JD Vance’s international right-wing populism

Right-wing populism has gone beyond the nation state. Analysing JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference earlier this year, Yunus Poblome describes how US foreign policy under Trump depicts Europe as being led by a corrupt elite which refuses to listen to its conservative people. This, he argues, further legitimises Europe’s own right-wing populists

On 14 February 2025, US Vice-President JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference sent shockwaves through Europe. The audience had braced itself for scathing remarks about Europe’s role in NATO. In the event, Vance dedicated almost all his 19 minutes on stage to critiquing European democracies for ‘not listening to their people’.

This may seem a remarkable choice of topic at a conference focusing on security. Yet Vance legitimised his theme by alleging that the biggest threat to Europe was not Russia or China, but ‘the threat from within’. Indeed, Vance claimed that ‘the European elite’ are disregarding ‘the European people’.

Vance's argument is an exemplary case of populism beyond the nation. Here, I consider his controversial speech in the context of recent literature on populism, to explore the implications for Europe of Trump 2.0.

JD Vance's international populism

Scholarship has approached populism mainly as a domestic category. It can, however, be practiced beyond the nation-state, and foreign policy provides a stage. Recent literature categorises the phenomenon as international populism, but this has received scant interest from mainstream political discourse or legacy media.

In populist discourse, antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ is central. While this antagonism usually manifests only at nation-state level, international populist discourse is possible when a populist claiming to represent ‘the people’ of his own nation-state articulates the grievances of a ‘people’ from another nation-state. Populist political actors may not claim to represent ‘the people’ of that other constituency directly. But their discourse aims to strengthen the legitimacy of its own political project by constructing allegiances and affinities with other populists and their audiences.

US foreign policy according to JD Vance

Empirical examples of international populism have usually been European right-wing populists in the European Parliament. The concept has, however, become central to understanding current US foreign policy discourse.

Vance’s core argument in Munich was that the US, as a concerned ally, looked upon Europe and saw a continent in retreat from its ‘shared democratic values’. The biggest threat to Europe, then, was ‘not Russia, not China, not any other external actor’ but ‘the threat from within’. For Vance, the European elite ‘not listening to its own people’ was akin to the ‘tyrannical forces on this continent’ during the Cold War.

Vance’s core argument in Munich was that the US, as a concerned ally, looked upon Europe and saw a continent in retreat from its ‘shared democratic values’

In populist fashion, Vance portrayed himself as a representative of the true American people in conversation with a European elite that had grown detached from its own people. His speech was thus not only a conversation between allied nations, but between an American populist and a European ‘corrupt elite’ in the name of the American and – albeit indirectly – European people.

Vance did not claim to represent Europeans. But he argued that the American and European ‘peoples’ enjoy shared (right-wing) values, and that European leaders would be wise to listen to these demands.

Is Europe becoming undemocratic?

Vance's examples of Europe’s supposed retreat from democracy clarified America's support for the European radical-right populist agenda. His implication was that for Europe to ‘restore’ its democracy, it must stop excluding the populist radical right from government.

First, he framed the 2024 Romanian presidential election as an example of free and fair elections being rejected by corrupt judges. Despite the fact that Russian interference was demonstrable and thus formed legitimate ground for contestation – and that a pro-EU candidate was subsequently elected – Vance took a clear side. For the US, then, this was a blatant example of the European elite disregarding democracy – to the chagrin of its people.

By likening the American and European migration contexts, Vance drew clear parallels between the struggles of the American and European ‘peoples’ being ignored by their elites

Second, Vance implicitly argued against the already brittle German Brandmauer, an agreement between traditional parties to exclude the far-right Alternative für Deutschland from governing coalitions. In so doing, he echoed a central talking point of European right-wing populist parties in coalition democracies with similar firewall agreements.

By likening the American and European migration contexts, Vance drew clear parallels between the struggles of the American and European ‘peoples’ being ignored by their elites. The result, he argued, is an influx of illegal migrants, and terror attacks like the recent one in Munich. Here, Vance's international populism really becomes clear. He strengthens his claim to represent ‘the American people’ by likening their struggles to those of ‘the European people’.

Implications for Europe

By indirectly speaking for ‘the European people’, Vance presents Europe as a conservative monolith neglected by its leaders. This delegitimises the democratically elected European leadership, and legitimises their radical-right populist rivals, which could tip the scales in future elections.

Ideologically aligned leaders like Viktor Orbán and Giorgia Meloni offer potential for a ‘new consensus’ in transatlantic relations with a strong MAGA flavour

Ideologically aligned leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Giorgia Meloni in Italy have relatively good relations with Trump. This opens up potential for a ‘new consensus’ in transatlantic relations with a strong MAGA flavour. The emphasis on ‘shared democratic values’ could mean a harsh foreign policy of conditional engagement. Europe may have to bow down to a radical-right White House, even in its domestic affairs.

Defending democracy across borders

So, through international right-wing populist discourse, the White House aims to empower its European ideological allies. For Europe to become democratic in the eyes of the US, it must grant legitimacy to radical-right populist voices across Europe, and bow to their conservative demands. This Trump administration doesn’t just want to undermine democracy at home. It wants the Old Continent to follow in its footsteps.

In a world that seems to grow darker and more violent every day, Europeans cannot afford to lose sight of their democratic values. If Trump wants to establish his Galactic MAGA Empire, let Europeans be the Rebellion!

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

photograph of Yunus Poblome
Yunus Poblome
Master's Student in Democracy and Leadership, Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Yunus holds a BSc cum laude in political science.

He is a research intern at VUB’s Political Science department, where he assists Eline Severs with the EU Horizon REDIRECT project.

He is a board member of the Royal Association Olivaint Conference of Belgium, and organising member of the Belgian parliamentary simulation Jeugd Parlement Jeunesse.

His main interests are far-right populism, international relations and European foreign policy.

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