🔮 Can the populist radical-right National Rally win the 2027 French presidential election? 

A Jordan Bardella presidency would represent the most significant reconfiguration of executive power since the Fifth Republic’s founding. Even without a radical policy rupture, the symbolic impact on democratic norms and institutional trust would be profound. For the EU, says John Ryan, the risk lies less in immediate withdrawal or obstruction than in gradual divergence

France’s 2027 presidential election could mark a decisive break in the country’s postwar political settlement. In March 2025, Marine Le Pen was convicted for misuse of EU funds — resulting in a five-year ban from standing for office. This has accelerated a succession process within the far-right Rassemblement National (RN), or National Rally. The party’s president, Jordan Bardella, has positioned himself as Le Pen's successor. In first-round voting intentions, he currently polls at levels comparable to Le Pen herself. 

The prospect of a Bardella candidacy raises urgent questions for French democracy and European politics. While the so-called 'republican front' has historically prevented the far right from winning national office, its durability is increasingly in doubt. Public distrust of mainstream parties, the erosion of traditional coalition norms, and the normalisation of RN’s leadership and discourse suggest that 2027 could become a watershed election. Here, I assess Bardella’s path to the presidency, the constraints he faces, and the implications for France, and Europe, should he prevail.

Macron’s technocratic approach alienates voters 

Since the early 2000s, French politics has relied on an informal cordon sanitaire to block the far right from power. This 'republican front' has functioned through tactical voting and cross-party alliances, particularly in second-round presidential and legislative contests. However, successive elections since 2017 indicate that this mechanism is weakening. 

Public perceptions of Macron have played a significant role in this realignment. Critics increasingly associate his presidency with technocratic arrogance, limited empathy, and an inability to deliver on core voter concerns such as public order, immigration, and social cohesion. Over seven years, repeated episodes of unrest and persistent concerns about illegal immigration have fuelled dissatisfaction, strengthening the RN’s appeal as an anti-system alternative. 

Pullquote: Since 2017, an informal cordon sanitaire has blocked the far right from power. This mechanism could now be weakening

President Emmanuel Macron’s failure to secure a parliamentary majority in 2022 marked a turning point. That election confirmed the RN as a permanent force rather than a protest movement. The European Parliament and National Assembly elections of 2024 reinforced this trend, with the RN consolidating its position as the single largest party by vote share in several contests.

As trust in mainstream politics erodes, the 'republican front' appears less capable of mobilising voters against the RN. While it remains operational for now, its future effectiveness — particularly in a highly polarised second-round contest — can no longer be taken for granted. 

Marine Le Pen’s disqualification and its political effects 

On 31 March 2025, Marine Le Pen was convicted for large-scale embezzlement of European Parliament funds. Her conviction represents a structural shock to French politics. The sentence — four years in prison (two suspended), a €100,000 fine, and an immediate five-year ban from standing for public office — effectively removes her from the 2027 race unless overturned on appeal. 

Jordan Bardella represents both continuity and rupture. Closely associated with Le Pen’s leadership, he has demonstrated loyalty to her during the legal proceedings, denouncing the verdict as a 'democratic scandal'. Yet Bardella's profile differs markedly from that of the Le Pen dynasty which has dominated the far right for five decades. 

Bardella is telegenic, media-savvy, and popular among younger voters. His recent autobiography is a bestseller; and he has invested heavily in cultivating relationships with business leaders and international actors. Elements of the conservative establishment increasingly view him as a figure capable of unifying the fragmented right. This, of course, has drawn explicit comparisons with Giorgia Meloni in Italy.

Pullquote: Unlike Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella is media-savvy, and popular among younger voters. Could he unify France's fragmented right?

For voters historically repelled by Marine Le Pen’s confrontational style, Bardella appears more palatable. In February 2025, following a controversial gesture by Steve Bannon, he cancelled an appearance at the US Conservative Political Action Conference. His decision reinforces attempts to distance himself from overt extremism and transatlantic illiberal networks.

However, Bardella’s lack of executive experience remains a significant vulnerability. He has never held ministerial office, and his authority within the party is not uncontested. The RN’s old guard continues to wield influence, and internal competition may yet emerge from within the Le Pen family. The likeliest candidate is Marion Maréchal, who could seek to reclaim her political inheritance after the collapse of Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête movement. 

Bardella’s candidacy and the second-round problem 

So, Bardella appears well positioned to reach the second round of the presidential election. But can he win it? French presidential elections are structurally different from parliamentary contests: personality, perceived competence, and coalition-building capacity matter disproportionately. Historically, the RN has struggled to broaden its appeal beyond its core electorate in second-round run-offs. Even at the height of Le Pen’s popularity in 2022, the 'republican front' proved sufficient to block her path to the Elysée. Whether Bardella can overcome this barrier remains uncertain. 

Two factors work in his favour. First, the weakening legitimacy of anti-RN coalitions may reduce second-round mobilisation against him. Second, his generational and stylistic break from the Le Pen name could attract centrist or conservative voters seeking change without disruption. For European policymakers, this raises a dilemma: a Bardella presidency might pursue strategic discretion rather than outright confrontation with EU partners. This risks complicating collective foreign policy coordination rather than openly undermining it.

Pullquote: Bardella's generational and stylistic break from Le Pen could attract centrist or conservative voters. But his lack of executive experience remains a significant vulnerability

Jordan Bardella’s path to the French presidency is no longer hypothetical. Marine Le Pen’s disqualification has accelerated a generational transition within the RN, without diminishing its electoral strength. Significant obstacles remain, particularly in the second round. Yet the convergence of institutional distrust, party normalisation, and leadership renewal means that 2027 could mark a decisive turning point. 

Whether Bardella ultimately wins or loses, his candidacy signals the end of the National Rally’s political quarantine in France. For policymakers in Paris, Brussels, and beyond, the priority must now be to understand — and respond to — the structural conditions enabling this shift, rather than assuming or hoping that inherited safeguards will continue to hold.

No.99 in a Loop series on the 🔮 Future of Populism

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

photograph of John Ryan
John Ryan
Research Network Fellow, CESifo, Munich

Previously, John was a Fellow at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

LinkedIn

ORCiD

Read more articles by this author

Share Article

Republish Article

We believe in the free flow of information Republish our articles for free, online or in print, under a Creative Commons license.

Creative Commons License

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

The Loop

Cutting-edge analysis showcasing the work of the political science discipline at its best.
Read more
THE EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH
Advancing Political Science
© 2026 European Consortium for Political Research. The ECPR is a charitable incorporated organisation (CIO) number 1167403 ECPR, Harbour House, 6-8 Hythe Quay, Colchester, CO2 8JF, United Kingdom.
linkedin facebook pinterest youtube rss twitter instagram facebook-blank rss-blank linkedin-blank pinterest youtube twitter instagram