Next year's Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons gives African states an opportunity to turn lofty disarmament pledges into real action. Kudakwashe Mapako says these states must take advantage of unity, minerals, and norms to press for irreversible nuclear disarmament
The finality that the UN embeds in its definition of disarmament suggests complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Yet we often interpret irreversibility more loosely, as a spectrum rather than an absolute condition. Interpreting irreversible nuclear disarmament (IND) as a process is practical, because it acknowledges that nuclear weapons states (NWS) have access to expertise and resources that would allow them to rearm.
In defining irreversibility, we must consider whether to contextualise IND within the current security climate or to compartmentalise the debate. Contextualisation is more realistic: it reflects disarmament progress to date, addresses concerns of nuclear and non-nuclear states, and allows incremental steps.
Would gradual disarmament yield more results than complete and immediate elimination, especially when NWS face 'perceived existential threats'? Non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) need to ask themselves this question. They must also reconcile with this contextualised approach while holding firm to high disarmament and non-proliferation expectations.
A robust system of international law is fundamental to the realisation and maintenance of nuclear disarmament. Yet the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — through threats of nuclear use or violations of sovereignty — have managed to circumvent the law. This exposes serious weaknesses.
The International Court of Justice has also been inconsistent in addressing nuclear issues. Its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons failed to determine whether nuclear use in self-defence is lawful. In Marshall Islands versus United Kingdom (2016), the court relied on technicalities to avoid substantive questions. Such failures raise doubts about whether international law can indeed uphold disarmament norms.
The permanent members of the UN Security Council have managed to circumvent international law, exposing serious weaknesses in the disarmament process
The responsibility to enforce the court’s decisions upon non-compliance falls on the UN Security Council, a highly political organ. But selective enforcement of its resolutions undermines international law, and weakens confidence in disarmament commitments.
This politicisation has a domino effect: NWS feel less bound to honour disarmament obligations, and prospects for irreversibility shrink. In such an environment, the likelihood that states will rearm or cheat remains high, making irreversibility difficult to envisage.
A robust legal regime could build confidence and deter nuclear pursuits. Weak enforcement, however, makes these goals unattainable in practice. This underscores the need for stronger legal regimes that account for both disarmament and post-disarmament environments.
Yet the weakness of international law does not render irreversibility unattainable. African states may not be able to close global enforcement gaps, but they can raise the costs of inaction, and inject momentum into stalled negotiations. By mobilising resources, unified diplomacy, and norm-setting, African states can pressure nuclear powers to take irreversibility more seriously, even in a fragile legal environment.
African states must embrace the core principles — irreversibility, verification, and transparency — fundamental to the realisation of disarmament. This will allow them take ambitious yet feasible steps toward IND without shifting responsibility to NNWS elsewhere. Such steps include:
African states’ approach towards African denuclearisation in 1965 is a valuable template for the pursuit of IND. The African Union could adopt the same commitment and unified vision against the production, testing, possession, and use of nuclear weapons to coordinate embargoes on the export of critical minerals used to manufacture nuclear weapons.
Embracing the core principles of irreversibility, verification, and transparency is fundamental to the realisation of nuclear disarmament
Since the 1921 opening of the Shinkolobwe uranium mine in Congo — which was later exploited for the Manhattan Project, a WWII research and development programme to produce the first nuclear weapons — Africa has been a key stakeholder in the global uranium supply chain. The regional bloc of African states, in fulfilment of their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, can capitalise on their uranium-possession status to negotiate, at international level, the cessation of nuclear weapons possession in an irreversible manner.
In the spirit of inclusive diplomacy — and consistent with UNGA Resolution A/RES/79/240 seeking UN member states' views on the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification — African states should consider participating in such initiatives. This would equip the respective states’ representatives with skills for capacity development.
African states must take advantage of their historical regional nonproliferation success to inform discussions on disarmament. They should galvanise a unified regional position through the African Union on key issues before deliberations in multilateral fora.
A cemented regional viewpoint has better chances of yielding success than isolated declarations on core issues. The leadership of South Africa and Egypt is thus crucial to unpack the cost-benefit debate that often hinders the effective participation and political will of African states when prioritising nuclear issues.
African states must reflect on their disarmament campaigns to date, and assess progress. They should evaluate the benefits and costs of engaging key debates on irreversibility, verification, and contextualisation, while maintaining high standards for disarmament and nonproliferation.
Africa needs to do more than just reflect. The continent’s unity, control of critical resources, and history of norm-setting give it unique leverage
But Africa needs to do more than just reflect. The continent’s unity, control of critical resources, and history of norm-setting give it unique leverage. In April 2026, delegates will gather in New York for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Though optimism is limited, African states have a responsibility to pursue creative pathways — through exploitation of natural resources and unified norm-setting. Their actions would be more than mere supplements to global disarmament efforts. They would be key drivers of efforts towards a nuclear weapon-free world.
