Cold War-era nuclear thinking can help explain how today’s challenges emerged. But Linde Desmaele warns that uncritical reliance on such thinking leads to misguided policies. Outdated frameworks can distort our understanding of how nuclear weapons are classified, how Russian intent is interpreted, what counts as success, and which actors will shape Europe’s nuclear future
Nuclear great power politics is returning to the forefront of European security discussions. As it does so, NATO has emphasised the urgent need to 'raise the nuclear IQ' among policymakers and civil society actors. Returning to Cold War-era nuclear politics can be a practical starting point for addressing the complexities of what this series calls the nuclear politics paradox. After all, knowing history is crucial to understanding how we arrived at the present.
Yet historians continue to disagree on many aspects of our nuclear past, including core questions about strategy, intent, and success. These debates remind us that history does not hold simple lessons easily transplanted across space and time. And even if we did agree on a single interpretation of the past, a pressing question remains: how relevant are such pre-existing frameworks to the nuclear challenges Europe faces today?
Even if we agree on a single interpretation of the past, how relevant are such pre-existing frameworks to the nuclear challenges Europe faces today?
Cold War insights are, of course, a valuable foundation. But hindsight bias and outdated models risk obscuring a strategic environment that has evolved significantly. In particular, these legacy frameworks may limit our understanding in at least four ways: how nuclear weapons are classified; how Russian intent and capabilities are viewed; how we evaluate past 'successes'; and which actors matter in shaping Europe’s nuclear future. Without updating these analytical models – likely in more than just these four areas – we risk misunderstanding today’s realities. Ultimately, we may end up with policies that miss the mark.
One clear example of outdated thinking is classification; particularly the distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. This distinction usually hinges on range and yield: tactical weapons have a shorter range and a lower yield. Yet today, missiles with lower and higher yields can be deployed on the same submarines. Technical advances in precision mean that many US systems with lower-yield warheads can deliver levels of destruction that were once the preserve of much larger strategic warheads. Such developments increasingly blur the lines between these categories.
Furthermore, the strategic-tactical divide tends to focus predominantly on the United States and Russia. But this neglects the nuclear postures of other European nuclear states like France and the United Kingdom. Both countries consider their arsenals strategic, regardless of yield or range.
Tactical nuclear weapons are central to European nuclear policy discussions. Yet they remain poorly defined – often categorised more by intuition than consistent criteria. This ambiguity risks undermining sound scholarly analysis and strategic planning.
Uncertainty about classification compounds worries about Russian nuclear strategy. Many NATO observers are rightly concerned about the size of Russia’s stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons compared with NATO’s smaller arsenal. The US State Department 2023 New START report estimates Russia possesses roughly 1000 to 2000 tactical nuclear warheads. By contrast, the United States maintains only one type of tactical nuclear weapon, with about 100 B-61 bombs forward-deployed in Europe.
Assessing Russia's nuclear threat requires more than simply counting warheads. We must also consider logistics, military organisation, and geography
While this imbalance raises valid concern, fixating on numbers alone may distort our understanding of the nature of the Russia challenge and misdirect NATO’s defence priorities. More productive questions are: what objectives does Russia pursue with these weapons? What advantages do they have over other nuclear or conventional systems? Proper evaluation also requires consideration of factors beyond sheer numbers. Logistics, military organisation and geography are all critical to such weapons' potential use. Without this holistic view, our grasp of the Russian nuclear threat – and how to address it – remains incomplete.
Cold War frameworks also risk oversimplifying past 'successes'. NATO’s current posture remains rooted in the Cold-War logic of Flexible Response. This envisaged graduated escalation, in which tactical nuclear weapon strikes are an intermediary step between conventional war and an all-out strategic exchange.
However, declassified records suggest NATO did not truly integrate this strategy into operational planning, nor did it fully agree on how to implement the strategy cohesively or effectively. Without reassessing these shortcomings, attempts to revive Cold War-era strategies may repeat mistakes, and fail to properly address contemporary challenges.
Finally, Europe’s nuclear conversation must extend beyond nuclear-armed states. Historically, non-nuclear NATO members played a limited role in nuclear-use scenarios. The general assumption was that only nuclear-armed states could credibly threaten an adversary’s nuclear capabilities. Even countries hosting US nuclear weapons have generally lacked positive control over their use; such decisions have been reserved for Washington.
Non-nuclear NATO members are now acquiring advanced conventional weapons. As they do so, their influence in nuclear escalation scenarios grows
But this dynamic is changing. Advanced conventional weapons – such as long-range precision strike missiles – are spreading to non-nuclear NATO members. Some of these weapons could threaten Russian nuclear forces and strengthen missile defence against nuclear strikes. As non-nuclear states acquire such capabilities, their influence in nuclear escalation scenarios grows. We should no longer sideline such states in risk assessments, but treat them as central actors in analysis and policy.
Cold War frameworks are, of course, products of a different era. Yet they continue to shape today’s nuclear discourse. To respond to present challenges, however, Europe’s playbook must evolve. Categories of analysis need updating, we must reassess old assumptions and overlooked actors – particularly non-nuclear states – and bring them to the fore. Only with such calibration can European nuclear policy move beyond inherited assumptions, and rise to the challenges of a transformed strategic environment.
