Hungary is gearing up for national elections in April 2026. The authoritarian Fidesz party – in power for over 15 years – is campaigning hard in the online realm. Alíz Nagy puts these developments in the broader context of digital authoritarianism
In Hungary, digital governance is not merely a technical response to technological change, but a political project that is reshaping Hungarian citizenship. Amid the country's current democratic backsliding, digitalisation does not simply modernise public administration, it allows the state to redefine legitimacy and what it means to be a 'good' citizen.
The Covid-19 pandemic accelerated Hungary’s trajectory toward digital governance, but earlier reforms focused primarily on digitising public administration. 2015's Act CCXXII introduced e-administration as a fundamental citizen right, aiming to make bureaucratic processes more efficient and accessible. At this stage, digitalisation largely meant transferring paper-based procedures into the digital realm.
A qualitative shift occurred with the introduction of the National Digital Citizenship Programme (2022–2026). This marked a transition from digitisation toward comprehensive digital governance. The Digital Citizenship Application (DÁP) became the central interface between citizens and the state, enabling online handling of services such as birth registration and vehicle administration. DÁP use is formally voluntary, but under certain circumstances electronic communication might become obligatory.
Digital profiles are citizens' primary point of contact with the state. But their infrastructure risks enabling surveillance, profiling, and secondary data use
Digital citizenship, then, is no longer merely a technical identity. Digital profiles are intended to serve as citizens' primary point of contact with the state, integrating administrative, legal, and potentially behavioural data. The government presents this as a service-enhancing innovation. But the infrastructure allows for extensive data processing, which raises concerns about surveillance, profiling, and secondary data use.
Amendments to the Fundamental Law of Hungary enabled the introduction of regulation through government decrees, and rapid legal implementation without meaningful public consultation. Draft legislation was available only briefly for public comment. Despite clear risks for data protection and privacy, even the Hungarian data protection authority was not properly consulted. The government amended several rules simultaneously to enable wide-ranging data processing, including provisions allowing for the commercialisation of anonymised data.
All this is happening in a society in which digital disinformation has long been part of the ruling power’s playbook, and digital literacy remains uneven. Citizens mostly have smartphones and internet access. Digital skills and critical digital literacy, however, are far less developed. Many don't understand the implications of data extraction, profiling, or algorithmic governance. Yet digital participation is increasingly the default mode of citizenship – and this places the burden of adaptation on citizens rather than the state. Digital governance in Hungary is increasingly intersecting with overt political mobilisation. Enhancing its digital presence is now the government's central political strategy.
Many Hungarians don't understand the implications of data extraction, profiling, or algorithmic governance. Yet digital governance in Hungary is increasingly intersecting with overt political mobilisation
In early 2025, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced a 'spring clean', explicitly targeting dissenting voices. The government introduced a law suspending citizenship for individuals it deemed to 'threaten national sovereignty', a broadly defined category that grants significant discretionary power to the executive.
At the same time, Orbán launched 'Fight Club' (Harcosok Klubja) aimed at recruiting tens of thousands of 'digital fighters'. The objective was to establish a strong, disciplined online presence, particularly on social media. Fidesz framed its initiative in explicitly combative terms. Hungary, it claims, is under attack, and digital fighters must therefore defend national values in the online arena.
Although initially opaque in structure and organisation, Fight Club soon revealed its operational logic. It mobilised through messaging platforms and, later, through Facebook groups, with participants receiving coordinated instructions on how to engage in online 'battles'. Fight Club urged users to comment en masse on the social media pages of opposition politicians, using pre-formulated talking points distributed by party-affiliated actors. The emphasis was not on deliberation or debate, but on visibility, repetition, and volume.
Orbán himself articulated a set of guiding principles that define the values and behaviours expected of participants. These principles emphasise patriotism, loyalty, unity, action, and obedience to a shared political mission. Participation in Fight Club is a 'moral duty'; dissent an implicit betrayal. Of course, some digital tools can help foster democratic legitimacy. But in this context, digital participation is stripped of its democratic connotations.
Orbán's 'Fight Club' urged users to comment en masse on the social media pages of opposition politicians. The emphasis was not on deliberation or debate, but on visibility, repetition, and volume
Orbán extended this logic with the launch of Digital Civic Circles (DCCs), announced during his annual speech at Tusványos. Presented as a collaboration with civil society, yet, DCCs are dominated by government figures and individuals closely connected to the ruling party. DCC membership is a lifelong commitment framed as a 'digital immune system' for the nation. Interestingly, Orbán's speech explicitly addressed Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin, but excluded the broader Hungarian diaspora. His focus reinforced a territorially and politically bounded notion of belonging. Conveniently, DCCs also circumvent Facebook's ban on political adverts.
Digital governance in Hungary operates simultaneously on formal and informal levels. Legal frameworks, applications, and administrative reforms institutionalise digital citizenship. But the government also uses digital infrastructures informally, to mobilise loyalty, discipline participation, and marginalise dissent. It no longer defines citizenship primarily by rights or political agency, but by compliance with state-designed digital systems and alignment with its political objectives. All facets of digital authoritarianism play out in contemporary Hungary.
The 'good' digital citizen is not one who participates critically or autonomously. Rather, they use government-prescribed platforms, contribute to extensive data collection, mobilise as digital fighters and become active participants in the government’s political messaging. The regime encourages participation only insofar as it reinforces regime legitimacy. Orbán has primed his digital fighters to discourage alternative forms of engagement, and even to bully those who engage in it.
Hungary's online landscape thus demonstrates how, in an illiberal political context, digital governance can become a powerful instrument of control. In this context, digital citizenship is not an extension of democratic participation, but a reconfigured relationship of obedience, loyalty, and managed engagement. Rather than empowering citizens, digitalisation in Hungary increasingly consolidates power by reshaping the norms, expectations, and practices through which citizenship is enacted.
