Bashar Assad is ousted in Syria; Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis are weakened in ongoing conflicts. All this has significantly weakened Iran’s 'axis of resistance'. John Chin and Mary Urso argue that the crisis of its regional proxies is leading Iran to strengthen cooperation with a global network of autocracies
For Iran’s Ayatollahs, it is the best of times, and it is the worst of times. In a bid to exert influence regionally and globally, the Islamic Republic has positioned itself at the centre of two axes. As its regional 'axis of resistance' falters, the Ayatollahs are deepening cooperation with a global 'axis of upheaval'. In part, this is a means of resisting the new Trump administration’s plans to renew pressure on Tehran. In January, Iran signed a strategic partnership treaty with Russia, mirroring a similar 2021 agreement with China.
Iran holds a peculiar and important position among modern authoritarian powers. Observers tend to regard China and Russia as the main global exporters of 'sharp power' – efforts to subvert democracy and prop up other autocracies. But the Islamic Republic benefits from global sharp power and produces its own, which it projects across the greater Middle East. Iran has sponsored proxies including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Assad regime.
Though Iran's sharp power has been weakened by conflicts with Israel and the US, the global context is becoming more favourable towards the regime.
Iran’s regional axis has been significantly weakened by ongoing conflicts with Israel and the US, and the fall of regional ally Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Is this the end of Iran’s sharp power influence? Perhaps not: alongside Iran's regional setbacks, the global context is becoming more favourable towards its regime.
In 2002, George W Bush famously dubbed Iran, Iraq, and North Korea the 'axis of evil'. Iran’s leaders, by contrast, claim to lead an 'axis of resistance' to US hegemony and Zionism in the Middle East. During the global war on terror, Iran sponsored irregular warfare and proxy militias across the Shia Crescent, leading the US to declare Iran the world’s leading state sponsor of terror. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Quds Force developed fearsome hybrid war capabilities, and cultivated relationships with militias in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq.
With its 2023 attacks on Israel, Hamas had hoped to provoke regional war. But Iran's axis of resistance was not prepared for conflict against a militarily superior enemy
Yet Hamas’ surprise 7 October attack in 2023, which ushered in an annus horribilis (2024) for Iran, imperilled Iran’s attempt to establish asymmetric deterrence of Israel and the US without going to war. Hamas, which sought to provoke regional war, had miscalculated. Iran's axis of resistance was not prepared to get involved in conventional warfare against a militarily superior enemy.
Hezbollah is one of the most strategically important axis members. After the 7 October attacks, it once again began firing missiles at Israel. The Lebanese Shia militia was weakened by Israel’s assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024 and invasion of southern Lebanon in October 2024. Since reaching a ceasefire agreement with Israel last November, Hezbollah has had to remove weapons and soldiers from southern Lebanon. In January, Hezbollah’s diminished political influence was revealed when its preferred candidates for Lebanese president and prime minister lost. In April, Lebanon's President Joseph Aoun said that this year, he will seek for Hezbollah militants to either join the army or disarm.
Hamas, long-time spoiler of the Oslo Accords, has ruled the Gaza Strip since 2006. Prior to 7 October 2023, it had maintained a tenuous peace with Israel, despite intermittent Hamas rocket attacks and mass mobilisation of Palestinian civilians. Israeli offensives have now decimated the organisation. An estimated 17,000 of its 25,000 fighters are dead. Senior Hamas leadership has been assassinated, including political chief Ismail Haniyeh; military chief Mohammed Deif; and elected leader Yahya Sinwar. As of April, Hamas was so depleted that it could not pay its fighters.
The Houthis have tried to take power in Yemen for years with Iran’s support, including advanced weaponry and drone capabilities. Despite facing Saudi military intervention, throughout the Israel-Hamas war the Houthis have launched drone strikes on vessels in the Red Sea, straining Israel’s economy. But a US bombing campaign has weakened the Houthis, and by April, rival militias were planning a ground offensive against them.
Iran’s regional axis has suffered other losses, mainly in Syria. Some believe Iraq, where Iran-backed militias have paused attacks recently, could be the next domino to fall.
Though Iran’s regional position has suffered, partnerships have blossomed with Russia, China, and North Korea. This global axis has been referred to, variously, as Autocracy Inc, the unholy alliance, the Eurasian axis, and the axis of rogues, adversaries or autocracies.
China and Russia have had the most influence in Iran since the mid-1990s, according to FBIC data. Iran’s reliance on these regimes for aid, arms, diplomatic support, and military cooperation has only grown in recent years. In 2023, Iran joined the BRICS. In March, Iran, China, and Russia participated in a joint naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman. And in April, China and Russia backed Iran’s demand for diplomacy and an end to US sanctions.
Iran's regional position may have suffered, but partnerships have blossomed with Russia, China and North Korea
China and Iran are 'ancient partners' in a shared quest to build a post-Western dominated Asia. China has grown to become one of the largest importers of Iranian crude oil, which constitutes 91% of Iranian exports. Iran joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2016. In 2021, China committed to increasing infrastructure investments in Iran as part of a 25-year strategic agreement.
Russia and Iran have also deepened diplomatic and military cooperation, particularly since the onset of the Syrian civil war (both backed Assad) and the Russia-Ukraine War. Russia is now a major customer for Iranian drones, which it has fielded to deadly effect in Ukraine. In April, Russia offered to mediate nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington.
Iran’s global axis is born of necessity and convenience. Its members all desire to break out of isolation imposed by Western sanctions. As US 'maximum pressure' is restored, Iran is poised to double down on its stake in Autocracy Inc.
