We often attribute populism’s rise to structural factors — economic insecurity, digital technology, and cultural backlash. But Manoel Gehrke and Feng Yang reveal a more immediate trigger: former leaders' conviction for corruption. In less democratic contexts, these rulings open the door for governments to amplify personalistic appeals — and boost their popularity
One of the topical debates in this blog series concerns the root causes of authoritarian populism. Many scholars of the rise of populism have emphasised structural transformations — including economic insecurity, rising inequality, cultural backlash, and the destabilising effects of digital media.
Such structural forces help create the fertile ground that allows populism to emerge. However, these forces also leave unanswered questions about the drivers of elite behaviour. A close examination across countries and over time reveals that certain political contexts are more conducive to personalist strategies than others. Beyond differences in populist leaders’ electoral success, comparative analysis also highlights divergent trajectories. Some leaders moderate their rhetoric once in office; others double down on personalistic appeals.
This variation highlights the role of immediate political triggers — beyond structural factors — in shaping governments’ adoption of personalistic strategies. But are we overlooking specific political dynamics that prompt leaders to embrace these appeals? And are there specific conditions that make such appeals resonate with the public?
Our recent research highlights one underexplored political trigger: the conviction of former leaders for corruption. In the past two decades, courts have increasingly prosecuted and convicted former presidents and prime ministers on corruption charges. From Lula da Silva in Brazil to Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Nicolas Sarkozy in France, Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, Joseph Estrada in the Philippines, Park Geun-hye in South Korea and Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, these high-profile convictions were often celebrated as triumphs for accountability and the rule of law.
Few events stir politics like the downfall of a former leader. Many definitions of populism place corruption at the core: leaders frame politics as a moral struggle between a 'virtuous people' and a 'corrupt elite'. Studies on the relationship between corruption and distrust in institutions have examined the impact of scandals. Few, however, have yet addressed the effects of convictions — arguably the most consequential stage of the judicial process. What happens after the gavel falls on former leaders?
In less democratic countries, limited investigative media and weak oversight let incumbents spin convictions to their advantage
Particularly in less democratic countries, governments often repurpose corruption convictions to amplify personalistic appeals rather than to reinforce institutional credibility. In these countries, limited investigative media and weak oversight let incumbents spin convictions to their advantage. Ironically, an event meant to symbolise institutional strength — the conviction of corrupt former leaders — can, in weak democracies, serve to erode institutionalism further by fuelling personalistic legitimation. As a result, leaders seize these moments to delegitimise rivals, portray themselves as anti-corruption champions, and craft a more personalistic, anti-establishment appeal to voters.
El Salvador offers a vivid example. President Nayib Bukele rose to power after the convictions of former presidents discredited the country’s two dominant parties. Using a tough-on-crime rhetoric, Bukele cast himself as an outsider immune to the corruption of the past — gaining unprecedented popularity in the process. In the Philippines, former President Joseph Estrada’s conviction helped successors like Benigno Aquino III and Rodrigo Duterte. Both presidents harnessed public anger and branded themselves as clean-break alternatives.
In the wake of corruption convictions, leaders can cast themselves as the antidote to a 'broken' system, reaching beyond core supporters
These dynamics echo patterns identified in the study of populist communication. As Lone Sørensen argues, understanding populism requires close attention to how leaders construct meaning. In the wake of corruption convictions, personalistic appeals allow leaders to cast themselves as the antidote to a 'broken' system. These narratives can reach beyond core supporters, tapping into widespread disillusionment and drawing in the broader public. In such cases, personalist legitimation strategies turn high-profile convictions into tools for consolidating power.
Importantly, the popularity gains we observe are not the result of deeper anti-corruption institutional reforms. Nor are they simply an artifact of how people respond to surveys in more authoritarian contexts.
What are the specific political conditions that make such personalistic appeals less likely and less effective? Convictions of former leaders do not trigger personalistic rhetoric and government popularity everywhere. We found that in countries that were more democratic in the period leading up to the convictions — such as France, Brazil, and South Korea — the convictions of former leaders did not significantly boost government approval. Here, independent media, opposition parties, and civil society limit the government’s ability to shape the narrative in its favour. They may even expose selective prosecutions or ongoing corruption among those currently in power, blunting any political gains. These conditions make governments less likely to resort to personalistic appeals following a conviction.
In more democratic countries, independent media, opposition parties, and civil society limit the government’s ability to shape the narrative in its favour
These findings contribute to broader efforts to explain when personalistic appeals gain traction — and, just as importantly, when they do not. Personalistic appeals flourish not simply in moments of public discontent, but specifically when institutional checks are already weak and other actors face stiff constraints in contesting those appeals.
This nuance refines existing insights that periods of heightened uncertainty and instability lead politicians to ramp up their populist rhetoric. Building on this, we identify the conditions under which landmark convictions against former leaders can give their successors a competitive advantage, complementing existing research on the risks of punitive populism.
Our contribution joins others in this series that critically examine existing explanations and point to new directions for research on the future of populism. We argue for closer attention to the moments when leaders deploy personalistic strategies — and to their effectiveness. Understanding populism today means looking not just at why it emerges, but at when and how leaders use it — often in response to specific events like high-profile corruption convictions.
