Little by little, scholarship on populism and public policy and administration has shown that populists in government cause significant damage to government institutions and policy processes. Mauricio I. Dussauge-Laguna argues that Mexico’s experience under president López Obrador reinforces these findings, and adds fresh (if discouraging) evidence to the argument
Myths regarding the nature of populism(s) abound. Yet the literature says little about how populists affect governing patterns and institutions. In fact, it is only recently that scholars have started to think about the way populists’ actions and decisions impact on bureaucracies and policy processes. So far, the findings are not encouraging.
Some authors have detailed that populists capture or dismantle administrative structures, while others suggest they politicise bureaucracies. Scholars also show that populists put public sector innovation and collaborative networks under stress.
In Mexico, things have not been much different. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s populist style has significantly damaged the country’s administrative apparatus and policymaking patterns.
Like other populist movements, López Obrador’s style is chamaeleonic in nature. He is commonly seen as a leftist because of his support of cash transfers. But he was also perceived as a centrist during his 2000–2006 tenure as Mexico City’s mayor. In his time as President (2018–), López Obrador has pursued an agenda associated with the right, downsizing the state apparatus and introducing austerity measures.
Beyond this, López Obrador has adopted what I call a ‘doublespeak populist’ approach. He uses terms and rhetorical phrases that supposedly put ‘the people’ first to disguise his true intentions. This kind of populist rhetoric has had a powerful legitimising effect on his actions.
López Obrador uses ‘doublespeak’ – terms and rhetorical phrases that supposedly put ‘the people’ first – to disguise his true intentions
For example, he has criticised what he calls a ‘golden bureaucracy’ (burocracia dorada) to seek stronger personalistic control over administrative and political institutions. Meanwhile, the ‘austerity’ mantra has served to justify his discretionary use of budget cuts and public funds.
More broadly, López Obrador’s ‘doublespeak populism’ has helped introduce changes and measures with grave effects for Mexico’s politico-administrative infrastructure.
Michael Bauer recently argued that the arrival of populists in government can have a ‘devastating’ effect on the state. The Mexican experience under López Obrador reaffirms this.
As part of his ‘transformation’ agenda, he has implemented several administrative measures which have dismantled administrative, policy, and state capacities.
Like other populists, López-Obrador has sought to extend political control over semi-autonomous regulators; attacked the reputation of independent agencies; used patronage appointments widely; terminated institutions for ideological reasons; and bypassed laws and administrative procedures.
Moreover, López-Obrador has substituted established bureaucratic channels to secure implementation of his pet projects. He has achieved this either through parallel structures, or via the ‘militarisation’ of civil administration areas.
López-Obrador's ‘transformation’ agenda has resulted in a Mexican administrative apparatus more obedient to the president’s will, but less capable of performing government tasks effectively
The overall result has been a Mexican administrative apparatus which is more obedient to the president’s will, but less capable of performing government tasks effectively and in line with traditional public service standards (e.g. rule of law, efficiency, accountability).
Another impact of populists in government is that they seek to reframe broader policymaking patterns. Indeed, López Obrador’s government in Mexico has further illustrated how populists distort every step of the policy cycle.
Claiming a monopoly over ‘the will of the people’, López Obrador has significantly influenced the public agenda. He decides which areas of debate are relevant (or not) and undermines the legitimacy of other policy actors. Clientelist ambitions and lack of technical considerations have been the norm in his policy initiatives' design.
Like other strong populist leaders, López Obrador’s implementation style has performative aspects. He builds narratives about how much his government does ‘for the people’ (e.g. its pandemic response) and emphasises his actions' symbolic aspects. Yet when his programmes prove ineffective, he downplays their environmental and economic shortcomings.
Using the populist tactic of identifying himself with ‘the people’, López Obrador discredits external experts and resorts to ‘alternative facts’ (otros datos) to affirm his agenda. He reports directly to the people in political meetings, disregarding monitoring, evaluation, and audit mechanisms.
On the campaign trail, populists claim to know what ‘the people’ want and need. Yet their rhetorical skills are never matched by good governing abilities. On the contrary, and no matter how capable they are at managing their own party movements, populists in government have shown they are not good at leading public sector organisations or making effective public policies.
Like Orbán, Trump, and Bolsonaro, López Obrador has politicised, captured, and diminished the policymaking ability of Mexico’s bureaucratic apparatus
The Mexican experience is yet another case of how populists damage governing institutions and policy processes. Like Viktor Orbán, Donald Trump, and Jair Bolsonaro, López Obrador has politicised, captured, and diminished the policymaking ability of Mexico’s bureaucratic apparatus.
In short, under populist rule, the needs of ‘the people’ remain largely unmet, while their government’s capacity to provide good and effective public goods and services is significantly eroded.
No.64 in a Loop thread on the Future of Populism. Look out for the 🔮 to read more