Valeriia Gergiieva examines the Iranian nuclear dilemma, from its non-compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in 2003 to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement and its eventual collapse. She analyses ongoing challenges around Iran’s nuclear policy, including its growing uranium stockpile, and renewal of pressure from the US
Iran has been a proliferation concern since 2003. That was the first time the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had been non-compliant with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
In 2005, newly elected president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took a hard stance on nuclear policy. Rather than rely on expensive enriched fuel from other countries, Ahmadinejad claimed Iran's right to develop its own nuclear fuel cycle. In so doing, he triggered a new period of sanctions against the Iranian government.
Sanctions against Iran peaked between 2010 and 2012. In 2010, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1929. Its Resolution extended the arms embargo, and tightened restrictions on financial and shipping companies engaged in ‘proliferation-sensitive activities’. The Resolution passed only because Russia and China finally agreed not to block it.
In 2012, the EU tightened its restrictions on trade with Iran. It imposed an oil embargo, and froze Central Bank of Iran assets in the EU. The result was serious economic decline in Iran, and increased political pressure on Ahmadinejad. In the 2012 elections, Ahmadinejad suffered a heavy defeat. Hassan Rouhani, a politician willing to negotiate with the West, became Iran's new President.
Amid a failing economy and loss of support from Russia and China, in 2015 Iran agreed a deal that would limit its nuclear capabilities in return for sanctions relief
Rising economic dissatisfaction, deteriorating support from Russia and China, and loss of confidence from the EU led to the successful negotiation and signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions (JCPOA). The JCPOA limited Iranian nuclear capabilities in return for sanctions relief, and imposed closer monitoring and restrictions on Iran’s uranium enrichment.
During his first term, in May 2018, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and launched a 'maximum pressure' campaign on Iran. A year later, Iran also began to withdraw from the agreement. The country rekindled its nuclear and missile development, and strengthened ties with Russia and China.
In 2019, Iran rekindled its nuclear development, and now has enough enriched uranium to build six nuclear bombs
Western sanctions have failed to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear capabilities. According to the IAEA's November 2024 report, the country had 182.3kg of uranium enriched to 60%. The Agency estimated the total enriched uranium stockpile in the form of UF6 (uranium hexafluoride) at 5,807.2kg. Rapid increase in enriched uranium, however, means these figures are constantly changing. According to latest IAEA reports, Iran now has 274.8 kg of uranium enriched to 60%: enough for six nuclear bombs. Most experts, however, estimate it would take Iran months to produce a functioning weapon.
Iran's 'axis of resistance' is a coalition of Iranian-backed militant organisations in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen that includes its most important ally, Hezbollah. In late 2024, the coalition suffered a significant setback. The Hezbollah-Israel conflict that erupted in October 2023 was intended to weaken Israel but resulted instead in severe damage to Hezbollah. While ceasefire from November 2024 has safeguarded Hezbollah's survival, its weakening remains a serious threat to Iranian security.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria in December 2024 also damaged Iranian geopolitical prospects. Cooperation from Assad helped Russia and Iran increase their influence in the region. Opposition rebels overthrew Assad's regime in less than two weeks: clear evidence for the West of ineffective resistance and poor military performance on both countries' part.
In early April, after numerous US airstrikes in Yemen, Iran withdrew its military personnel from Yemen for the first time, leaving the Houthis without support. This could be an attempt to de-escalate tensions with the US prior to negotiations – or preparation for a US airstrike.
Yet even in its weakened state, the axis of resistance remains a significant threat, and could succeed in radicalising Iran yet further.
On 4 February 2025, at the start of his second term, President Trump signed a memorandum reinstating 'maximum economic pressure' on Iran. Trump’s main aim is to cut Iranian oil exports to zero. But China, the biggest importer of Iranian oil, is not ready to cooperate with the US on sanctions policy. China's trading system uses mostly Chinese currency, avoiding the US dollar, and this complicates the implementation of Trump's plan.
Trump began his second term by reinstating 'maximum economic pressure' on Iran – but to make any future deal work, he will need the support of Russia and China
After reinstating 'maximum economic pressure', the next step toward negotiations, was Trump’s letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This left Iran with only two options: negotiations or a more radical approach.
To make any future deal work, Trump will need the support of Russia and China. The Kremlin initially expressed willingness to act as mediator, but its strategic partnership with Iran renders Russia a biased actor. In the past, Oman played a role in JCPOA negotiations. The choice of Oman as main mediator in the negotiation process was therefore approved by all sides.
China and Russia are still demonstrating their ongoing partnership. They have reassured Iran that its allies will not capitulate to pressure from Washington. In response to a 14 March UN Security Council meeting in New York on the Iran 'nuclear issue', Iran, Russia and China held a high-level meeting in Beijing on the same day. The three nations also conducted joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman.
The first round of talks began with a positive but cautious approach on 12 April. After the three 'constructive' rounds of US-Iran negotiations, the fourth round in Rome was postponed for 'logistical and technical' reasons. The fact that the US imposed further sanctions on Iran's oil industry on 30 April, however, could be an additional obstacle. Neither party trusts the other, so successful negotiations depend on them not crossing each other's red lines.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's recent comments on Iran's enrichment and missile programme skirted very close to the Iranian red line. Iran would not import enriched uranium, and will not give up developing its missile programme. Iran links the right to uranium enrichment and missile programme development to its deterrence capability.
Both countries' desire to find common ground offers hope for an agreement, but we should prepare for a long game with shifting rules.
Valeriia works on the IFSH Arms Control and Emerging Technologies project.
She is also a Research Fellow at the Odesa Center for Nonproliferation.
In autumn 2019, she was appointed Visiting Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey.
Valeriia is a Vice-President of the Black Sea Women in Nuclear Network, and she leads and moderates its webinar series Black Sea Experts NucTalks.
She is also a member of the ELN's Younger Generation Leadership Network.
Valeriia's research focuses on nonproliferation, disarmament, the nuclear programmes of Iran, Russia-Iran cooperation, and radiological security.
Her 2023 article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, co-authored with Ali Alkis, deals with Russia’s long-term influence over Turkey’s nuclear energy programme.
Valeriia lectures regularly on nonproliferation, arms control, and the security implications of emerging technologies.
Russia’s War on Ukraine
Springer, 2023
Chapter on how the invasion influenced Iran’s nuclear posture.
Arms Control and Europe
Springer, 2022
Chapter analysing the Iranian nuclear programme's impact on European security.
