We should understand the rise of authoritarian populism as a substantive ideology, write Armin Schäfer and Michael Zürn
Populism has been a major preoccupation of political scientists over the last thirty years. Homeland, territory, feminism, democratic quality, and Covid-19 are just a few of the themes this 🔮 Future of Populism series has covered. However, contributors have debated two questions more than any other. First: what is the meaning and definition of populism; and second: what has driven populism's success in recent decades?
In their foundational blog for this series, Mattia Zulianello and Petra Guasti identified three 'myths' about populism. We agree with them that populism is not associated with specific issue positions. Indeed, we argue, too, that populism is part of the ordinary political landscape – and it is neither right- nor left-wing.
Among scholars, there is debate between those such as Cas Mudde who see populism as a 'thin ideology', and those, like Ernesto Laclau, who consider it full of empty signifiers. In their new book, Andrew Arato and Jean L. Cohen present an 'ideal-typical definition of populism' that combines the two concepts. According to them, populism is a strategy of political mobilisation that offers a symbolic representation of the people as a whole.
Populism relies upon a friend-enemy dichotomy and nationalism, it valorises political competition, and it can espouse a variety of economic ideologies. Populist parties tend to have charismatic leaders. We also believe that populism embodies anti-internationalism and decisionism, and we define this large segment of contemporary populism as 'authoritarian populism'.
The recent rise of populism is, to a large extent, the rise of authoritarian populism
The term 'authoritarian populism', however, does not cover 'populism' as a whole – and that is beneficial. To analyse democrats, liberals, and populists meaningfully, we need a qualifying adverb. We cannot lump together neoliberals and social liberals, or liberal democrats and illiberal democrats, if we want to understand the reasons for their success or their impact on society. The same goes for populists.
The grassroots US populists of the 19th century, for example, were vastly different from modern-day authoritarian populists. To analyse their relative success and impact on the political system, we must acknowledge this. The recent rise of populism is, to a large extent, the rise of authoritarian populism. Parties and movements led by authoritarian populists are currently shaking up the world and endangering liberal democracies.
Authoritarian populism is more than a 'thin' ideology, and includes the discourses of contemporary populists. From a cleavage perspective (as in the work of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan), no ideology has a solution to all the world's potential ills; rather, it responds to the urgent problems of the era in which it exists. Ideologies only develop in interaction with competing ideologies, binding together the issues relevant to a given cleavage. Authoritarian populism, as Jan-Werner Müller suggests, does not depend on sophisticated philosophical texts. Rather, it depends upon the capacity to fuse ideas and sentiments to justify the exercise of power.
No ideology has a solution to all the world's potential ills; rather, it responds to the urgent problems of a given era
An ideology is 'thick' (substantial) if it develops a narrative that brings together the contentious issues of a particular time. Many ideologies develop as time goes on, adapting to new social challenges and objections. In so doing, they become detached from the conditions of their time of origin. Liberalism originated in this way in the eighteenth century. It distanced itself from absolute monarchy but was subsequently embraced by a far wider section of bourgeois society.
We contend that despite its lack of sophistication, authoritarian populism is based on a fully-fledged political ideology. It has very specific ideas about how to influence and mobilise the will of the people. It takes a strong view, for example, on migration, trade, international institutions, Russian aggression against Ukraine, climate change, and Covid-19. On all these issues, authoritarian populists oppose the Greens and the New Left. For example, the main enemy of Alternative für Deutschland in Germany is the Green Party.
Authoritarian populism has very specific ideas about how to influence and mobilise the will of the people
Authoritarian populism has created a new cleavage between liberal cosmopolitans and nationalist communitarians. Authoritarian populists can lean either left or right; think, for example, of Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro and Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. But authoritarian populism does not need a host ideology, and this helps explain the rise of authoritarian populism worldwide. Indeed, authoritarian populist ideology is one half of a new two-dimensional political landscape. We can't explain it simply as a backlash by working-class people against cultural marginalisation or economic inequality.
At the core of authoritarian populism is the liberal-democratic tension between popular sovereignty and constitutionalism. This tension was present before the 1980s. However, since then, globalisation, the rise of non-majoritarian institutions and the decline of social-democratic parties representing the less privileged has resulted in a new cleavage. Those who have gained in political, economic, and cultural respects from globalism are now pitted against those who have suffered the negative economic effects of a globalised world.
Lower social classes lack representation in parliaments, and politicians are less likely to respond to the needs of the working class. At the same time, public trust in non-majoritarian institutions – such as central banks – as impartial and trustworthy agents has declined. Ordinary folk see such institutions as biased towards a liberal cosmopolitanism that protects open borders and free markets, rather than prioritising native people. Parliaments are comprised largely of educated elites who have lost touch with ordinary citizens and the everyday challenges they face.
We acknowledge the new cultural and socio-economic divisions caused by the rise of authoritarian populism. However, we feel that there is a political explanation for the ensuing polarisation. We believe that current divisions are fuelled less by specific issues such as migration or globalisation than by a wider struggle between liberal democracy and the elite political class: affective polarisation.
