Current focus on the new Syrian government's sectarianism risks overlooking its dual policy of co-optation and brutality. Here, Andrea Novellis suggests a new framework to explain how the logic of post-conflict consolidation drives this seemingly contradictory approach
The Assad regime’s collapse in December 2024 left a puzzling reality. The new Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa has pursued a sophisticated charm offensive, securing international aid and winning sanctions relief from the West. At the same time, its forces have engaged in brutal massacres of Alawite and Druze minorities. Why does Al-Sharaa's regime engage simultaneously in inclusive state-building and exclusionary violence?
Existing theories fail to explain the parallel strategy of coercion and cooptation. To remedy this, I analysed the factors influencing the new regime's power consolidation process during its first few months. My typology of short-term rebel consolidation suggests that the logic behind Al-Sharaa’s power consolidation as a state-building project is driven by a calculus of threat and opportunity.
Al-Sharaa’s power consolidation as a state-building project is driven by a calculus of threat and opportunity
To understand the differences, we look at two things: who won the conflict, a single group or a loose alliance, and how the new regime holds power. Does it use peaceful, inclusive methods (co-optation), or does it rely on violence and fear (coercion)?
Combining these two factors creates four possible paths for post-conflict rule. A unified winner can build a stable, inclusive autocracy (Integrated Hegemony) or rule through terror (Coercive Hegemony). A fractured alliance might try to stay together through fragile negotiations (Fragile Coalition) or fall into chaos as former allies fight each other (Warlord Anarchy).
| Unified Hegemon | Fractured Coalition | ||
| Dominant consolidation strategy | Co-optative | Integrated Hegemony | Fragile Coalition |
| Dominant consolidation strategy | Coercive | Coercive Hegemony | Warlord Anarchy |
The fall of Damascus was a Fractured victory, achieved by a coalition between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). The Al-Sharaa government’s primary goal has been to transition from this precarious, fractured reality to a durable, Unified Hegemony.
To achieve this, the new government has pursued a dual-track strategy of selective co-optation and coercion. My framework foresees this combination, because, to consolidate into a unified hegemon, fractured victors must expand their base through inclusion and neutralise threats through elimination. Two factors dictate this strategy: the specific faction or community under consideration, and whether the government perceives that group as a flexible partner to be integrated, or an irreconcilable threat to be eliminated.
The government’s most visible strategy has been co-optation: incorporating compatible armed groups and civil society actors through institutional channels to secure power where it was weakest. The primary driver was an existential need for resources; without sanctions relief and foreign investment, the new government would fail.
My framework explains this as a move to build an Integrated Hegemony. The government pursued international co-optation, rebranding its leader, establishing a security partnership with the US, and attracting Saudi Arabia as a powerful regional patron. This strategy culminated in the lifting of US and EU sanctions and over $13 billion in reconstruction deals. Domestically, co-optation was a two-pronged strategy to neutralise military rivals and build broader political legitimacy. In my framework, a fractured victor seeking to become an Integrated Hegemony expands its coalition through selective inclusion to reduce fragmentation while retaining central control.
Aware that his new government would fail without sanctions relief and foreign investment, Al-Sharaa has used institutional channels to secure power and resources
The government co-opted the SNA by integrating its factions as a bloc and appointing powerful warlords to senior posts. Simultaneously, it co-opted key civil society figures to established bodies like the National Commission for Transitional Justice, and held a National Dialogue Conference.
Alongside this co-optative campaign, however, the government has deployed brutal coercion against groups it sees as irreconcilable threats to its project to build a centralised, unified state. In my framework, a would-be hegemon uses Coercive Hegemony when it cannot integrate a rival faction or out-group without jeopardising its monopoly on power and ideological vision. The Al-Sharaa government's approach to the Alawite and Druze minorities is one such example.
Al-Sharaa regarded the Alawite community, the sectarian base of the Assad regime, as a potential fifth column for loyalist insurgencies. This threat perception led to brutal 'security campaigns'. These campaigns culminated in the March 2025 massacres, where a government counter-offensive devolved into sectarian retribution, killing over 1,400 people.
Similarly, the Druze community’s demand for autonomy, along with its independent militias, represented a direct challenge to state centralisation. When clashes erupted in Suwayda in July 2025, government forces intervened not as peacekeepers but as partisan enforcers, committing widespread atrocities against Druze civilians. Likewise, where in-group military challengers refused to submit, coercion was also absolute. In April 2024, Al-Sharaa forces forcibly dismantled the autonomous Eighth Brigade in Daraa after a massive show of force. Their message was clear: the government would crush armed defiance.
Alongside co-optation, the Al-Sharaa regime has deployed brutal coercion against groups it sees as irreconcilable threats to its project to build a centralised, unified state
The government's strategy toward the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a stalled Fragile Coalition. Out of necessity, Damascus pursued co-optation through the March 2025 integration agreement. The SDF was too powerful to coerce, and intense US pressure for a deal was critical to securing international legitimacy. Irreconcilable ideological conflict, however, has stalled the agreement. The government’s insistence on a centralised state, rejecting federalism as a red line, is fundamentally incompatible with the SDF's core demands. Thus, under the model, such deadlock increases the likelihood of the government resorting to coercive strategies.
The Al-Sharaa government's dual-track approach reflects a cold logic of consolidation: building legitimacy while brutally silencing internal threats. Syria is currently rebuilding from the ruins of Assad’s collapse. As it does so, the new regime’s calculus will continue to shift, blending pragmatism and violence, depending on whether it perceives different groups as assets to integration or obstacles to power. The paradox of Syria's new peace, then, is that stability and violence are not opposites but intertwined strategies of rule.
