Articles by Rory Costello

June 6, 2024

Auction politics: when and why parties are likely to over-promise

Rory Costello

Party competition sometimes resembles an auction, where parties seek to ‘buy’ elections through spending promises. Rory Costello argues that this is particularly likely to occur when parties are ideologically indistinct. Parties that do not expect to be in government are also more likely to over-promise

Rory Costello

Associate Professor, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick

Rory's research focuses on electoral and party politics in Europe.

He has published on topics such as election pledges, political representation, and coalition government.

His research has appeared in a variety of international journals including (among others) the European Journal of Political Research, European Union Politics, Journal of European Public Policy, Party Politics, Electoral Studies, West European Politics, and the American Journal of Political Science.

Comparative European Politics: Distinctive Democracies, Common Challenges
Oxford University Press, 2024
Co-editor, with Neil Robinson

The Loop

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Articles by Rory Costello

Auction politics: when and why parties are likely to over-promise

The Loop

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