Zeynep MenteÅŸoÄŸlu Tardivo
Zeynep Mentesoglu Tardivo analyses the role played by nominally democratic political institutions in authoritarian regimes. She argues that rulers design such institutions to consolidate their power base, even at the cost of economic and political development Read more
Jun Koga Sudduth
Does the creation of nominally democratic institutions help dictators stay in power by reducing the risk of coups d’etat? Jun Koga Sudduth analyses and categorises different types of coup, and their effects. In so doing, she confounds the conventional wisdom that democratic institutions reduce the likelihood of dictators being overthrown Read more
Alexander Dukalskis
Authoritarian states deliberately use a number of tools to manage their image internationally, writes Alexander Dukalskis. Creating positive news, distracting and silencing critique, and shaping elite opinion help make the world safer for dictatorships Read more
Lars Pelke
It is a common assumption that autocrats have no incentive to redistribute income and wealth. Not so, says Lars Pelke. Uncertainty about the outcomes of autocratic elections can incentivise dictators to redistribute wealth, especially when the incumbents’ ruling coalition is inclusive Read more
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