Rising geopolitical pressures, including an ongoing war in its immediate neighbourhood, have thrust EU enlargement back onto the agenda. Lucas Schramm contends that the European Council must reconcile the dual challenges of widening and deepening, as it has done historically. Despite formidable obstacles, enlargement could spur internal reforms and innovations
In December 2023, the European Council set the stage for another EU enlargement round. The leaders of the 27 member states endorsed initiating accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova. This unexpected shift challenges years of presumed enlargement fatigue. It signals a renewed, transformative drive for European integration and urgent reform.
As Veronica Anghel notes in her foundational post for this series, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, coupled with its interference in the domestic politics of Moldova and other countries in the region, has fundamentally reshaped the European Union’s discourse on enlargement. Analysts observed that 'geopolitics' had finally permeated the language of enlargement.
Yet, a historical review of the EU's four successful accession rounds reveals that geopolitics has always been integral to the process. Geopolitical considerations have consistently mediated external pressures with internal imperatives. This underscores the primacy of political influence and regional security over purely economic factors.
In every round of EU accession, geopolitical considerations have mediated external pressures
Consider the first Northern enlargement of 1973, which brought in the United Kingdom alongside Denmark and Ireland. The European Community sought to amplify its political clout and economic reach. The Southern enlargement of the 1980s welcomed Greece, Spain, and Portugal. It was driven by a desire to consolidate nascent democracies, despite economic concerns flagged by the European Commission. The post-Cold War second Northern enlargement of 1995 reflected shifting geopolitical realities, while the 2004/07 'big bang' Eastern enlargement aimed to stabilise Eastern Europe and complete the continent's political consolidation.
At the heart of these transformative episodes stands the European Council, the de facto architect of EU enlargement. Comprising the Heads of State or Government of member states, its own full-time President, the President of the European Commission and the Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (as a participant), the European Council’s significant role in EU policymaking transcends its ostensibly secondary status as outlined in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.
On the one hand, the 'conditions of eligibility' of the applicant countries, as agreed upon by the European Council, 'shall be taken into account'. On the other, this Treaty article suggests a prominent role for the Council (of national ministers) and the European Commission. In practice, however, it is the European Council that has decided on the opening and concluding of enlargement negotiations. This is because national leaders, thanks to the highest domestic offices they hold, have the political authority to decide on constitutional politics and thus 'membership of the club'.
The national leaders who comprise the European Council have the political authority to decide who can 'join the EU club'
As a consequence, for every (successful) accession round of the Union, the European Council has framed a specific 'enlargement doctrine'. It is particularly noteworthy that with respect to the new dynamics and the possible enlargement towards Ukraine, Moldova and countries from the Western Balkans, leaders refer explicitly to the early stages of European integration. In their Granada declaration of October 2023, they note that 'the original promise of the European project' was to ensure peace, stability and prosperity on the European continent.
There is a second key dimension where the European Council comes in, after the decision to open accession negotiations in view of geopolitical motives. This relates to the implications of enlargement for the existing EU polity. Scholars have long debated the link between 'widening' and 'deepening'. While some note that enlargement might come at the expense of the EU’s functioning, others tend to stress mutually reinforcing dynamics.
Indeed, concerns about the EU’s 'absorption capacity' have always been present in European Council deliberations. Again, it is interesting to take a closer look at the four enlargement rounds to date. Deepening preceded widening in the early 1970s, in the sense that existing member states like France had insisted on completing community policies like agriculture and the budget before the UK could accede. In the 1980s and 1990s, widening and deepening essentially ran in parallel. With the EU becoming larger and more heterogenous, deepening became more difficult to realise. Scholars pointed out that the EU fell short of previously declared objectives for internal reform and development in the context of Eastern enlargement.
This mixed legacy is largely attributable to the European Council’s dynamics. National leaders often prioritised parochial interests. They tended to debate vote shares and veto rights rather than pursuing comprehensive reforms in areas like budget financing and spending priorities.
As the EU faces fresh enlargement prospects, the European Council’s decisive role remains unchanged. Its limitations—from the unanimity requirement to constrained administrative capacity—mean the European Commission will also be pivotal.
National leaders must balance candidate countries' qualifications, member states' demands, and the imperative for internal reform
Yet, any future enlargement will likely hinge on another grand bargain among national leaders. Member states must balance candidate countries' qualifications, member states' demands, and the imperative for internal reform. This complex interplay will determine whether the Union can reconcile its ambitions with the realities of an ever-evolving geopolitical landscape.