Many regarded the coronacrisis as a shock that would reshape the management of public life, improving Spain's preparedness for future crises. But Francisco Javier Romero Caro explains how, in their disastrous handling of recent floods in Valencia, Spanish politicians seemed to have forgotten the lessons learned during the pandemic

Cooperation as a hallmark of pandemic management in Spain

The Covid-19 crisis highlighted two key lessons about crisis management. First, it showed the need for swift decision-making. Second, it highlighted the importance of intergovernmental coordination, especially in countries with multiple layers of government. The pandemic spurred a surge in intergovernmental cooperation, and not just in traditionally cooperative states like Germany and Switzerland. Cooperation also improved dramatically in countries like Spain and Italy, where such forums had, until that point, remained less developed.

Spain is a country with a longstanding lack of intergovernmental cooperation. But the pandemic prompted a remarkable shift. The number of sectoral conferences skyrocketed from an annual average of 56 to 169 in 2020, and to 171 in 2021. This emphasis on shared governance made Spain a notable case study. Spain's response to the first wave of the pandemic was initially centralised. But by the second wave, the country had established strong coordination between central government and autonomous communities. This resulted in decentralised management of the state of emergency.

Discoordination, ineptitude, and lack of leadership: a deadly combination

In October 2024, torrential rains struck eastern Spain, causing deadly flooding and widespread destruction. As during the pandemic, the disaster demanded swift and coordinated response from public administrations. Such a response, however, never materialised. This led to catastrophic consequences that the people of Spain will feel for years, if not decades.

Spain's meteorological agency had issued red-level weather alerts for the morning of 29 October. Their warnings signalled extreme danger and significant risk to the population. Despite these warnings, public administrations failed to take necessary protection measures.

Despite warnings from Spain's meteorological agency of extreme danger to life, public administrations failed to take the necessary protection measures

Communication between the national meteorological agency, the river monitoring entity, and regional emergency management bodies was inadequate. Crucial emails warning of rising water in the Poyo ravine — right up until the currents swept away the monitoring devices — were sent too late. Valencia’s Emergency Department ignored them. The regional president, Carlos Mazón, in an egregious display of ineptitude and irresponsibility, remained unreachable for more than two hours.

It was not until 5pm that the authorities convened a crisis centre, despite Valencia’s government having requested military assistance in Utiel (80 km from the epicentre) two hours earlier.

The lack of coordination was so severe that Valencia’s crisis centre did not issue a mobile phone alert to the population until 8:11pm. But this was a full 90 minutes after warnings about the river’s rise, and many towns were already submerged. Notably, the decision to send the alert was prompted not by flooding, but by concerns over the potential failure of the Forata Dam.

Political legitimacy under scrutiny

The poor crisis management provided fertile ground for populist movements, who united under the slogan 'only the people save the people'. This discontent culminated in outbursts of anger — and violence — during the visit of the King and Prime Minister to Paiporta. The lack of coordination between administrations had left some areas awaiting assistance days after the floods.

Research from the LEGITIMULT project shows that public trust increases when different levels of government make decisions collaboratively. In Spain, this effect is even more pronounced for regional governments, whose decisions gain greater acceptance when coordinated with the central government.

When the floodwaters rose, central government failed to use its legal powers to centralise crisis management, as it did during the pandemic

This makes it all the more striking that central government failed to use its legal powers to centralise crisis management, as it did when the pandemic struck. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez argued that assuming the Valencian government’s responsibilities would undermine the effectiveness of public action. Only after two days of blame-shifting did both governments eventually begin to demonstrate cooperation. Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska joined Valencia’s crisis centre and deployed over 18,000 personnel, including military and security forces.

Navigating crisis responses: from expert governance to political salvation

During the pandemic, expert committees proliferated. These committees were both advisory bodies to policymakers, and instruments to enhance the legitimacy of decisions and mitigate public criticism. In Italy and Spain, these experts gained significant media prominence, creating an appearance of technocratic crisis management.

Under mounting criticism for his poor handling of the crisis, Valencia’s president appears to have drawn inspiration from the pandemic approach. He appointed Lieutenant General Francisco José Gan Pampols, a retired military officer with experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, as vice president in charge of reconstructing affected areas. Gan Pampols' responsibilities included coordinating with central government, which, to overcome political rifts and work collaboratively, also named a special commissioner for reconstruction. Both agreed to seek collaboration, despite the fact that they have not yet announced any meetings — or, indeed, tangible results.

Five months into his tenure, the vice president in charge of reconstructing affected areas has announced no concrete initiatives or budgets for reconstruction

Gan Pampols was appointed in November 2024. So far, however, he has failed to deliver the impact Mazón desired. Five months into his tenure, beyond calls for cooperation and claims of independence, Gan Pampols has announced no concrete initiatives or budgets for reconstruction. Opposition parties have already begun accusing President Mazón of using the appointment as a ploy to salvage his image following his disastrous mishandling of the crisis.

The road ahead

Spain’s contrasting responses to the pandemic and the Valencia floods reveal the crucial role of leadership, coordination, and swift decision-making in effective and legitimate crisis management. While the pandemic exemplified the potential for intergovernmental cooperation, the flood crisis revealed the costs of inaction and discord.

Moving forward, Spanish authorities must institutionalise the lessons learned from both events to ensure preparedness and resilience for future crises. Prioritising collaborative governance, clear communication channels, and robust contingency planning will be essential to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.

This article uses some preliminary results from the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme Project LEGITIMULT, Grant Number HORIZON-CL2-2021-DEMOCRACY-01, GA Nr. 101061550