☢️ Saving arms control in a changing world order

Valentina Cassar examines the motivations for US-Russian diplomacy and arms control in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. What role do these countries' nuclear postures play in sustaining their international primacy? China, certainly, will play a key part, while the outcomes will influence all states in the broader nuclear order

Foreign policy statements are coming thick and fast out of the White House. As other governments scramble to keep up, the impression is that we are living through a transformational era.

Could this be a re-START for US-Russian relations?

The foreign policy approach of Trump administration 2.0 stands in stark contrast with that of its predecessor. Trump’s rhetoric and approach to Russia, his relationship with President Putin, and his willingness to negotiate over Ukraine are all markedly different from Biden's.

US-Russia relations have always been tumultuous. Since the Cold War ended, they have cycled between tension and cooperation. Yet the decline precipitated by Russia’s war against Ukraine is unprecedented. The conflict has brought nuclear deterrence – and uncertainties surrounding extended deterrence – back to the forefront of European security politics.

All this comes at a time when the future of arms control is unclear. Back in 2010, the US and Russia signed the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) committing them to a reduction of arms, and a programme of monitoring and verification.

The first Trump administration was reluctant to commit to the Treaty’s extension, calling for China's inclusion in future arms control agreements. In 2021, the Biden administration eventually extended the Treaty for five years. Russia and the US agreed to bilateral strategic dialogue to explore a pathway for arms control. Diplomatic efforts, however, were suspended in 2023.

The geopolitics of arms control

The New START Treaty expires in February 2026. Revival of Russia-US dialogue on broad security issues, and specifically on the renewal of the Treaty, is thus crucial before that point. There are various prospects for a resuscitated arms control process and its outcomes. These may include maintenance of the status quo; or deteriorating relations and dialogue, and an increase in nuclear capabilities. More optimistically, they may result in a new agreement, and improved geopolitical stability.

Ongoing tensions between Russia and Ukraine make renewal of an arms control framework, and the reassurance of strategic stability, extremely important. Yet arms control also holds value in the context of broader geopolitical changes.

Many observers now regard China as the only US competitor with the intent and capacity to reshape the international order

The US has long recognised Russia as a state with which it holds strategic parity, yet it also acknowledges that it faces systemic challenges from China. Indeed, it is China which now poses the principal economic and political threat to the US. China's military modernisation and investment in nuclear capabilities is a cause of increasing concern. Many regard it as the only US competitor with the intent and capacity to reshape the international order.

Russia’s strategic outlook is underpinned by its nuclear capabilities. Despite its weaker political, economic and conventional military standing, nuclear weapons allow Russia to maintain a parity-of-sorts with the US.

China’s nuclear growth

In comparison with the US and Russia, China's nuclear capability remains relatively small. Beijing has thus dismissed the need for restraint by arms control agreements because of the disparity in size of its nuclear arsenal. However, while China maintained only 178 warheads in 2011, its arsenal had grown to an estimated 500 by 2024. The US Department of Defence estimates that China may exceed the 1,000 mark by 2030.

The US and Russia find themselves in a post-bipolar world in which they must contend with an increasingly assertive China

For the US and Russia, ongoing geopolitical shifts are challenging their international status, and threatening their primacy – whether real or perceived. Maintaining strategic stability also reaffirms their desired status. Both countries find themselves in a post-bipolar and post-American world, in which they must contend with a rising and increasingly assertive China. Bilateral strategic stability and trilateral strategic dialogue would therefore help them adjust to shifting geopolitical realities. It would also help them maintain their primacy within a redefined distribution of international order and influence.

Where does this leave the rest?

Europe is seriously mulling over the possibility that the formerly rock-solid transatlantic alliance may no longer hold steady. The EU is discussing the need to 'rearm Europe'. And the extended deterrence of the US nuclear umbrella, so long a cornerstone of NATO, has now also fallen into question.

The transatlantic alliance, so long a cornerstone of NATO, is no longer a given, and the EU is discussing the need to 'rearm Europe'

Consequently, academics and politicians have raised the possibility of a distinct European deterrent. This could take the form of an extended French or British nuclear deterrent that guarantees the defence of European allies. Such a posture would also become more significant in an evolving strategic balance of power that may well necessitate wider arms control frameworks beyond the trilateral.

Developments like this may also give rise to greater concerns over nuclear proliferation within the broader international community, among 'rogue states' and others that have traditionally benefitted from extended deterrence. This has led Gideon Rose to speculate whether Trump’s approach may usher in a new nuclear age of proliferation.

In his foundational piece for this series, Mahmoud Javadi points out the paradox of nuclear politics. He shows the stark contrast between the strategic stability that nuclear weapons may provide against the vulnerability and insecurity that may result from proliferation and mismanagement.

Haves and have-nots

The coming nuclear age need not be determined only by the nuclear haves. Impasses and frustrations within the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty regime, together with increasing concerns surrounding the humanitarian consequences of nuclear use, have led to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The TPNW is an increasingly valuable tool that gives agency to the nuclear have-nots – and a stronger voice to their concerns over strategic stability during a fractured nuclear age.

☢️ No.6 in a series on the Nuclear Politics Paradox

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

photograph of Valentina Cassar
Valentina Cassar
Senior Lecturer, Department of International Relations, University of Malta

Valentina completed a PhD in International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, where she conducted research on the Nuclear Strategic Cultures of the United States and Russia.

She is the Department Contact Point within the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium Network and is an alumnus of the Salzburg Seminars and of the Studies of the United States Institute (SUSI).

Her teaching, research and writing focus on strategic cultures, nuclear politics, the foreign and security policies of the United States and Russia, neutrality and European security and defence issues.

Valentina contributed a chapter to the book Russia's War on Ukraine (Springer, 2023).

@valentinacassar

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