Often dismissed as a procedural bystander in EU enlargement, the European Parliament holds underused tools to shape outcomes — from budgetary leverage to informal diplomacy. Lien Jansen argues that the European Parliament can act strategically — if internal cohesion and inter-institutional cooperation align. Its latent power matters more than ever in today’s geopolitical climate
In enlargement policy, attention usually falls on the European Commission and the Council. The European Parliament (EP), by contrast, is often treated as a bystander — its role limited to granting final consent to accession treaties. But this perception underestimates how the Parliament has gradually carved out a more assertive position in EU policy-making, including enlargement.
By creating channels of engagement with EU candidate countries, the EP has pushed the boundaries of its role in external relations and developed its own concrete initiatives
Through a mix of formal competencies and informal strategies, the EP has developed ways to exert influence beyond its veto power. These include treaty-based rights as well as practices of institutional self-empowerment. By interpreting its remit expansively, and creating channels of engagement with candidate countries, the EP has pushed the boundaries of its role in external relations and developed its own concrete initiatives.
The EP can use five main tools to engage more strategically with enlargement: the consent procedure, budgetary powers, agenda-setting, parliamentary oversight, and its network of interparliamentary delegations to (potential) candidate countries. Among these, the consent procedure and the power of the purse stand out.
The consent procedure gives the EP a formal veto over any accession treaty. This means that a candidate country cannot join the EU without Parliament’s approval. Although this vote comes at the very end of the process — and the EP has no formal role in shaping negotiation mandates — it has found ways to use this leverage upstream. Through early political resolutions, it can communicate its priorities and red lines to both the Commission and candidate governments. The EP can also delay consent in response to unresolved concerns. It did this with Turkey by conditioning the approval of the EU-Turkey Association Agreement on constitutional reforms to improve human rights.
Budgetary powers provide another key point of influence. While the Council determines the overall ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the EP must give its formal consent. This grants it effective veto power and the ability to attach political conditions. Within the annual budget process, where the EP co-decides with the Council, it can shape how much funding is allocated to enlargement — and how that funding is structured, monitored, and targeted.
Through its co-legislative role on instruments such as the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III (the main programme for the Western Balkan region and Turkey) and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument NDICI (which also covers the ‘Associated Trio’ — Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, countries with Association Agreements with the EU), the EP can influence spending priorities in candidate countries in more granular ways than is often acknowledged. This indirect influence gives the Parliament meaningful say in how the EU allocates its money in candidate countries on the ground.
The EP also draws on its agenda-setting and scrutiny tools to amplify its role in enlargement. Through resolutions, own-initiative reports, plenary debates, and high-profile speeches by the EP President, it can keep enlargement on the political radar and push to the fore issues that might otherwise be sidelined.
Oversight mechanisms allow the EP to monitor the Commission’s handling of enlargement policy. These include hearings during the appointment of the Commissioner for Enlargement, debates on Commission and Council statements, parliamentary questions, consultation rights in Association and Accession agreements, and budgetary scrutiny through the discharge procedure. Together, they give the EP multiple entry points to hold the executive to account.
A final key instrument is the EP’s network of standing delegations to (potential) candidate countries. These bodies facilitate regular political dialogue and information exchange, allowing MEPs to gather firsthand insights that strengthen parliamentary input. Delegations also act as preparatory agents. They lay the groundwork for executive decisions and allow greater flexibility in engagement than traditional diplomatic channels.
Despite this toolkit, the EP’s impact on enlargement policy remains uneven. Much depends on internal cohesion. A fragmented Parliament is less likely to speak with a unified voice or use its tools strategically. Coordination across committees and delegations is not always seamless. Delegation appointments often rely on volunteer participation, leading to variation in commitment and expertise.
The EP’s ability to influence enlargement depends on the willingness of the Commission and Council to share information and engage seriously with its positions, which is not always the case
Inter-institutional dynamics also matter. The EP’s ability to influence enlargement depends on the willingness of the Commission and Council to share information and engage seriously with its positions. This is not always the case. Parliament has often struggled to obtain timely data or access to negotiation updates, weakening its ability to exercise oversight or shape debates in real time.
Still, these limitations are not inevitable. Where there is political will, the EP can act — and has acted — as more than a procedural checkpoint. It remains the only directly elected EU institution, giving it a unique democratic mandate. That mandate becomes more meaningful when backed by the Parliament’s willingness to coordinate internally, assert its prerogatives, and use the informal avenues at its disposal to shape the narrative around enlargement.
The EP is not the primary driver of EU enlargement. But it does not have to remain in the back seat. As the EU navigates what Veronica Anghel has in this series called a strategic turn in enlargement — in which questions of security, democracy, and geopolitics are increasingly entangled — the EP’s role deserves renewed attention. Its tools are already on the table. The question is whether it will use them — and whether other institutions will enable it to do so.
