The cancelled elections and the mainstreaming of the far right in Romania

Hard-right ‘TikTok messiah’ Călin Georgescu was leading the Romanian presidential race when suspected Russian intervention prompted the Constitutional Court to annul the elections. Ana Țăranu analyses how the annulment feeds into the Romanian far right's polarising worldview

On 12 January 2025, tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Bucharest in support of former presidential candidate Călin Georgescu. A hard-right independent, Georgescu is now challenging the Romanian Constitutional Court's decision to cancel the first round of the presidential elections, which he won. The Court, however, ruled that there was clear evidence of Russian intervention in his TikTok-centric election campaign. It made its annulment ruling at the very last moment, on the eve of the second round. Indeed, voting in this round had already got underway among the Romanian diaspora – a stronghold of Georgescu support.

All this is evidence of the incremental normalisation of far-right rhetoric in Romania. With Georgescu’s entry into the second round and the coalition efforts of all pro-European parties in a ‘nation-saving’ project, Romanian political life is fundamentally altered. Manichean far-right contestation prevails: pro-Europeans versus sovereigntists, Westernisers versus patriots, elites versus the people.

Protesters gathered in Bucharest. Photo: Ana Țăranu

Sovereigntist building blocks

It is not the first time that far-right mobilisation has exposed blind spots in Romania's political establishment. The far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians' (AUR) entry into parliament in 2020 was similarly regarded as shocking. Based on targeted online campaigning, AUR won 9% of the votes with a straightforwardly populist electoral platform: the patriotic fight against corrupt political elites, whose servitude towards the West had weakened national sovereignty. The Covid-19 pandemic created a favourable environment for AUR's protectionist, anti-globalist stances, as has war in Ukraine.

AUR has since managed to double its support, winning 18.3% of the votes in the 2024 legislative elections. Unsurprisingly, two new players have emerged in the so-called ‘sovereigntist’ parliamentary bloc: Diana Iovanovici-Șoșoacă’s S.O.S. Romania (founded after her 2021 exclusion from AUR) and POT (Partidul Oamenilor Tineri – The Party of Young People), a consistent supporter of Georgescu. In the 1 December legislative elections, S.O.S. and POT helped push overall support for the far right to around a third.

Most expected the second round of the presidential race to be a run-off between current PM Marcel Ciolacu and George Simion

This surge of the far right was not, in fact, unforeseen. Most expected the second round of elections to be a run-off between current PM Marcel Ciolacu (Social Democratic Party) and the far-right George Simion, leader of AUR. Visible in both traditional and online media – his TikTok account has 1.2 million followers –, Simion played by the populist textbook. The fact that he lost to Georgescu shows how far-right normalisation is a double-edged sword.

Protester livestreaming during the 12 January sovereigntist protests organised by AUR. Photo: Ana Țăranu

Challenges of mainstreaming: why not Simion?

As a player in mainstream politics, AUR has struggled to moderate its far-right positions without alienating its electorate. A common strategy to mitigate this has been to exclude some party members – notably Șoșoacă and Georgescu. Removed for ‘indiscipline’ and for their public praise of fascist leaders, both went on to secure substantial support and claim the coveted (albeit marginal) position of populist truth-bearers. Simion tried to court the conservative electorate by moderating his stances. Questions on minority rights and NATO membership got favourable answers in his personable TikTok Q&As.

George Simion during an at-home Q&A: 'I will be involved in getting people in a relationship the rights they are asking for.'

The diffusion of nationalist and conservative rhetoric across the political spectrum complemented his moderation. AUR infused their aggressively nationalist early 2024 campaign with historical imagery and religious symbolism. It seems to have changed the lexicon of domestic politics. Fellow candidates, such as Elena Lasconi, embraced religious symbols, folkloric patterns, and flowery patriotic language across their political communication. Against this common background, Simion’s attempt at Meloni-style populism made him indistinguishable from the ‘system’ candidates. In other words, he became too mainstream.

Simion’s attempt at Meloni-style populism made him indistinguishable from the other candidates: he became too mainstream

Georgescu’s anti-system mysticism

Georgescu’s (apparent) disengagement from traditional politics and the media boosted his appeal and the legitimacy of his anti-system mysticism. His central themes were Romanian exceptionalism, economic protectionism, geopolitical ‘neutrality’ (with anti-Ukrainian and Russophile overtones), and the recurrent motif of a common body of the nation, unified finally in an electoral work of God.

Viral AI-generated TikTok visual protesting the annulment.
The text reads: 'The Enemy IS NOT RUSSIAN; the Enemy is Romanian!'

Annulment or coup d'état?

The annulment came as a relief to many, as well as an infuriating confirmation of far-right capacity-building. In an abusive and poorly orchestrated coup d'état, the highly politicised institutions of the ‘system’ swooped in to save it once again. Or so argue Georgescu and Simion, who are interpreting the court's decision as a sovereigntist fight. AUR was quick to launch an online petition 'for free elections'. The petition has reached around a million signatures and is part of its notification of concerns to the Venice Commission. It is saddening for a Romanian patriot, argues Simion in a TikTok video, that it takes external intervention to restore Romanian democracy.

To many Romanians, annulment of the election came as a relief, as well as infuriating confirmation of far-right capacity-building

The paradoxical status of these far-right leaders, who court Western support while claiming complete sovereignty, remains less obvious than the simple narrative around which they rally: the salvation of Romanian dignity from Western degeneration.

That a similar language of national salvation has entered the vocabulary of pro-European parties suggests it is indeed effective. But it also highlights how, ahead of the spring 2025 election rerun, a Manichean narrative of populist contestation is gaining ground, pitting Westernisers against self-styled patriots, or globalist elites against an increasingly endangered people.

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

photograph of Ana Țăranu
Ana Țăranu
PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology, University of Warwick / Department of Film and Media, Babeș-Bolyai University

Ana is pursuing her PhD in a joint programme funded by the EUTOPIA Alliance.

Her doctoral research approaches the cultural history of the contemporary far right in Central Eastern Europe, with a focus on Romania.

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