Saudi Arabia faces an existential threat from a potentially proliferating Iran and an unpredictable ally in the Trump administration. Zoha Naser and Sarah Tzinieris explore how the country is carefully weighing up its strategic partnerships as it pursues a civil nuclear programme
In a recent visit to Saudi Arabia, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright seemed optimistic about a 'pathway' towards a comprehensive nuclear deal between the two nations. The proposed memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Washington and Riyadh would encompass a range of nuclear energy aspects, including infrastructure, mining, and technological developments.
Wright went as far as to assert there will 'definitely' be a 123 agreement – referring to section 123 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, which sets out criteria for nuclear cooperation between the US and a partner state. A bilateral deal between Riyadh and Washington would be a landmark move, securing a mutually beneficial partnership on energy development between the two allies.
Just two weeks later, on 22 April, Chinese and Saudi nuclear regulatory officials signed a memorandum on cooperation over nuclear safety and security. It happened at the first China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology, held in Chengdu. Just like Saudi’s American MoU, the two countries would cooperate over technical expertise, personnel, and joint training programmes. It is the latest cooperation agreement between the two countries as China pursues its policy of outreach to the Kingdom.
Riyadh is at a crossroads, weighing its options between a historic ally in the US or an emerging partner in China
Riyadh is clearly at a crossroads, weighing its options between a historic but unpredictable ally in the US or an agreeable, emerging partner in China. For a nation that has been open about its weapons-grade nuclear prospects, the path towards a civil nuclear programme is beset with obstacles.
Civil nuclear energy has interested Saudi Arabia for decades. With a growing youth population and significant energy and desalination demands, adding nuclear to the mix offers a promising opportunity for energy diversification, enabling the Kingdom to transition away from an overreliance on oil.
Saudi’s nuclear authority was founded in 1977. By 1988, the Saudi Atomic Energy Institute was established, with the mission to promote industrial applications of nuclear technology. The GCC issued a joint declaration on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in 1996, announcing several regional research programmes. Riyadh subsequently signed a number of memorandums on nuclear energy development with several countries, and even surveyed its indigenous uranium deposits in the hope of uncovering a domestic fuel supply.
Developing Saudi’s nuclear energy programme is an attractive investment prospect. Concerns remain, however, about Riyadh’s reluctance to denounce the possibility that it might use this programme to build a nuclear weapons system. Indeed, the Kingdom was considering this prospect as early as 2003. As the Kingdom's nemesis Iran edged closer to the bomb, Saudi's primary motive was security. High-ranking Saudi officials have repeatedly made it clear that the Kingdom would pursue the bomb should Iran ever successfully develop one.
Saudi officials have made it clear that the Kingdom would pursue the nuclear bomb should Iran ever successfully develop one
This condition has undermined subsequent US-Saudi discussions on nuclear energy, primarily because the Kingdom’s firm rebuff of the 123 'gold standard' and rejection of US non-proliferation standards means a traditional deal, like the one signed with the UAE, would be unlikely to secure Congressional support in the US.
Riyadh remains steadfast in its insistence on maintaining enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman stated in 2023 that the country would pursue 'the entire nuclear fuel cycle', which would include the production of low-enriched uranium and nuclear fuel for domestic use and export.
Eyeing these setbacks, China has swept in to provide a solution to the deadlock. China has made no demands about a Saudi indigenous fuel cycle, and has even assisted in surveys of the Kingdom's uranium deposits. In continuing to engage on the topic, Beijing is looking to capitalise on where Washington is faltering in its negotiations with Riyadh. Outside the field of nuclear technology, China has also swooped in as a mediator between Saudi and Iran, re-establishing diplomatic relations between the adversaries in March 2023.
The recent memorandum signed between the two nations inevitably prompts a broader strategic question: is Riyadh drifting away from its historical alliance with Washington?
Beijing is looking to capitalise on where Washington is faltering in its negotiations with Riyadh, also swooping in as a mediator between Saudi and Iran
Bilateral relations between the US and Saudi remain friendly. There is a $100 billion arms package in the works as President Trump gears up for his visit to the Kingdom on 13 May – Trump's first official foreign visit of his second term. Riyadh also continues to mediate between Washington and Moscow on the war in Ukraine, and may facilitate a meeting between Trump and Putin.
Trump himself maintains a close personal relationship with Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman and The Trump Organization reached investment deals in the Kingdom as recently as December 2024. Riyadh’s recent rejection of an offer on Chinese stealth fightercraft J-35A in favour of Western options offers further proof that the Kingdom will still turn to its old allies on matters of security and defence.
Nevertheless, China remains an active partner on technology and energy investment. China invests more in energy infrastructure in Saudi than any other sector, dedicating roughly US$11.6 billion between 2005 and 2024. Although the US may dominate in traditional sectors, we cannot ignore strengthening of bilateral relations between the Kingdom and China here.
Saudi Arabia shares the same inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear as every other nation. The risk of proliferation, however, is one that must be calculated in determining the country’s shift to nuclear. Given that the Kingdom remains intent on enrichment, the US should not take its historic alliance for granted. Any future negotiations must account for the danger in underestimating the alternative sources Riyadh will seek if Washington stands firm.
☢️ No.5 in a series on the Nuclear Politics Paradox
