Greenland is a test of US power – and Trump is failing it

Donald Trump’s coercion of Denmark over Greenland is not just an Arctic dispute. Igor Sevenard and Richard J. Cook argue that by treating NATO allies as real estate vendors, Trump shatters the trust necessary to deter China. Breaking faith in Europe, the US loses credibility in Asia

The paradox of power

American power stands on a paradox that many policymakers have forgotten. The US is not powerful despite its alliances. It is powerful because of them. Military might and economic resources matter less than the alliance structure that multiplies this power. For seven decades, this force multiplier enabled Washington to project influence worldwide. It helped stabilise Europe and maintain a competitive advantage in the Indo-Pacific by shaping the rules of the international order.

Yet the Trump administration’s transactional approach to foreign policy, exemplified most recently and visibly by the ongoing Greenland Affair, represents something qualitatively different from typical great power recalibration. It is a claim to unrestrained power under Trump II; the kind that corrodes and hollows out the historic legitimacy upon which the traditional alliance systems ultimately rest.

We have seen this approach in the extraction of Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela, yet applying this strategy to a NATO ally is a dangerous escalation. The US is sacrificing long-term legitimacy for short-term extraction by invoking tariffs against fellow NATO members for rejecting Trump’s claim to annex Greenland.

From partner to predator

The Greenland Affair signifies a deeper erosion of trust. In response to direct US threats of annexation, Denmark, a key NATO ally since 1949, has bolstered Arctic defence posture through allocations totaling $13billion. Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen has framed the White House stance as a desire to 'conquer over Greenland'. Yet, when Copenhagen refused to discuss selling Greenland, the US response was punitive. Trump announced a 10% tariff on eight NATO allies. Europe’s reaction has been less defiant than sober. A growing assessment is emerging that the transatlantic security partnership and alliance can no longer be treated as the unquestioned foundation of European foreign policy.

When Copenhagen refused to discuss selling Greenland, Trump announced a 10% tariff on eight NATO allies, causing deep anxiety about the reliability of the NATO alliance

In Copenhagen, large demonstrations featuring slogans such as 'Make America Go Away' expressed not only opposition to the Greenland claim but also deep anxiety about the reliability of the NATO alliance. Durable alliances work through a basic transaction. The US has long served as the main security guarantor of the old continent. It has ensured lasting peace in Europe, and, in return, allies accept US leadership and legitimacy. But when the US shifts from offering predictable security guarantees to imposing unpredictable annexation rhetoric and tariff threats, the relationship transforms, creating strategic shock for European states. Under these conditions, transatlantic ties begin to resemble coercive extraction rather than a reciprocal partnership.

Repercussions in the Indo-Pacific

The danger of erosion of credibility with European allies carries direct functional consequences for US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Alliance credibility, vested in the promise that the US will defend allies, forms the bedrock of security assurances with regional allies, such as South Korea and Japan. When Washington begins to appear transactional about NATO commitments, the likes of Tokyo and Seoul rationally update their beliefs about the reliability of US guarantees.

This dynamic is particularly acute since the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific region – the hub-and-spokes system – is absent from a regional collective security architecture. Therefore, the bilateral credibility between the US and each ally is the sole pillar supporting the entire structure aimed at containing China. Essentially, the road between robust functional alliance structures and fragile dysfunctional alliances is very short. This is precisely what occurs when a hegemon or alliance leader actively ‘transactionalises’ relations with partners.

The irreversibility of distrust

The most dangerous implication is that the damage done by geopolitical incidents such as the Greenland Affair is becoming permanent. Although Trump ultimately dropped his threats of force and tariffs at Davos, the Greenland Affair has crossed a rubicon. By leaking private correspondence with NATO leaders, including Secretary General Mark Rutte and French President Emmanuel Macron, the US has shattered the trust and confidentiality that are essential to an alliance.

By leaking private correspondence with NATO leaders, the US has shattered the trust and confidentiality that are essential to an alliance and it is now hostage to its own rhetoric

The Trump administration thus creates a new category of risk: irreversibility. A restrained great power maintains the capacity to reverse course, to calibrate its demands, and to distinguish between ultimate objectives and negotiating positions, all while managing its allies amicably. But a great power that has weaponised its alliance commitments, made threats without off-ramps, and entrenched those threats, erodes flexibility and trust. The US, and its global power stemming from its allies, is now hostage to its own rhetoric.

Restrained order or unrestrained isolation?

The strategic paradox is self-defeating. While the White House frames its approach to Europe as necessary to pivot resources and strategic focus toward the Indo-Pacific, this approach ignores the nature of alliance credibility. A degradation of trust in Brussels and London resonates instantly through the alliance network in Tokyo and Seoul. If US security guarantees are regarded as transactional, Asian partners may view the American 'nuclear umbrella' as unreliable. An unforeseen consequence, this increases the probability that Japan and South Korea will seek independent nuclear arsenals for strategic survival.

Some Asian partners may now view the American 'nuclear umbrella' as unreliable and seek independent nuclear arsenals for strategic survival

The credibility and deterrence that prevents Russian aggression in Europe and keeps Chinese ambition in Asia in check depend fundamentally on one variable: the credibility of US security commitments and the functional ally network in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. This credibility is not infinite; it depletes with each transactional demand, each threat against allies, and each public discussion of payment for protection. Moscow and Beijing are betting on exactly this alliance collapse.

The Greenland Affair is thus less an Arctic dispute and more about the soul of American power. The question is whether the US will restore the strategic restraint that made its postwar order enduring. The alternative is to abandon alliance for empire, risking that when long-built-up credibility fails in Europe or Asia, there will be no allied hand to reach back.

Image credit: Jens Cederskjold CC BY 4.0

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Contributing Authors

photograph of Igor Sevenard Igor Sevenard PhD Candidate, Research Training Group East Asian Futures, Department of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen More by this author
photograph of Richard J. Cook Richard J. Cook Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University More by this author

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