Luiza Januário argues that the threats and opportunities of nuclear technology are an intrinsically global matter. Here, she offers a South American perspective on the nuclear politics dilemma
As the nuclear era dawned, states were forced to update their strategies on dissuasion and arms control. But their new strategies didn't just affect potential nuclear powers and their close allies. Nuclear politics, including the peaceful use of nuclear technology and the danger represented by its military use, affects every country in the world. Despite this, political organisations and academic research overlook the nuclear experiences and expectations of many states, particularly those in the Global South.
For most of the developing world, nuclear politics is not simply a matter of security. It is also one of development. This is central to nuclear politics in South America, particularly for Argentina and Brazil, which developed the region's most advanced nuclear programmes. For South America, nuclear technology represented modernisation and scientific innovation, social and economic development, and a passport to the big boys' club of international politics.
For developing countries in South America, nuclear technology represented a passport to the big boys' club of international politics
The nonproliferation regime centres on the discriminatory principle of the nuclear haves and have-nots of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). But the NPT's hierarchy hinders the ambitions of developing countries. It is crucial that we achieve justice for such countries, particularly when many are questioning the value of nonproliferation. Considering the viewpoints of marginalised communities may constructively inform nuclear policy.
South American and Latin American nuclear states sought innovative solutions to overcome local concerns about the nonproliferation regime. The best-known initiative is the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Opened for signatures in 1967, it established the first nuclear-weapons-free-zone (NWFZ) in a densely inhabited area. This set the precedent for similar arrangements in other parts of the world, and created a regional face for the nonproliferation norm.
Its approach remains relevant today, as attested by the ongoing debate about a NWFZ in the Middle East, which some experts suggest may offer security without nuclear weapons. Legitimacy is central to the Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco, opened for signatures in 1967, remains a valid and original agreement for dealing with the dangers of the nuclear age
The Treaty of Tlatelolco remains a valid and original agreement for dealing with the dangers of the nuclear age. Even during the decades when the Brazilian government was cautious about nonproliferation initiatives, it considered Tlatelolco a force for good, in contrast with the NPT's inherent unfairness.
The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in 1991. Its creation instituted a sui generis safeguarding mechanism based on a neighbour-inspects-neighbour formula. ABACC remains a unique bilateral solution that may be applicable to other cases. It is particularly relevant when we consider that Argentina and Brazil are longstanding rivals. Indeed, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the international community feared the two might plunge the region into a nuclear arms race.
Both countries shrouded their nuclear programmes in secrecy, and they battled for regional technological supremacy. Still, their rivalry was interspersed with spells of cooperation sparked by common challenges. Eventually, cooperation prevailed, and ABACC remains a mechanism for long-term safeguarding.
Longstanding geopolitical rivals Argentina and Brazil nevertheless understood that they had to stand shoulder to shoulder against an unjust global nuclear order
A common understanding of the global nuclear dilemmas was central to ABACC’s inception. Argentina and Brazil understood that they had to stand shoulder to shoulder against an unjust global nuclear order that cast them as agents of instability, despite the global nuclear order's own shortcomings in promoting disarmament and cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
Neither Argentina nor Brazil had the power to change the global nuclear order, but they could change their stance within it, to promote nonproliferation. Countries accepted most compromises associated with the NPT before their accession to the Treaty, as a result of the 1994 agreement between ABACC, Argentina, Brazil, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. In so doing, they created an original initiative that preserved fairness and political agency.
Despite their misgivings about the nonproliferation regime, South American states are strong in their defence of nonproliferation and disarmament. Though these states often support cornerstone initiatives such as the NPT, they recognise its shortcomings and may seek alternative solutions. Most South American states endorsed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017, though ratification remains pending in some countries. As the recent Third Meeting of Parties declaration affirmed, the TPNW's effort to transform global politics is a beacon of hope.
Change is necessary in politics, or it can offer only worn-out solutions that pose a grave threat to global security. Imagining alternative futures is essential to transformative politics, and the ability to consider a variety of viewpoints is critical to building a positive future.
Perhaps it is time for the nonproliferation community to engage more with cases of nonproliferation success than with proliferation itself.
