Aly Verjee and Valerie Sticher argue that an international monitoring mission could bolster a ceasefire. But any new ceasefire faces serious challenges, and will hold only if all parties heed the experience of past monitoring efforts in eastern Ukraine
In the now-infamous meeting between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump at the White House on 28 February, Zelenskyy emphasised how Russia had repeatedly violated its ceasefire commitments in the 2014 and 2015 Minsk Agreements, which sought to end the then conflict between Ukraine and Russia-backed separatists in the Donbas region. Left undiscussed in the Oval Office was the role of the international monitors who oversaw the Minsk ceasefires.
Examining the experience of the monitors who observed the previous ceasefire in eastern Ukraine is essential in light of current discussions about ending the Russia-Ukraine War. Evidence suggests that credible monitoring leads to better-respected ceasefires, but only when monitoring design matches a conflict’s political realities.
Credible monitoring leads to better-respected ceasefires, but only when monitoring design matches a conflict's political realities
So far, the details of monitoring arrangements are sparse. Both Emmanuel Macron and Keir Starmer have suggested that European peacekeepers guarantee a future ceasefire in Ukraine. Zelenskyy has repeatedly called for tangible 'security guarantees', including a sizeable peacekeeping presence. Even Vladimir Putin has asked what mechanism would decide on ceasefire violations in any potential truce.
Based on our research on the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), three of the most important considerations for a future monitoring mechanism are: having a clear strategy in monitoring; making ceasefire violations count, rather than just counting violations; and the skilful use of remote sensing technology.
Back in 2015, the entirely civilian SMM was repurposed to address Ukraine's quickly deteriorating security situation. The SMM was ultimately tasked to monitor the Minsk ceasefires. Over the next seven years, the mission expanded to monitor the activities of combatants on both sides.
Noncompliance was widespread. There were few, if any, consequences for the violators. While the SMM achieved numerous successes at a local level — achieving temporary breaks in the hostilities, facilitating humanitarian action, and supporting the response to the downing of flight MH17 — it had limited means to escalate concerns when serious ceasefire violations occurred. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, the SMM hastily withdrew.
If monitors’ aim is to deter most violations, they must have clear plans for how to respond to violations when they occur
A new peacekeeping or monitoring force needs a clear raison d’être and an overarching strategy. Consensus about what a new monitoring force can achieve will be required, at least among the contributing states. As in almost all ceasefires, violations may still occur.
So, if monitors’ aim is to deter most violations, they must have clear plans for how to respond to violations if they occur, understand under what conditions they will act, and determine what scenarios might escalate their own response. If monitors aim to de-escalate the conflict but still tolerate a degree of violence between the conflict parties, a monitoring strategy considerably different in scope, geography, and personnel might be required.
Amid the talks about the size of any (military) monitoring force, the need for a continued civilian dimension to monitoring remains paramount. As in the SMM, civilian monitors bring different skills and benefits to monitoring that military personnel do not.
The SMM took a quantitative approach to monitoring. It was good at counting violations, which sometimes numbered hundreds or even thousands per day. This data, however, did little to help ceasefire compliance. A fundamental weakness of the SMM was its failure to attribute ceasefire violations to the responsible parties. Recording violations without assigning blame, even if it could be inferred, made monitoring weak.
In part, this stemmed from the absence of a sufficiently robust mandate, and the need to navigate the delicate balance between ensuring the mission’s continuation, which depended on approval from all the contributing and concerned states, including Russia, while still producing meaningful reports. To walk this fine line, the mission avoided attributing direct responsibility.
This ambiguity weakened third parties' ability to impose meaningful consequences on violators. It also enabled selective responses from the international community. Western states largely condemned violations by Russian-backed separatists; Russia and its allies emphasised Ukrainian violations. This undermined the potential impact of international pressure: condemnation from a violator’s supporters — while rare — would likely have carried more weight.
The already limited trust between the conflict parties has, of course, diminished yet further since the time of the SMM. Ambiguity in attributing violations committed in a future ceasefire will only incentivise the conflict actors to cheat on their commitments. To be effective, a new monitoring mission in Ukraine must have explicit authority to publicly report on violations, including attribution whenever possible. The organisational and bureaucratic constraints that plagued the SMM must not hamper a new mission's leadership.
Ambiguity in attributing violations committed in a future ceasefire will only incentivise the conflict actors to cheat on their commitments
Additionally, a new mission should include a joint commission allowing representatives from both sides to directly address violations. Such a mechanism would establish a direct line of communication between military forces — not just political leadership — allowing them to manage minor infractions and, potentially, to avert renewed escalation.
One of the SMM’s strengths was its use of remote sensing technology: more than any other ceasefire monitoring mission before, it integrated camera-equipped drones, stationary cameras, satellite imagery, and acoustic sensors into monitoring.
These tools greatly enhanced the mission’s observational power. Drones, in particular, enabled monitors to observe areas otherwise inaccessible because of movement restrictions and safety concerns. Drones also allowed monitors to observe violations at night.
However, the SMM shows that more robust monitoring does not necessarily lead to greater compliance. Remote technology is at best a complement to traditional monitoring. Moreover, having the technological means can be a temptation to follow every single shot fired into the wild. Such an approach says little about a violation's significance. Technology can best help in monitoring if used to focus on important violations rather than attempting to count every conflict development.
