The Three Communiqués, born from President Nixon's 1972 historic visit to China, continue to shape Sino-American relations and influence Taiwan's status. Aagya Gupta explains how diplomatic powerplays and agreements have sustained their relevance and shaped modern geopolitics
Since the late 19th century, negotiating with China has been a formidable challenge for the United States, particularly regarding Taiwan. Today, the People's Republic of China (PRC) in mainland China and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan compete for international recognition as the legitimate government of China. This delicate balance was first established through a decade of rapprochement, including ping-pong diplomacy in 1971, former US President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972, and the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. The Three Communiqués and the landmark US assurances to Taiwan serve as the cornerstone for current Sino-US ties and outline areas for beneficial cooperation.
Today, the People's Republic of China in mainland China and the Republic of China in Taiwan compete for international recognition as the legitimate government of China
Nixon's visit to Beijing had numerous motivations, but the most sensitive issue was Taiwan. PRC diplomat Qiao Guanhua and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger came to a tactical resolution. This resolution paved the way for Nixon and Premier of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, to sign the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972. This document marked the United States' formal embrace of the One-China policy. All Chinese citizens in Taiwan and mainland China were acknowledged as one entity. Although the US tried to play with the terminologies indicating its ambiguous stance on Taiwan's future, Beijing maintained its position that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China.
America's 1972 stance introduced strategic ambiguity into its China policy, a tactic that persists in the 21st century. The American pro-communist leanings at the time temporarily unsettled Taiwan, raising fears among Taipei's democrats about their sovereign control. In 1979, then US President Jimmy Carter reaffirmed the Shanghai Communiqué, derecognised Taipei's status, and normalised diplomatic ties with China. This move allowed the US to protect Taiwan's interests informally, despite ending formal ties.
In the same year, the US smartly signed the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Ties with the PRC. It also introduced the Taiwan Relations Act in Congress. This act underscored America's commitment to providing defence arms and services to Taiwan. Taiwan was enabled to maintain self-defence capabilities and resist coercion that could jeopardise its security or social and economic systems. The act also advanced informal ties beyond security domains.
Despite the normalisation deal, PRC authorities were displeased that an arms sales cut-off was not included. They continued to pressure the US regarding the Taiwan problem. This led to the third joint communiqué in 1982 under former US President Ronald Reagan's administration. The communiqué stated that the US did not intend to sell arms to Taipei on a long-term basis and planned to gradually reduce sales.
The third joint communiqué stated that the US did not intend to sell arms to Taipei on a long-term basis and planned to gradually reduce sales
For Beijing, these elements exemplified the US military backing for Taiwan. The meticulously negotiated compromise was undone by unilateral US actions when the Reagan administration strengthened its ties with Taiwan in 1981–82. In 1982, President Reagan assured Taiwan through his Six Assurances that the US would not confer with Beijing on military shipments or set an end-date for halting them. This move enhanced Taiwan's confidence but also reinforced the PRC's belief that the US was bargaining in bad faith.
The ideals of the Three Communiqués, especially the Shanghai Communiqué, continue to serve as the cornerstone of Sino-American relations. Later administrations have upheld these values, recognising the significant role these agreements play in shaping foreign policy towards Taiwan.
The ideals of the Three Communiqués continue to serve as the cornerstone of Sino-American relations
The Donald Trump administration disturbed both Taipei and Beijing by referring to the One-China policy as a 'bargaining chip'. This damaged Taiwan's confidence in US support but ultimately, Trump reaffirmed the One-China policy, understanding Beijing's severe reaction to any challenges.
Holding on to the success of American foreign policy at the signing of the communiqués, the US has continued to assist Taipei with arms sales, sharing military technology and modernising the weaponry. Both the Trump and Joe Biden administrations have continued to support Taiwan in different key areas. Under Trump, the US shared military technology worth $1.42 billion with Taiwan. The Biden administration has focused on maintenance sales, with both administrations servicing sales close in value.
The Sino-American relationship, built on these communiqués, continues to shape US foreign policy towards Taiwanese citizens’ preference for maintaining the status quo with China. The ambiguous language in these agreements still influences American administrations, making the Shanghai Communiqué and its successors timeless references in maintaining strategic balance, even in contemporary times.
Despite the strong relevance of the agreements, the Sino-American relationship advances towards a military, diplomatic, economic, and geopolitically contested ballgame. The often-disputable relationship between the two continues to face several contemporary challenges, significantly shaped by the historical frameworks established through the three communiqués. One of the most pressing issues is the evolving status of Taiwan. The strategic ambiguity continues to empower recent US administrations to facilitate arms sales and military support to Taiwan, escalating tensions with Beijing. The Biden administration, like its predecessors, has continued to bolster Taiwan’s defence capabilities. Beijing has perceived this move as a direct challenge to its sovereignty.
Strategic ambiguity continues to empower recent US administrations to facilitate arms sales and military support to Taiwan, escalating tensions with Beijing. The Biden administration has continued to bolster Taiwan’s defence capabilities, a move perceived by Beijing as a direct challenge to its sovereignty
Conversely, China’s unofficial claims in the South China Seas and its ever-expanding territorial ambitions in the East and Southeast Asia has caused great concern for recent US administrations. The US allies with like-minded nations. Japan, Australia, and India strongly condemn China’s aggressive military exercises, extra-territorial claims, assertive intrusions into economic zones and other security-threatening activities that challenge Beijing regionally.
Economically speaking, trade imbalances and financial competition further strains Sino-American relations. The US has imposed tariffs and sanctions on Chinese goods and technology firms, citing unfair trade practices and national security concerns. In response, China has adopted retaliatory measures and launched global initiatives like Belt and Road, affecting global supply chains and economic stability.
Severe human rights violations in China, particularly in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, have led to diplomatic frictions and UN-led sanctions against Chinese officials for alleged abuses. Lastly, the rivalry extends into the realm of technological supremacy. Both nations are vying for dominance in AI, 5G, and other emerging technologies. This competition is not just economic but also carries significant geopolitical implications, influencing global alliances and security strategies.
