Brought together by a shared ideology, converging around global events, and united in their support for radical-right leaders, populist audiences on social media are becoming increasingly global. Francesco Vittonetto discusses why we can now start talking about transnational populist publics
Open the YouTube comment sections of populist radical-right (PRR) parties and you'll see more than just users debating national politics. Increasingly, commenters endorse foreign leaders as allies in a shared struggle. Under a 2018 video by the Spanish party Vox about immigration, one user wrote: 'We need a Spanish Trump'. On a 2022 US Republican Party video, another praised the unity of 'Bolsonaro, Trump, Netanyahu, and Meloni'. And when Vox celebrated Brothers of Italy’s election victory that same year, users chimed in: 'Milei, Trump, Bukele, Meloni: the world needs you'.
These examples indicate that everyday YouTube users who are sympathetic to the PRR are looking beyond their national borders. In other words, it may not only be PRR leaders and parties sending signals of mutual support across borders and increasingly singing from the same hymn sheet. Their audiences on social media may be doing so too.
In my new article for the Australian Journal of Political Science, I address this question by testing whether PRR parties’ digital publics – the individuals who engage with them on social media – are indeed producing similar discourses. To do so, I analysed 2.7 million YouTube comments posted between 2018 and 2024 on the official channels of three PRR parties: Brothers of Italy, the US Republicans, and Vox.
I found that PRR publics are connected on three levels. First, they share a common ideological core, rooted in nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Second, they converge in how they react to global events, from the pandemic to the war in Ukraine. And third, they increasingly express support for foreign PRR leaders.
Social media is the most likely arena for transnationalisation. It lets populist parties and activists bypass legacy media while also enabling transnational spaces of discussion, where people align around shared ideas and grievances beyond national borders – from #MeToo to the anti-immigration campaign ‘120 dB’.
Social media lets populist parties and activists bypass legacy media and enables transnational spaces of discussion, where people align around shared ideas and grievances beyond national borders
How, then, can we understand the digital publics of PRR parties as transnational? These publics are not just passive audiences, but active participants who interpret party claims in their own ways. Building on studies of the transnationalisation of public spheres, I argue that a first indicator is thus whether these publics talk about the same issues and assign them similar importance.
If they are becoming transnational, we should observe two things. First, convergence around cross-national grievances such as the alleged threat of Muslim immigration. Second, similar and synchronised reactions to global news events. Populist leaders have already shown their ability to mobilise people around crisis, as we saw during the Covid-19 pandemic. These are precisely the occasions when transnational publics are most likely to emerge.
My text analysis of YouTube comments on Brothers of Italy, Vox, and the Republicans’ channels confirmed the expected dynamics. Digital publics in Italy, Spain, and the US aligned around core ideological tropes, such as anti-immigration and opposition to supranational organisations (like the EU). National contexts strongly shaped these debates, but I found striking cross-country similarities. Attacks on mainstream media, for instance, were everywhere tied to the idea of them hiding the truth. Comments consistently portrayed left-wing elites as extremists – 'communists' or simply 'evil'.
My analysis of YouTube comments on far-right channels in Italy, Spain and the US found that they consistently portrayed left-wing elites as extremists – 'communists' or simply 'evil'
Digital publics also reacted in comparable ways to global events. The Covid-19 pandemic and the economic fallout of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine produced similar discussions across countries. These included a shared opposition to vaccination mandates and lockdowns, as well as concerns about the rising cost of living.
What was most striking, however, was how publics now rally around foreign leaders. In recent years this has become particularly evident, and it goes both ways: supporters of a party mentioning leaders abroad, and foreign users appearing on other parties’ channels.
By 2023, transnational support had become a visible feature. For example, Giorgia Meloni and Javier Milei were reference points for Vox’s publics, especially following Milei’s victory and Meloni’s appearance at Vox’s ‘Viva’ event. In the US, Trump emerged as a global icon, attracting greetings and solidarity from supporters in places as varied as Australia, France, India, and Germany. A smaller, but notable, pattern also appeared in Italy, where supporters of India’s Modi began praising Meloni on her channel following the two leaders' growing rapport.
Transnational communication among PRR publics is no longer only about issues or crises but also about leaders becoming worldwide icons
Although still a minor share of discussions, this trend marks an important shift. Transnational communication among PRR publics is no longer only about issues or crises but also about leaders becoming worldwide icons. In other words, populist publics engage not just in vertical transnationalisation – attributing grievances to supranational causes – but also in horizontal transnationalisation, showing greater attention to actors in other countries.
Overall, my research shows that we can indeed speak of transnational publics for the PRR. This has at least three implications.
First, it reinforces the idea that we should understand radical-right populism as a coherent global phenomenon, not only in terms of what parties say but also what their audiences discuss.
Second, PRR parties’ efforts to transnationalise increasingly resonate with their digital publics, even if the national context still prevails. This invites us to approach the PRR challenge to liberal democracy from a transnational as well as a national perspective.
Third, leaders matter. While much has been written about the myth of the ‘charismatic populist leader’, it is true that figures like Trump and Meloni have become icons for PRR publics that go well beyond their national audiences.
Their broad appeal thus suggests that leaders play a key role in constructing transnational publics.
