To resist Russian aggression in Ukraine, the EU must present a united military front. But, argues Morgiane Noel, differing security priorities between member states mean that the EU must now navigate internal divisions, address external threats, and redefine its global role
For 70 years, the EU has chosen NATO as the cornerstone of its military security for European territory. This allows the EU to benefit from the full might of American defence, particularly after the fragmentation of the European defence industry.
The EU has long faced integration challenges, especially Brexit. During Donald Trump's 2017–2021 presidency, Europeans also faced sovereigntist US policies, widening the gap in multilateralism and weakening the transatlantic bond. Now re-elected, Trump will reopen the debate.
Defence remains a national competence, but the EU has developed mechanisms for cooperation, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy. While primarily intergovernmental, initiatives like the European Defence Fund, the European Peace Facility, and PESCO introduce supranational elements for closer collaboration.
However, member states have varying defence priorities and budgets, and this has hampered the creation of a unified policy.
In 1947, discussions about a European military alliance began when France and the UK signed the Treaty of Dunkirk for mutual assistance in case of attack. On 17 March 1948, five countries signed the Treaty of Brussels, aimed at economic and cultural collaboration and legitimate self-defence, thus forming the Western Union.
But the 1948 Prague Coup and Berlin Blockade heightened tensions. This prompted the US to propose a broader alliance: the North Atlantic Treaty. Signed in April 1949 by the Benelux countries, Canada, Denmark, France, the US, Iceland, Italy, Norway, the UK and Portugal, the Treaty marked America's formal commitment to a military alliance. On 6 October the same year, President Truman signed, solidifying the agreement.
Since the Treaty's signing, EU military alliance has never concretely materialised. A new initiative promoting military cooperation among member states has now revived the idea
In 2017, PESCO, an initiative to deepen EU defence cooperation was formed to strengthen integration. Despite assurances of NATO-EU complementarity, PESCO has reignited tensions over defence cooperation and coordination. Member states fear the duplication of NATO, and the exclusion of non-EU allies from European defence projects.
Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, European defence dynamics have changed. No longer neutral, Finland joined NATO in April 2023, Sweden in March 2024.
Denmark has ended its 30-year opt-out from the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, joining PESCO in May 2023. The country is revising its defence funding plan to meet NATO's 2% GDP target, and considering raising it to 3%.
A 2024 European Commission press release revealed the EU is considering a European defence fund to enhance procurement and readiness. This indicates a profound shift towards greater European defence integration. Implemented under the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement instrument (EDIRPA), each of the five projects will receive €60 million. In March 2024, the Commission introduced the European Defence Industry Programme, to extend the EDIRPA framework beyond 2025, sustain European demand, and enhance interoperability.
The geopolitical resurgence of great-power competition underscores the need for Europe to define its security priorities independently.
War in Ukraine, the first armed conflict in Europe since the 1990s, has had a significant impact on EU defence cooperation. The European Commission has played a key role in shaping policies, allocating funds, and promoting joint military efforts. In March 2024, it appointed its first Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius.
The European Commission has suggested using the European budget to subsidise rearmament of individual member states, encouraging joint purchases
Two regulations came into force in 2023: in July, the regulation on support for ammunition production, followed by the regulation on joint acquisitions in October. A third regulation, currently in preparation, aims to make this cooperation permanent by establishing a European defence investment programme. The instrument would be based on Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides for the Commission’s support for the competitiveness of European industry.
This means the Commission could manage it directly, setting priorities and funding conditions in coordination with member states, the European Defence Agency, and the European External Action Service. The evolution of EU defence is intrinsically linked to NATO, because most EU member states are also NATO members, and their defence policies are influenced by NATO objectives. Measures such as the 2016 and 2018 Joint Declarations or military mobility initiatives are designed to align with NATO commitments.
EU foreign policy competencies encompass diplomatic representation, sanctions, crisis management missions, trade agreements, and human rights promotion. However, they remain largely intergovernmental, requiring unanimity and relying on member states for implementation and to comply with EU policies.
Russia's armed aggression, reminiscent of Soviet-era belligerence, evokes NATO's raison d'être at its founding. The current war reinforces NATO legitimacy more than ever.
EU military alliance requires substantial investment in defence capabilities. It would also require a unified command structure, and the alignment of national interests with collective security goals. Establishing a robust European Defence Fund, and fostering joining military projects, are steps in the right direction. The scale and scope of such an endeavour, however, requires sustained commitment over decades.
EU military alliance would need substantial investment in defence capabilities. It would also require a unified command structure, and the alignment of national interests with collective security goals
Defence remains, largely, a national prerogative. Yet the European Commission has significantly expanded its role in this area, in particular with its decision to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine through the EPF. This was a crucial shift in EU defence policy that shattered longstanding restrictions on military aid. It marked a transition from its focus on economic and diplomatic influence to an active stance on security and defence.
Is the EU ready to make autonomous military alliance a reality? This depends on its ability to navigate internal divisions, address external threats, and redefine its global role. But the changing dynamics of transatlantic relations may force the Union to embrace a more self-reliant approach to defence and security.
