The Nuclear Suppliers Group faces new tests from great-power rivalry, climate change, and the spread of nuclear technology. Syeda Saba Batool argues the Group needs clear rules for admitting countries outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to ensure that climate-vulnerable developing states gain fair access to civilian nuclear energy
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created in 1975, following global concern over India’s 1974 nuclear tests. Its seven founding members — the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, West Germany, and Canada — sought to stop civilian nuclear trade from being misused for weapons development. The Group now has 48 members that collectively oversee most global nuclear exports.
Today, renewed great-power rivalry has intensified the risks of proliferation. Russia has revised its nuclear doctrine in response to Western military support for Ukraine. The United States, meanwhile, remains locked in strategic competition with China. India plays a balancing role in this increasingly multipolar order.
India first applied for NSG membership in 2016. In 2023, a joint Indo-US statement reaffirmed Washington’s support for India’s bid. Such selective support can heighten regional tensions, much as it did in 2008, when the US lobbied for India’s exemption from NSG restrictions on nuclear trade. India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not apply full-scope safeguards from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Despite objections from some NSG members, the US secured the waiver to strengthen its partnership with New Delhi. Supporters of the deal argued that it brought more of India’s civilian facilities under IAEA inspection, improving transparency.
Today, renewed great-power rivalry has intensified the risks of proliferation
This case matters beyond South Asia. The 2008 exemption raised concerns among several NSG members that it was blurring the line between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states. Critics warned that such exceptional treatment undermined the NSG’s credibility and commitment to equal standards.
Indian media reports in 2022 suggested growing international support for India’s NSG bid, including from Beijing. Yet China — which blocked India’s application in 2016 — remains opposed.
NSG decisions are made by consensus and behind closed doors. Information gaps invite speculation. Media in India and Pakistan often present conflicting stories to influence opinion. Real progress toward membership is signalled not by public statements but by measurable actions: aligning export-control rules with NSG standards, enforcing them effectively, and expanding IAEA safeguards to more facilities. Quiet technical steps matter more than diplomatic headlines.
India’s pursuit of membership reflects both great-power ambition and domestic political incentives, as governments use foreign-policy achievements to signal strength at home. Election cycles and prestige politics — the effort to claim credit for landmark international successes — can narrow the space for compromise. For most NSG members, 'like-mindedness' is judged by performance. Strengths include strong export-control laws, clear separation of civilian and military fuel cycles, compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and willingness to extend IAEA safeguards.
Russia’s recent use of high-precision, non-nuclear weapons in Ukraine has prompted some non-nuclear states to question whether nuclear powers would truly defend them in a crisis
Russia’s recent use of high-precision, non-nuclear weapons in Ukraine has also heightened insecurity. This has prompted some non-nuclear states to question whether nuclear powers would truly defend them in a crisis. In this tense environment, the NSG’s confidential decision-making process leaves space for propaganda and mixed messaging. Indian and Pakistani outlets regularly trade claims of imminent entry or threatened vetoes. Such coverage often exaggerates progress or conceals unresolved problems. Durable signs of commitment are legal reforms and verified compliance — though these rarely attract media attention.
Developing countries urgently need clean energy to combat climate change. Nuclear power, which emits very low levels of greenhouse gases, can help meet rising demand while advancing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. It can also reduce dependence on fossil fuels, and tackle energy shortages and climate-driven instability. Yet domestic politics and geopolitical rivalry often delay projects and distort investment priorities.
Many NSG members remain reluctant to admit non-NPT states, yet these states are often among the most climate vulnerable. Excluding them from civilian nuclear trade limits global efforts to cut emissions and adapt to a warming world.
Pakistan, for instance, faces severe climate stress and energy shortages. Its civilian nuclear programme has expanded under IAEA oversight, and Islamabad emphasises its compliance with international safety standards. At the same time, Pakistan’s history of illicit nuclear transfers still colours how some NSG members perceive it. Pakistan argues that NSG membership would help it meet its energy needs responsibly. Without membership, the country remains cut off from much of the global nuclear market. Several African and Latin American countries have made similar appeals for equitable access to civilian nuclear technology, highlighting that this is not a South Asian problem alone but a broader governance gap. Balancing these developmental and security pressures will define the NSG’s relevance in the coming decades.
US backing for India’s membership — and India’s balancing between Western and Asian partners — has complicated consensus among NSG governments. To preserve the Group’s credibility, decisions on new members should rest on transparent, technical criteria rather than geopolitical favouritism.
To preserve the credibility of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, decisions on new members should rest on transparent, technical criteria rather than geopolitical favouritism
India and Pakistan must demonstrate that they meet the NSG’s standards of like-mindedness, transparency, and responsible trade. This will require both to strengthen export-control laws, expand safeguards, and show consistency across other non-proliferation regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and The Australia Group.
The five permanent members of the UN Security Council should lead by example: either by enforcing NSG guidelines equitably and aligning their own policies with the NPT’s Article VI obligations, or by committing to impartial, criteria-based assessments of non-NPT applicants. Renewed commitment to arms-control treaties would help rebuild trust and create space for fair decisions that meet security and energy needs.
As the NSG turns fifty, its greatest challenge is to refine its membership criteria and apply them consistently. By judging all applicants on equal terms — their safeguards, export-control records, and non-proliferation performance — the Group can strengthen global security and sustainable energy access.
