In January 2026, many believed Venezuela to be on the brink of democratic transition. Recent political developments, however, have tempered any such optimism. So, have transformative efforts come to an end, or have they ever truly begun? Tim Pires Alves outlines a possible long-term trajectory for Venezuela toward a dysfunctional democracy shaped by economic dependence and opportunism.
On 3 January 2026, deposed Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro was in a US government plane headed for New York. He had not yet reached US soil before the world had already begun debating the prospects of regime change in his country. The international community widely condemned US intervention in Venezuela as a violation of international law. Public opinion tended to agree. Critics argue that for the US, foreign military engagement is never about bringing democracy but about access to oil. And indeed, during President Trump’s 20-minute speech shortly after the Caracas mission, he did not mention the word 'democracy' once.
While the world's attention shifts from democratisation in Venezuela to the conflict in Iran, the Maduro regime persists – just without Maduro
Democratisation in Venezuela has largely faded from Western political debate. This is partly the result of the world's attention shifting to Iran, where US-Israeli attacks threaten to overthrow the mullah regime. Yet there's another reason for the current silence on Venezuela: more than two months after Operation Absolute Resolve, the Maduro regime persists – just without Maduro. How should we interpret the apparent standstill in Venezuelan democratisation? It is time for a preliminary long-term assessment.
The US military and intelligence services have long been active in Latin America, particularly since the Cold War. US entanglement in the 1973 military coup against the socialist government in Chile led by Salvador Allende is perhaps the best-known example. And while that led to almost 20 years of dictatorship by Augusto Pinochet, later US engagement, such as Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, explicitly targeted democracy promotion. In many cases, US efforts were successful. Despite criticism of global powers meddling in foreign affairs, the US played a key role in Panama’s 'overnight democratisation'. New president Guillermo Endara was sworn in on a US military base as bombs were still falling on Panama City.
Interestingly, the Venezuelan and Panamanian cases are quite similar: Panama's ruler Manuel Noriega, like Maduro, was arrested and later imprisoned in the US. In fact, the Venezuelan case suggests an even higher 'transitional speed': the mission leading to Maduro’s capture lasted only a few hours, whereas Noriega hid for ten days in Panama City's Apostolic Nunciature before surrendering. As for genuine regime change, however, the two cases could not be more different.
In his 3 January statement, President Trump noted repeatedly that Caracas was targeted 'in the dark'. This, of course, raised the metaphorical question of when the light will return. While Venezuelan opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado stands ready to assume the presidency, Maduro’s longtime ally Delcy Rodríguez currently holds power in Caracas. That her 'interim government' may be anything but interim became clear when Trump declared at the Shield of the Americas Summit on 7 March that Rodríguez is 'doing a great job working with us. […] And I’m pleased to say that this week we have formally recognized the Venezuelan government.'
Rodríguez's hold on power may appear disappointing. But it could become part of a more complex transformative picture. While Rodríguez was second-in-command in Maduro’s authoritarian regime, her continued leadership may not represent the final nail in the coffin of Venezuelan democracy.
Democratisation research identifies three core scenarios of democratic transition: reform (or transformation), rupture (or replacement), and foreign intervention. We already know that the latter – unlike in Panama – did not immediately trigger fundamental changes in Venezuela’s political system. However, the US intervention could lead to domestic reforms and liberalisation. This would mirror the transition mode of 'democracy through opportunism'. The Trump administration appears satisfied as long as US companies have access to Venezuelan crude oil. And Rodríguez provides that access, consistent with selectorate theory, which holds that political leaders must reward those who keep them in power. Indeed, although Venezuela remains unstable, its petroleum cooperation with the US is expanding, attracting domestic investment.
If segments of the Venezuelan elite see liberalisation as a necessary evil, any resulting democracy is likely to remain fragile and dysfunctional
The White House has pledged to support the Venezuelan transition. But the question is whether it understands the transition not merely as an economic process but as a political one. If segments of the Venezuelan elite see liberalisation as a necessary evil, any resulting democracy is likely to remain fragile and dysfunctional. Still, even a flawed democracy could emerge as a by-product of US foreign energy policy. And that may be preferable to no democracy at all.
Overall, Venezuela’s political trajectory has been deeply troubled. One of Latin America’s flagship electoral democracies since the 1960s, following the Bolivarian Revolution it became a notable example of state failure and autocracy in the Global South. The US intervention came as something of a New Year surprise. We will therefore have to wait until 2027 for reliable quantitative data on whether regime quality in Venezuela improved in 2026. In light of the new economic leverage, Venezuelan autocracy is likely to at least soften (political prisoners have already been released) to meet US expectations on human rights, legitimacy, and government performance.
Given Venezuela is dependent on a single industry – crude oil – a hybrid regime reminiscent of an oligarchy or domain democracy may emerge
Even with moderate increases in democratic quality, political developments in Venezuela may further slow the Latin American wave of autocratisation. However, given the country is dependent on a single industry, a hybrid regime reminiscent of an oligarchy or domain democracy may emerge.
Geopolitically, Latin America remains dynamic. This risks creating destabilisation while also offering prospects for democratic recovery. The direction of US strategy, however, seems already set. As President Trump put it at the Shield Summit: 'great change […] will soon be coming to Cuba. […] They have a bad regime […], but Cuba is in its last moments of life as it was.'
