The EU enlargement process successfully transformed Southern and Eastern European states into market democracies, but faltered in the Western Balkans. Jelena Džankić argues that amid today’s geopolitical challenges, prioritising the transformative mechanisms of EU enlargement is more critical than focusing solely on achieving full membership
In her foundational piece for this series, Veronica Anghel highlights the pressure and the imminent necessity for the EU to enlarge to avoid ‘disintegration and irrelevance’. She argues that enlargement had helped stabilise neighbouring countries in the past, boosted their economic performance, and offered the idea of a political project of European identity. It also created a ‘security community’ of members to stand in solidarity against economic and military threats. All this happened not only because enlargement was the outcome of the ‘promise of membership’, but also because of the process that led to it.
In the Western Balkans, the link between the promise, process and outcome of enlargement withered away. The region’s countries received assurances for future membership at the 2003 Thessaloniki European Council. Yet, since Croatia joined back in 2013, there have been no further enlargements. The reason for this was a combination of the EU’s ‘enlargement fatigue’ following the ‘Big Bang’ accession, and the slow transformation of contested post-conflict states in the Western Balkans.
As the prospect of EU membership has receded, the Union's power to drive democratic reforms in aspiring countries has eroded
As the prospect of EU membership recedes, the Union's power to drive democratic reforms in aspiring countries has eroded significantly. Tackling this decline in influence — rather than becoming mired in debates over the feasibility or desirability of enlargement — is imperative in today’s shifting geopolitical landscape. Why does this matter now more than ever?
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU extended the same membership promise to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia that it had made to the Western Balkans over two decades earlier. While the Western Balkans bore the brunt of the consequences of this unfulfilled commitment, the EU itself experienced little substantive impact. Western Balkan countries felt these effects on two distinct levels.
First, the waning of the ‘promise of membership’ weakened the effects of the EU’s conditionality mechanism. Marred by a series of crises, which required immediate responses, the Union turned inwards. This meant that its key goal was to maintain stability at its external borders. Prioritisation of stability over democracy, in turn, cemented political power strongholds, corruption, and state capture among aspiring Western Balkan members. The use of veto powers by Greece and Bulgaria to block the progress of North Macedonia further diminished trust among societies and policymakers in the region that meeting accession conditions would be rewarded.
The blockage of North Macedonia's membership further diminished trust in the region that meeting accession conditions would be rewarded
Second, the lack of a clear European future for the Western Balkans opened space for the creation of political and economic dependencies on countries such as China, Russia, and the Gulf states. These countries could exert potentially harmful effects on democratic development in the region. Notably, the foreign policy of those countries with a strong Russian influence – such as Serbia – is not fully aligned with that of the EU. The same influence could stir conflict within countries and across the region.
Ultimately, democracy and stability in the Western Balkans have been compromised by the broken promise of enlargement and the EU’s weak transformative power.
Before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the enlargement process had reached a dead end in the Western Balkans. In the immediately preceding years, the Union had been beset by a series of crises. The result was a marked lack of political will among the member states to expand any further. Nor was there much desire to push for substantive democratic reforms across the (potential) candidates. This inertia sparked different propositions to complement and reinvigorate the enlargement process, or provide an alternative to it. Among the options discussed were proposals for a European Political Community, external differentiated integration, and staged accession.
The shift in global geopolitics since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has revived near-forgotten narratives of EU 'widening'
The tectonic shift in global geopolitics has revived enlargement in two important ways. Symbolically, the ‘promise of membership’ and the related expansion of the candidate-country pool has revived near-forgotten narratives of EU ‘widening’. Practically, speeding up the tempo of enlargement decisions returned some dynamism in the formal steps of the process. Is this enough for enlargement to happen? Perhaps, in some way, or for some countries.
With renewed focus on EU enlargement, two colossal challenges now dominate the EU’s political agenda. There is the Union’s pressing need for institutional reform and the imperative for candidate countries to implement substantive democratic changes. The scale of these challenges varies across candidates. Addressing both is essential to sustain a functional Union and a shared European vision.
Yes, enlargement matters. However, the accession process must go beyond ticking boxes or closing negotiation chapters. It must fundamentally reshape political culture, governance practices, and perceptions of Europe — within candidate countries and the EU itself. Ultimately, the transformative process, not merely the outcome, is what defines meaningful integration.
Jelena holds a PhD in International Studies from the University of Cambridge, and has taught and researched at the University of Edinburgh, University College London, the University of Graz, and Passau University.
She is the author of The Global Market for Investor Citizenship (Palgrave, 2019), a leading study in the field of wealth-based citizenship acquisition.
Her research interests include citizenship acquisition and loss, wealth-based migration and new mobilities, Europeanisation and state-building.
