Independent local lists are often seen as a sign of democratic community organisation. More than that, write Fred Paxton and Eliška Drápalová, their rise may actually limit the success of populist parties among voters disenchanted with mainstream politics
Across Europe, populist parties claim to speak for the ‘forgotten people’ living in ‘left-behind’ places. Yet they are not the only challengers to established politics in such localities. In town halls across Eastern and Western Europe, another kind of movement has quietly been gaining ground: independent local lists (ILLs) – community-based groups that reject national party labels altogether.
Our findings, to be published in a forthcoming Political Research Exchange special collection, challenge a familiar story about populism rising amid popular discontent. We show that where these local independents are strong, populist parties tend to struggle. Our research reveals how local politics can redirect anti-establishment sentiment away from national populist actors.
In recent years, rising dissatisfaction with established parties has produced what geographers call the revenge of the places that don’t matter. In so-called left-behind areas, residents face economic decline, shrinking public services and a fading sense of community. These people are turning away from mainstream parties in increasing numbers. We tend to expect populists to benefit most from this backlash.
But populist parties face competition. Across much of Europe, another form of politics is flourishing in response: independent local lists. These groups campaign on local issues, emphasise independence from party elites, and often style themselves as non-political. Like populist parties, they claim to stand for ordinary citizens against the establishment – but they tend to do so through local, pragmatic action rather than national protest. We see this in citizen-led experiments such as Flatpack Democracy in the British town of Frome.
Like populist parties, independent local lists claim to stand for ordinary citizens against the establishment – but through local, pragmatic action rather than national protest
This raises a crucial question: how does the rise of independent local lists affect the electoral performance of populist parties, especially in places feeling ‘left behind’?
To answer this question, our study examined local elections in the Czech Republic. The country is especially well suited, because populist parties and ILLs both play prominent roles. Once considered a model of post-communist democratic stability, Czechia has experienced growing disillusionment with mainstream political parties. Over the past decade and a half, it has seen the electoral breakthrough of new populist movements such as Public Affairs (VV), ANO 2011, and the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD). At the same time, hundreds of independent local lists have taken hold in towns and villages across the country.
Our analysis focuses on all Czech municipalities with more than 2,000 residents, across four local elections, from 2010 to 2022 – a period that captures the full rise of the country’s populist parties. Using a panel design with municipality and year fixed effects – in simple terms, tracking the same towns over time – allowed us to isolate how shifts in local conditions and ILL strength affect populist performance.
Our findings reveal a clear pattern: the local strength of independent lists is associated with a significant reduction in the success of populist parties. Municipalities with higher ILL representation consistently exhibit lower populist vote and seat shares – even when accounting for economic deprivation, social capital, and other contextual factors.
Substantively, a 1% increase in ILL seat share corresponds to a decline of roughly 0.12 points for ANO, 0.03 for SPD, and 0.14 in the pooled populist model. In practical terms, in a typical 21-seat local council, an 11-point swing in ILL representation translates into around two fewer seats for populist parties.
Our findings show how the local strength of independent lists significantly reduced the success of populist parties
The effect is not uniform across populist types. Independent local lists and populist parties draw on overlapping pools of anti-party sentiment, but the intensity of their competition depends on the populist party’s ideological profile. Specifically, we find that ANO, a centrist, technocratic populist party, is the most affected. SPD, a populist radical-right party, also loses ground, though the effect is smaller. For VV, a short-lived centrist populist movement, the relationship is weaker and less consistent.
ILLs also reshape how economic deprivation translates into populist support. In municipalities with strong ILLs, the link between unemployment and populist vote share largely disappears. This indicates that local political alternatives can divert protest energy away from populist channels.
These results have important implications for how we understand politics in left-behind places. The standard narrative portrays deprived regions as natural breeding grounds for populism. Yet our evidence shows that political supply – not just demand – shapes outcomes. When credible, community-based alternatives exist, discontented voters may channel frustration through local independents instead of populist parties.
What does this mean for democracy? On one hand, ILLs can provide a democratic outlet for anti-establishment sentiment, giving citizens a sense of voice and ownership in local governance. On the other, their proliferation may also fragment political authority and representation, making politics more volatile. Local independents often lack organisational continuity or coherent programmes, and their proliferation can complicate coalition building and blur accountability. As more voters channel their grievances through purely local actors, the link between local and national politics weakens. This risks a vertical fragmentation that would leave national institutions less connected to citizens’ everyday concerns.
As voters channel grievances through local actors, the link between local and national politics weakens. This could leave national institutions less connected to citizens’ everyday concerns
Although our analysis focuses on Czechia, similar dynamics are visible elsewhere. In Sweden and Germany, local independent groups have also gained ground, suggesting that competition between populists and local independents may be a wider European phenomenon. Wherever local politics remains open and weakly institutionalised, these non-party movements may play a decisive role in shaping the fortunes of populist challengers. Our findings therefore offer lessons for responding to populists elsewhere.
In short, the rise of independent local lists shows that political renewal doesn’t always flow through populist channels. Understanding these local dynamics helps explain why some left-behind communities turn to populists – while others look closer to home.
