Consuelo Thiers argues that Javier Milei is not merely shifting Argentina's foreign policy but dismantling its diplomatic institutions. As ideology replaces expertise, and institutional norms collapse, Argentina has become a stark example of how personalist leadership can upend international relations
Across democracies, foreign policy is becoming increasingly entangled with domestic polarisation. Leaders who once operated within established institutional constraints now wield diplomacy as an extension of culture wars. They are subordinating traditional strategic interests to ideological performance.
In international relations, political leaders may set priorities, but institutions are meant to keep the system on track. Foreign ministries, slow and procedural, ensure continuity and coherence across administrations. But what happens when a leader enters office with little regard for such institutional constraints?
This phenomenon has manifested elsewhere: think US President Donald Trump's marginalisation of the State Department and Hungary's ideological approach under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Argentina's President, Javier Milei, offers a particularly clear example of how this dynamic unfolds. His foreign policy has abandoned historical principles in favour of advancing domestic political agendas.
To find out how, I interviewed a number of Argentine government actors, and consulted public records and reporting. While Argentina is no stranger to charismatic and populist leaders, my findings reveal that Milei represents something fundamentally different. His approach involves not merely policy shifts or alliance changes, but the deliberate dismantling of Argentina's diplomatic institutions in service of ideological goals.
Rather than recalibrating Argentina's global position, Milei is orchestrating a deeper institutional breakdown. His administration prioritises loyalty and ideology over strategic interests, destroying structures that enable coherent, long-term planning.
Upon assuming office, Milei appeared to pursue conventional diplomatic channels. To the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Milei appointed Diana Mondino, a pragmatic economist who assembled a team of seasoned professionals. They focused on trade promotion and Western re-engagement.
Argentina condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and attempted to connect with multilateral frameworks like the OECD. Mondino's team included centre-right liberals, many affiliated with former president Mauricio Macri’s PRO party. None, however, were extreme ideologues.
But this equilibrium quickly collapsed as Milei's personal ideology began to eclipse institutional logic. His unambiguous pro-Israel stance, for instance, disrupted Argentina's traditional Middle East neutrality, and threatened support for the Malvinas claim.
While Milei initially pursued conventional diplomatic channels, his personal ideology quickly began to eclipse institutional logic
His rejection of the UN's Agenda 2030 as a 'globalist conspiracy' alarmed Western allies – and contradicted Argentina's own laws. Most tellingly, his position on Ukraine shifted following Trump's return to the White House. This revealed a foreign policy subordinated not to national strategy but to ideological allegiance.
As Milei declared a 'cultural war', the Ministry faced direct interference from ideological actors with no diplomatic experience. Ultra-conservative figures like Ursula Basset gained influence inside the Ministry before formal appointments.
A network of far-right Catholic NGOs and social media influencers began shaping policy discourse. Online provocateurs eventually joined official delegations. Their concern was not Argentina's geopolitical positioning but battling feminism, gender and human rights.
The breaking point came in October 2024, with Mondino's dismissal over a routine UN vote to lift the Cuba embargo that was consistent with decades of Argentine policy and domestic law. Her replacement, businessman Gerardo Werthein, immediately began purging career officials. He launched an audit to identify those promoting 'agendas that oppose freedom'.
The government announced embassy closures, budget cuts, and the suspension of the Foreign Service Institute’s admission process. It has effectively dismantled the institutional pathway for training future diplomats.
At the centre of this transformation is Milei himself, who shows little interest in the institutional mechanisms of foreign policy. He rarely engages with career diplomats, avoids formal state visits, and refuses to meet with foreign leaders he personally dislikes.
His decision-making is often improvised, and driven by ideological commitments, not strategic calculation. He holds meetings without subject-matter experts, and fails to keep official records – a departure from established diplomatic practice.
Milei’s ideological, individualistic, and anti-institutional disposition has reshaped how Argentina conceives and executes foreign policy
Several factors help explain how this disruption has occurred. First, longstanding structural fragilities had already weakened Argentina’s foreign policy institutions. Second, Milei’s administration came to power without an experienced governing team, which led to institutional improvisation. But perhaps most importantly, Milei’s ideological, individualistic, and anti-institutional disposition has fundamentally reshaped how the country conceives, and executes, foreign policy.
Milei’s personality traits directly shape foreign policy outcomes. His rhetoric is confrontational, his worldview binary, and his understanding of international relations limited. He is resistant to advice, quick to dismiss dissent, and prone to politicising foreign affairs for domestic consumption.
The consequences of the shifts in the Ministry have been significant. Many in the diplomatic corps operate in an atmosphere of fear and caution. Promotions and overseas postings have been frozen; open disagreement is seen as a liability.
The case raises broader questions for democratic systems. Can institutional constraints hold when a leader is determined to override them? And what happens to a country’s standing in the world when foreign policy becomes a vehicle for ideological performance rather than strategic interest?
Can institutional constraints hold when a leader is determined to override them?
Milei has undermined institutional continuity in ways that may prove difficult to reverse. The replacement of experienced staff with inexperienced political allies, combined with erratic positions, reflect this broader pattern of subordinating foreign policy to domestic political objectives.
In many democracies, institutions act as guardrails, preventing dramatic overreach. Foreign ministries are among the most conservative and resilient, yet they are not invulnerable. When leaders deliberately bypass, defund, and politicise them, the damage is real.
Argentina today serves as a cautionary tale. The country shows what happens when ideology, personal loyalty, and political spectacle replace expertise, process, and diplomacy. Argentina’s foreign service remains in a state of paralysis; its professionals sidelined, its direction unclear, and its credibility diminished.
To revitalise Argentina's foreign policy institutions, future governments will need to restore meritocratic appointments, reinstate professional diplomatic training, and insulate the ministry from ideological capture. Argentina's experience serves as a stark reminder that even well-established diplomatic institutions can be rapidly dismantled when ideology trumps expertise.
