If you believe that Paris agrees on how to handle its nuclear weapons, you are mistaken. July Decarpentrie examines the French nuclear strategic debate from 1972 to 2024. She argues that what appears to be a continuous doctrine is in fact shaped by ongoing debates to ensure its relevance over time and across changing geopolitical contexts
French nuclear doctrine is characterised by continuity. Although certain aspects have evolved since the first White Paper on Defence in 1972, Paris has maintained a remarkably consistent stance on its nuclear deterrence. This continuity is reflected in the long-lasting principles that constitute the pillars of French nuclear doctrine.
Since acquiring the bomb, France has followed a strict doctrinal logic to justify its nuclear programme. The French force de frappe (strike force) is strictly conceived as defensive. It is designed to protect the country’s vital interests and ensure its sovereignty and freedom of action. You find this strategic logic in all governmental documents on nuclear deterrence, and across all presidencies.
This doctrinal consistency transcends political differences and spans multiple French administrations. The core principles set during the early Cold War years remain largely unchanged today. When Jacques Chirac and François Hollande, presidents from opposing sides of the political spectrum, addressed nuclear matters, their language was remarkably similar. Although there have been tactical shifts — such as dismantling the land-based component and reducing warhead numbers — the fundamental principles remain unchanged. To many observers, such continuity suggests strong national agreement on nuclear matters and is embedded in French strategic culture.
France has dismantled the land-based component of its nuclear arsenal, and reduced warhead numbers, but this has not altered the fundamentals
On the face of it, France appears to have reached a consensus on nuclear weapons and their purpose. This assessment, however, might be somewhat superficial. Stability is achieved through motion. Continuity is not passive or automatic; it requires work and engagement to maintain relevance across time. The continuity of French nuclear doctrine and strategy requires maintenance. Through ongoing debates and strategic reassessments, the French nuclear deterrent remains relevant, reinforcing the legitimacy of its nuclear weapons. To illustrate this, let us consider the principle of vital interests.
This principle of vital interests first appears in the 1972 White Paper, and its definition remains unchanged. The exact scope of French vital interests is deliberately unclear. Ultimately, it is the President's prerogative to determine what constitutes vital interests in any given situation, and whether those interests are being challenged. That said, it is inconceivable for the President to explicitly define France's vital interests, because it would undermine strategic ambiguity.
In the early years of the Cold War, France struggled to define the scope of its vital interests; their European dimension in particular. At first, the government stipulated that French nuclear weapons should have a character exclusively national, based on a territorial approach. Several voices rose to contest this isolationist approach which, they argued, was unrealistic in the Germany-centric security framework of Western Europe.
What, precisely, French nuclear weapons are protecting remains unclear, and this creates confusion
Over time, the vital-interests concept has increasingly included broader European aspects – but to what extent? In 2015, President Hollande was vague on this matter. In contrast, in 2020, President Macron highlighted the European element with unprecedented firmness. Yet what, precisely, French nuclear weapons are protecting remains unclear, and this creates confusion.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reignited the question of the Europeanisation of the force de frappe. More recently, Donald Trump’s aggressive rhetoric and actions toward the EU and NATO have intensified debate, foregrounding France's ongoing struggle to define the scope of its vital interests.
One could argue that there is continuity in the definition of French vital interests. They remain rooted in ambiguity, and always include a European element. A closer look, however, reveals that, despite ongoing usage of the term, the concept of vital interests as we understood it during the Cold War differs significantly from its contemporary interpretation. The territorial approach, central in 1972, appears less important in the twenty-first century. And although European elements have always been present, they have become increasingly blurred. The focus has shifted from protecting West Germany during the Cold War to opening discussions about the potential for French nuclear sharing in 2025.
France's definition of 'French vital interests' has always been rooted in ambiguity, and included a European element. Yet what constitutes vital interests has altered significantly since the Cold War
These shifts did not happen naturally and required important conversations. Right now, important government debates are taking place to challenge President Macron’s view on the state’s vital interests. Les Républicains, a liberal-conservative political party, tabled a bill aimed at including nuclear deterrence in the National Defence Code. The party's goal is to protect the concept of vital interests and ensure they remain exclusively under national control. In this bill, Les Républicains argue that current 'questions of foreign policy suggest a fundamental modification of French nuclear doctrine or at least create a certain ambiguity, which runs counter to the sovereign interests of our country'. Consequently, the group advocates a return to the core territorial essence of the concept. This bill is currently in progress and was referred to the Commission on National Defence and Armed Forces on 28 May 2024.
France appears to have been engaged in a continuous effort to define the scope of its interests. French debate, often hidden behind strategic ambiguity, has struggled to reach consensus on what its nuclear weapons are meant to protect. I used the example of vital interests, but I could just as easily have chosen other aspects of the French nuclear doctrine, such as strict sufficiency or threat perception. In other words, the French debate 'what to protect' as often as 'against whom' and ‘how’.
The stability and continuity of French nuclear doctrine and strategy come precisely from these dynamic processes. They involve questioning, arguing, debating and, ultimately, recommitting to foundational principles to adapt their applications to contemporary challenges. Without this, the French nuclear doctrine becomes irrelevant. If the French cannot justify what their nuclear weapons protect, how they will protect it, and what they will deter, it becomes difficult for Paris to legitimise its costly nuclear arsenal. The French must work consistently to reaffirm what they need to keep doing.
