Does the creation of nominally democratic institutions help dictators stay in power by reducing the risk of coups d’etat? Jun Koga Sudduth analyses and categorises different types of coup, and their effects. In so doing, she confounds the conventional wisdom that democratic institutions reduce the likelihood of dictators being overthrown
Jun received her PhD in political science from Emory University.
Her research focuses on political violence, authoritarian politics, and civil-military relations.
Jun's current work focuses on the process of consolidation of power in dictatorships and explores when and how dictators purge rival elites.
She has published articles in Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, International Studies Quarterly, and elsewhere.
Her research has been funded by the British Academy/Leverhulme, the Carnegie Trust, and the Research Council of Norway.
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