The Romanian presidential elections reveal the dangers of unregulated digital electoral campaigning, argues Gabriela Borz. To combat the risks and harvest the benefits of technology, democracies should take urgent regulatory measures, and improve their citizens’ digital skills
Digital election campaigning is one of the most significant developments in contemporary politics. A case in point is the Romanian presidential elections in November 2024, which were annulled by the Constitutional Court two days before the second round of voting, on grounds of foreign interference. The case reveals how digital political campaigning is not just about paid adverts promoted within the electoral period. It is also about unpaid social media content which can influence huge numbers of citizens who tend to attach political meaning to posts from politicians.
After the first round of elections, the independent Călin Georgescu emerged with the most votes. Georgescu is an ultra-nationalist, pro-Russian ‘virtual’ candidate, who does not even have bricks-and-mortar campaign headquarters. With the help of TikTok, Georgescu's audience grew exponentially. In the last two weeks of his campaign, through personal accounts and ‘influencers’ who indirectly promoted his message, he reached similar levels of exposure as the mainstream candidates.
The centrist alliance of Liberals and Social Democrats lost ground to Georgescu. His TikTok ‘campaign’ and Facebook promotion via third-party sites appealed mainly to voters’ emotions, in particular to their anger at the incumbents. Georgescu declared zero campaign expenses to the National Electoral Authority, and will likely be investigated. The election will be re-run.
Digital political campaigns are a magnet for foreign powers seeking to spread disinformation
This case reveals how digital campaigning is a magnet for foreign powers seeking to spread disinformation. There is also the danger that it favours electoral extremes, especially in states where the mainstream parties have failed their citizens. Romania's recent experience exposes the inadequacy of online political campaign regulation, and the pressing need for reform.
In most European countries, digital political campaigning operates in a regulatory vacuum. Those countries must update national electoral laws as a matter of urgency. Regulatory amendments must deal with specific aspects of digital campaigning, such as microtargeting, and the dissemination of fake information with the aim of manipulating opinion.
Of the 27 EU member states, only 17 regulate digital campaigning, and most of those only indirectly. How states legally define digital political campaigning, and moderate online content, is also important. Societies seem to favour a relaxed definition of what is, and is not, considered an online 'political campaign'.
In the absence of a clear national law, EU member states can turn to EU law. The EU is moving rapidly, with binding and voluntary rules for online political campaigning. Among these are the Code of Practice on Disinformation (2018), the Strengthen Code of Practice on Disinformation (2022), and the Guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks of electoral processes (2024).
Most major traders and service providers sign up voluntarily to online codes of practice. It is noteworthy, therefore, that X (then Twitter) withdrew from the EU Strengthen Code on Disinformation in May 2023, as soon as the reporting required under the Code – mainly in relation to transparency, citizens’ rights and freedoms – became more rigid.
It is revealing that Twitter-X withdrew from an EU code on disinformation once its reporting requirements became more rigid
Platform compliance can still be monitored under the Digital Service Act. Article 26 deals with advertising on online platforms; articles 34 and 35 deal with systemic risks. And Recital 40a of the AI Act stipulates that AI systems intended to influence the outcome of an election, or the voting behaviours of natural persons, should be classified as high-risk AI.
For example, under the legally binding Digital Service Act, the Romanian watchdog on media notified the government about Georgescu’s suspicious TikTok campaign. The Commission then opened formal proceedings on election risks related to TikTok’s recommender systems, and TikTok's policies on political content.
Countries outside the EU might turn to their constitution as a regulatory democratic safeguard, as the Romanian Constitutional Court did when it annulled the recent election result.
Democracies worldwide could also consider spending limits for online campaigning. In 2015, for example, Romania introduced a limit on digital spending of 30% of total campaign costs. It is possible, however, for parties and candidates to exceed such spending limits on platforms which ban paid political advertising. TikTok, for example, does not filter out the ‘political’ content of posts by self-declared apolitical users. In Romania, this allowed the 'TikTok candidate’ Georgescu to harvest the protest vote against the incumbent parties.
There is another more extreme alternative, already considered by various countries: banning online platforms if national security concerns justify it.
Recently, X faced a legal ban in Brazil. But the ban was lifted in October 2024 after a US$5 million fine and the blocking of accounts which spread disinformation. An increasing list of countries and international organisations are already placing restrictions on TikTok use. Since 2023, The EU Commission, NATO, Canada, and Denmark, have banned the use of TikTok on work phones. Likewise Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway have banned TikTok on governmental devices. India and Nepal have gone even further, introducing a national ban on TikTok, in 2020 and 2023 respectively. Australia is currently implementing a social media ban for children under 16.
Striking a balance is essential: countries with an autocratic past may not favour outright bans on social media platforms
These measures generate debate about regulators’ need to balance the protection of individual rights and democracy against concerns about privacy. Social media can support political engagement, and countries with an autocratic past may not necessarily favour the censorship or banning of the major platforms.
As a matter of urgency, democracies should address the negative effects of digital political campaigning. Technological developments require national and transnational reforms of electoral laws, and greater focus on the negative effects of campaign activities. In addition to political parties, consultancies, influencers, platforms and search engines involved in various activities of digital campaigning require regulatory attention. International organisations, governments, parties, NGOs and traditional media should monitor online misinformation, disinformation and mal-information. And to counter the risks of online campaigning, detailed risk identification and mitigation processes need to converge around democratic principles. Lastly, they should devote more time and resources towards improving citizens’ civic education and digital skills for democracy.
