Across Europe, mainstream conservative parties are edging closer to ultranationalists and far-right populists. Many see this as a sudden turn. But Martino Comelli argues its roots are part of Christian Democratic strategy DNA. Historically, this strategy has balanced market liberalism with the desire to constrain mass politics
Europe's mainstream conservative parties were once touted as pillars of moderation. But recent headlines have left many wondering how they can so readily align themselves with the far right. In Germany, the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has flirted with tougher migration policies that mirror positions long held by the far-right Alternative für Deutschland, (AfD). Austria's Freedom Party (FPÖ) is leading coalition talks. In Italy, the supposedly moderate Forza Italia has joined forces with Giorgia Meloni and Matteo Salvini. Meanwhile, in France, President Macron formed a minority coalition of right-wing groups, leading critics to warn of a soft coup.
To understand this convergence, we need to revisit the dual meaning of 'liberalism'. Most far-right parties in Europe are hardly 'anti-liberal' in an economic sense. They often join Christian Democratic forces in promoting free-market principles, limiting state intervention, and keeping major economic decisions outside the reach of everyday democratic debate.
Historically, Christian Democracy emerged after World War II as a powerful, centrist-seeming alternative to the extremes of fascism and communism. Yet its key architects included thinkers who shaped West Germany’s postwar social market economy. Such architects drew on ordoliberal and Christian intellectual traditions that place strong checks on popular sovereignty. Constitutions, experts, and supranational institutions would do the heavy lifting, protecting economic questions from real public scrutiny.
The architects of postwar Christian Democracy relied upon constitutions, experts, and supranational institutions to protect economic questions from real public scrutiny
What kept Christian Democrats electorally competitive was a bargain: if they held the more radical conservative elements close, under the Christian Democratic umbrella, this would blunt their anti-system potential. In the 1950s and 1960s, that tactic could have appeared a triumph of moderation, containing far-right ideas within big-tent conservative parties rather than unleashing them outright. Today, that same dynamic risks going in reverse: far-right sentiments are being normalised from within.
Too often, Western observers view 'illiberal democracy' as a pathology confined to Hungary’s Viktor Orbán or Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party. But the roots of this identitarian playbook in fact lie in Western Europe.
Germany’s CDU, for instance, has periodically revived the concept of Leitkultur (the guiding national culture). This implies a hierarchy of acceptable religious and cultural traits, which conveniently overshadow deeper socio-economic reforms. In France, conservative and centrist figures alike have stoked fears of 'communitarism' or multicultural chaos, even as they sidestep pressing issues of economic inequality.
The CDU's periodic revival of the guiding national culture implies a hierarchy of acceptable religious and cultural traits, conveniently overshadowing deeper socio-economic reforms
This is not merely rhetorical. Identity politics — especially Christian culture or 'traditional' family values — fills the gap when mainstream parties effectively sideline robust economic debate. Hostility toward immigrants, LGBTQ communities, or 'woke elites' becomes a grim replacement for social and economic solidarity.
European institutions continue to protect the single market and maintain tight fiscal boundaries. As they do so, national-level politicians have fewer tools to address everyday economic grievances. Right-wing identity politics rushes in to fill the void. Christian Democratic parties have long been adept at juggling economic liberalism with moral conservatism. They are now discovering that courting far-right allies can be dangerously effective.
Historian Emiel Lamberts pointed out that 'the power of the Christian Democrats was dependent on their ability to keep the political (conservative) right permanently tied to them'. This strategy has historically been something of a Faustian bargain. What began as the taming of fascist remnants in the early postwar years has developed into the normalisation of illiberal extremes.
Christian Democratic parties are now discovering that courting far-right allies can be dangerously effective
The EU has always been a civilisational project. However, the nature of its institutional design has made it easy to overlook this fact. Influenced by the ideas of Carl Schmitt, the ordoliberals, and Friedrich Hayek, the EU’s framework emphasises the separation of economic policies from democracy. Rooted in Christian Democratic ordoliberal principles that guarantee economic freedom through a strong legal basis, it has evolved into a form of 'politics without policy', where monetary austerity and market freedoms are almost sacred, while culture wars flare up at the national level.
Countries like Hungary haven’t diverged from the EU mainstream as much as they’ve magnified its paradoxes. They champion free-market policies that seldom face serious electoral challenge, while doubling down on nationalist, conservative identity politics that rally voters.
If we’re concerned by the far-right’s ascent, we must grapple with more than just 'backsliding' in Central and Eastern Europe. The deeper problem lies in a European order that protects negative freedoms (market choice, property rights) while offering little space for robust 'freedom to' act collectively on the economy.
Christian Democracy isn’t a monolith, nor is it doomed to stoke illiberal flames. But as Europe’s centre-right parties increasingly cast about for new electoral alliances, we should remember how deeply they share certain instincts. In particular, they share the desire to constrain democracy in order to shield markets and 'tradition'. That impetus can lead them straight into the arms of the far right.
Instead of seeing 'Eastern illiberalism' as a distant malfunction, Europe would do well to confront its own old deal with conservative ideas. Only by shedding light on Christian Democracy’s ambiguous legacy — and revisiting the EU’s own 'anti-political' economic structures — can we begin to address the real roots of the continent’s authoritarian slide.
