe. There, issues like female emancipation and same-sex marriage did not trigger a groundswell against cultural liberalism.
And the profile of today's radical-right voters is not marked by traditionalist attitudes in this domain. But the tale of terminal cultural decline that radical-right parties tell is not so compatible with nuance and moderation. The AfD has already undergone cycles of radicalisation, and it shows no signs of stopping. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia have instead charted a less aggressively traditionalist course. But the party now finds itself with a challenger on its right flank that campaigns hard on traditional norms and values.
The trend may even be facilitated by mainstream parties adopting harder stances on immigration. It creates an incentive to move into other issue domains, where mainstream parties have not repositioned themselves. Traditional values and a comprehensive critique of cultural liberalism may be an obvious choice. After all, the radical right has a natural affinity for traditional moral norms. Social conservatism may then not be the origin of today's radical right – but it looks increasingly like this is its destination.
