Germany’s domestic intelligence agency is supposed to defend democracy from extremist threats. But new statistical evidence suggests that branches of the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland are most likely to be labelled extremist in regions where the party is electorally strongest. This pattern, says Henning Schäckelhoff, raises a difficult question: is militant democracy protecting the constitution – or shaping political competition?
Germany’s system of militant democracy gives the state powerful tools to defend the constitutional order. One of its tools is the Verfassungsschutz, the domestic intelligence service tasked with monitoring extremist threats to the constitution, mainly organisations and parties.
These classifications matter. When the state labels a party branch 'proven right-wing extremist', its decision shapes public perception. It may discourage voters, civil servants and potential members from associating with the party. It can also spark debates about whether a party should be banned or whether members of that party should work in the public sector.
My analysis identifies a striking pattern. Branches of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) are significantly more likely to receive the most severe classification in states where the party is electorally strong.
Electoral support between 2020 and 2026 predicts extremist classification better than geography does. Once we take voting patterns into account, the familiar distinction between East and West Germany disappears.
This pattern does not prove politicisation. But it raises a question militant democracy cannot avoid: what happens when defence of the constitution overlaps with party competition?
The Verfassungsschutz does not prosecute crimes. It collects and analyses intelligence on activities that may threaten Germany’s liberal democratic order.
Authorities use three main categories:
Each step expands surveillance powers and increases political and public stigma.
Germany’s constitution allows the banning of political parties if they seek to abolish democracy. Only the Federal Constitutional Court can impose such bans, and the threshold is deliberately high.
Germany’s constitution allows the banning of political parties if they seek to abolish democracy; the threshold is deliberately high
Classifications therefore sit at the boundary between security policy and democratic competition. Decisions are formally technical, but politically consequential.
Germany’s federal structure adds another layer of complexity. Each state has its own Verfassungsschutz office under the authority of the state interior ministry. Political parties that compete directly with the AfD are running these ministries.
Critics argue that this institutional design creates at least a potential conflict of interest. Supporters contend that judicial review prevents abuse of power, and that the Verfassungsschutz is not acting on its own accord.
Either way, extremist classifications are never politically neutral in their effects.
To understand the pattern of classifications, I analysed Verfassungsschutz assessments across the German Länder between 2020 and 2026, using an ordinal logistic regression model. I took 2020 as my starting point because it was the first time the AfD had been labelled a suspected case, in Brandenburg; 2026 is when the latest Land labelled an AfD branch in Lower Saxony a proven extremist organisation.
I took two factors into my analysis:
The results are unambiguous.
Higher AfD vote shares strongly increase the probability of a 'proven extremist' classification. The relationship is statistically significant and robust.
Regional location, by contrast, has no explanatory power once we include electoral support. The commonly cited East–West divide turns out to be largely a proxy for AfD strength.
The model achieves substantial explanatory power. Political variables outweigh regional ones by a wide margin.
The graph below shows that as AfD vote share increases; the probability of a 'proven extremist' classification rises steeply.
One interpretation is controversial but unavoidable.
If extremist classifications follow electoral strength, they may function indirectly as instruments of political competition. The label 'proven extremist' carries strong reputational costs. It may deter moderate voters and isolate the party politically.
From this perspective, militant democracy may protect the constitutional order while simultaneously protecting established parties from electoral losses.
This interpretation does not imply deliberate manipulation. Institutional dynamics alone can produce such patterns.
The label 'proven extremist' carries strong reputational costs. It may deter moderate voters and isolate a party politically
Authorities may thus wish to pay closer attention to parties that become politically relevant. Larger organisations generate more public statements and political activity, which in turn produce more evidence for classification decisions.
Electoral success and radicalisation may therefore develop in parallel.
The Verfassungsschutz bases its assessments on documented statements and activities. Courts review its decisions, including ongoing litigation concerning AfD classifications.
Yet perception can be as important as reality.
If a significant share of voters believes extremist labels follow electoral success, trust in oversight institutions may erode. The legitimacy of militant democracy depends not only on legality but also on credibility.
Germany’s militant democracy was designed to prevent the collapse of democracy from within. Its institutions reflect the lessons of the twentieth century.
Today, the challenge looks different.
The AfD is not a marginal party but a major electoral force. Instruments designed for small extremist groups now apply to a party supported by millions of voters.
This shift exposes a structural tension.
The Verfassungsschutz must defend the constitutional order. At the same time, its decisions inevitably influence political competition.
Extremist classifications follow political dynamics more closely than official narratives suggest
The statistical evidence does not prove partisan intent. But it shows that extremist classifications follow political dynamics more closely than official narratives suggest.
Militant democracy depends on public trust in institutional neutrality. Without that trust, even justified classifications risk losing their legitimacy.
The strongest defence of democracy is not only firmness against extremism. It is also the visible impartiality of the institutions that enforce it.
When extremist labels appear to track election results, that impartiality becomes harder to sustain. If a branch is labelled 'proven extremist', one solution could be a time limit on observation with an automatically engaged judicial review. In AfD's case, it remains to be seen whether this review will ever take place.
Henning teaches courses on the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany, European integration, theory and history of the modern constitutional state, and, to some extent, comparative political science.
His research interests also include European integration, democratic theory, party politics, and the relationship between law and politics.
The topic of his dissertation, Zwischen politischer und rechtlicher Verfassung: Hybridisierung der britischen Verfassung durch den UK Supreme Court?, which was published as a monograph in 2025, also falls within this field of research.
In his cumulative postdoctoral thesis, he addresses questions relating to new forms of governance, and explores the possibilities of governing ‘by proxy’ at national and supranational levels, thereby linking his fields of research.
