Giada Pasquettaz argues that although Trump is indeed a populist, he is a distinct species within the category, and should be treated accordingly. Unlike other populist leaders, Trump does not seek to reshape multilateralism from within. Instead, he rejects it altogether
On his first day in office, Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the World Health Organization. Two years later, his administration had initiated withdrawals from dozens of international organisations it considered 'Contrary to the Interests of the United States'.
Most people fear the end of an international liberal order grounded on multilateralism and reciprocal support. Here, I consider whether Donald Trump is still behaving like a right-wing populist at the international level.
Right-wing populist leaders often criticise international organisations and multilateral organisations. For example, the leader of the Italian political party Lega, Matteo Salvini, has 'declared war' on NGOs that rescue migrants in the Mediterranean. Across Europe and beyond, right-wing populists claim that unaccountable elites who threaten national sovereignty dominate the international ground.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni recently recorded a video for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, supporting his bid for re-election in April. In it, she claimed: 'Together we stand for a Europe that respects national sovereignty; it is proud of its cultural and religious roots'.
But do these politicians' words necessarily translate into action? When we look at what they do in practice, the picture is slightly different.
One way to make sense of Trump’s behaviour is to look at his international allies in government. Right-wing populists in power tend to behave in a recurring pattern. While they continue to criticise international institutions rhetorically, they rarely dismantle them outright. Instead, their language moderates, and their engagement becomes more selective. Populist contestation does not take the form of disengagement.
In opposition, Giorgia Meloni cast the EU as unaccountable, globalist elites. Once in office, she increasingly spoke the language of partnership, especially in moments of crisis
Giorgia Meloni's behaviour offers a good example. As an opposition leader, she cast the European Union and international organisations as unaccountable elites imposing 'nihilistic globalism' on sovereign nations. Yet once in office, her rhetoric shifted. Without abandoning nationalist allies or conservative symbolism, Meloni increasingly spoke the language of partnership, especially in moments of crisis. She no longer portrayed international cooperation as betrayal by elites, but as a strategic necessity to protect national interests.
This pattern suggests that populism in power is not simply about rejection. It is about reframing: cooperation becomes acceptable when leaders can present it as serving 'the people' at home.
Material choices mirror this rhetorical moderation. We know that populist governments tend to reduce multilateral foreign aid contributions while preserving, or even expanding, bilateral channels. The goal is not withdrawal, but control. Multilateral aid they frame as money lost to distant bureaucracies; bilateral aid, by contrast, they justify as purposeful, conditional, and nationally beneficial. Foreign aid is then diverted, but without a commitment to disengaging.
Seen through this lens, international cooperation becomes narrower and more transactional. Aid is no longer about shared – emotional – responsibility toward distant others. Rather, it is about domestic priorities such as migration management, border control, or geopolitical leverage. Cooperation survives – but only when it can be domesticated.
Most right-wing populists in power, therefore, walk a tightrope: they maintain anti-elite rhetoric while avoiding outright exits that would signal incompetence or irresponsibility.
Trump, however, does not follow this script.
Rather than moderate his behaviour, Trump opts for exit: from the World Health Organization, from climate agreements, and from a growing number of IOs not aligned with current American interests. This goes beyond symbolic contestation or strategic obstruction; indeed, it’s a tactic MEPs from Viktor Orbán's party Fidesz often use. Unusually for a populist, Trump's actions match his words. Amid the recent tariff war with Europe, he announced on his Truth Social platform that 'in order to protect Global Peace and Security, strong measures must be taken so that this potentially perilous situation ends quickly, and without question'.
Unusually for a populist, Trump's actions match his words. His administration is breaking agreements, and leaving organisations not aligned with current US interests
And this is where the label 'right-wing populist' begins to strain. Unlike Meloni, Trump does not seek to reshape multilateralism from within or instrumentalise it for domestic legitimacy. Instead, he rejects it altogether.
If we understand populism as a political style, rather than an ideology, it helps us clarify why. Populists thrive by 'performing' crises: they amplify failure, assign blame, and position themselves as the only authentic defenders of 'the people'. Crucially, however, governing populists usually need to resolve crises, at least symbolically, by offering protection, competence, or leadership.
Trump’s performance on Truth Social expands this idea. He frames global politics almost entirely through the first person – him – a 'lonely hero' seeking revenge for the missed Nobel Peace Prize. He weaponises tariffs against those who oppose him, promises peace through unilateral strength, and depicts international organisations not as arenas of cooperation but as instruments that should serve the US, or be abandoned.
Trump frames global politics almost entirely through the first person – him. Rather than mobilising a collective of 'real Americans', Trump’s discourse collapses 'the people' into the leader himself
This suggests a personalisation that goes beyond ideology alone. Rather than mobilising a defined collective of 'real Americans', Trump’s discourse increasingly collapses 'the people' into the leader himself. 'America First' becomes indistinguishable from the authority and will of the 'I'. Trump is not pitting people against elites, but substituting the people with a personalised performance of strength, one that leaves little room for cooperation.
This helps explain why Trump’s foreign policy feels more destabilising than that of many other right-wing populists. While others adapt their rhetoric to the constraints of office, Trump doubles down on antagonism.
The danger, then, is not populist scepticism toward ideology-led multilateralism per se. It is exit-oriented populism that translates rhetoric into withdrawal – from organisations and from agreements – as an end in itself. When populists 'want out', the unmaking of multilateralism is not accidental; it is the point. Clearly, 'populism' has now become a combination of ideology and political style.
No.101 in a Loop series on the 🔮 Future of Populism
Image credit: World Economic Forum / Benedikt von Loebell. CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
