Russia continues to rely on its sub-strategic nuclear arsenal, and NATO is therefore hoping in vain for sub-strategic nuclear arms control negotiations. For three decades, says Wannes Verstraete, the Alliance has merely been 'waiting for Godot'
After the Cold War, the US decided, unilaterally, to make drastic reductions to its nuclear arsenal. Consequently, NATO's sub-strategic arsenal reduced by 80%. Only one system, the dual-capable aircraft (DCA), equipped with nuclear gravity bombs, continues in use. During the three decades following the Cold War, the number of forward-deployed bombs decreased from an alleged 700 to 100 warheads.
NATO hoped that Russia would reciprocate, making further reductions possible. Yet Russia retains a sub-strategic nuclear arsenal of around 1,500 warheads.
America's Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 resulted in deep unilateral reductions in the US arsenal. George W. Bush eliminated all ground-based tactical nuclear weapons and withdrew all naval tactical nuclear weapons. His administration also terminated a replacement programme for the nuclear air-launched short-range attack missile.
Soviet and Russian Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, and Boris Yeltsin in 1992, promised to take reciprocal measures, but failed to fully implement them. The US informed only a few allies before its decision to reduce its nuclear arsenal. Nonetheless, NATO allies accepted these measures, given the improved security environment. Moreover, NATO retained its DCA capability.
In the early nineties, the Bush administration made deep unilateral reductions in the US arsenal. Russia promised to take reciprocal measures, but failed to fully implement them
In 1996, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared of NATO enlargement that 'in today’s Europe, we have no intention, no reason, and no plans to station nuclear weapons on the territory of future members'. The three-no’s statement is another unilateral constraint NATO imposed upon itself to foster cooperative relations with Russia.
Ten years later, in April 2009, US President Barack Obama gave a speech in Prague pledging that the US was committed to striving for a world without nuclear weapons. Obama's speech supported disarmament advocates' expectation that further reductions were possible.
The 2010 Strategic Concept kept the door open. However, it also stated that additional reductions 'must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons'. After the New START arms reduction treaty in 2011, the US tried to engage Russia on sub-strategic nuclear weapons, but without success.
Following the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, hopes remained high. The Alliance, however, continued to emphasise the need for reciprocity:
NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons […] in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons
Following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO issued a Declaration after its September summit affirming that the allies 'continue to believe' in a partnership with Russia. It also called for an 'increased mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe'.
The US also claims that since 2014, Russia has been violating the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by developing the SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile. Russia refuses to comply with this Treaty, and in 2019 the US therefore decided – with NATO allies’ support – to withdraw.
NATO, however, again unilaterally restrained its response options. In 2019, NATO stated that it would 'not mirror' Russia’s development of a nuclear ground-launched, intermediate-range missile, aggravating the imbalance in sub-strategic nuclear forces. The only new nuclear-theatre capabilities the US announced in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review were a low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and development of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile.
NATO's 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué marked a change in tone. The allies remained 'committed to contribute to creating the conditions for further reductions in the future on the basis of reciprocity'. They also, however, regretted that 'the conditions for achieving disarmament are not favourable today'.
Two years later, NATO's 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration stated: 'We regret that the conditions for achieving disarmament have not become more favourable since the 2016 Warsaw NATO Summit'. Unsurprisingly, the 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué contained the same message. Any remaining hopes were shattered by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The subsequent 2022 Strategic Concept stated that 'The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace'.
Any hopes that NATO allies might achieve significant disarmament were shattered by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022
In the meantime, however, most nuclear-sharing allies did modernise their DCA capability with F-35As. In December 2024, the US also completed modernisation of its nuclear gravity bombs to the B61-12 variant. And in June 2025, the UK announced it would join NATO’s nuclear mission. Nonetheless, further changes beyond modernisation of the minimal sub-strategic nuclear posture and the addition of the UK are still being debated.
My recent Æther article discusses NATO’s options to change the hardware of its forward-deployed nuclear force. Options for strengthening its posture range from increasing the number of aircraft to expanding the number of nuclear-sharing allies, and introducing additional air-, sea-, and ground-based nuclear systems. Non-nuclear capabilities, such as conventional deep strike, can complement, but not replace, sub-strategic nuclear options.
In hindsight, NATO has merely been waiting for Godot. Initially, its wait-and-see attitude appeared understandable, given the improved post-Cold War security environment. However, since 2014, and certainly 2022, it has been clear that Russia prefers aggression over cooperation. Nevertheless, the allies still cannot agree on a way forward. The threat perception among countries on the eastern and northern flanks of the Alliance still differs from that of allies in western and southern Europe.
The former group wants to strengthen NATO's deterrence posture faster. The latter is more concerned about provoking Russia. In the end, both will need to find a compromise to deter and, if necessary, defend against a revisionist power that relies on a significant and diverse sub-strategic nuclear arsenal.
The author would like to thank Alexander Mattelaer for his comments on an earlier draft of this piece.
