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	<title>Oliwia Szczupska, Author at The Loop</title>
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		<title>Poland got more divided without getting more extreme</title>
		<link>https://theloop.ecpr.eu/poland-got-more-divided-without-getting-more-extreme/</link>
					<comments>https://theloop.ecpr.eu/poland-got-more-divided-without-getting-more-extreme/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Oliwia Szczupska]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 09:27:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[All Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eastern European Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Featured]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democratic backsliding]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Law and Justice Party]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PiS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[polarisation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[polarization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prawo i Sprawiedliwość]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[radicalisation]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://theloop.ecpr.eu/?p=29859</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Poland’s democratic backsliding was not preceded by voters becoming more extreme, argue Marta Kołczyńska, Maciej Sychowiec and Oliwia Szczupska. Before democratic erosion took hold, Poles’ views were already becoming more tightly connected across issues, and more closely aligned with party choice</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/poland-got-more-divided-without-getting-more-extreme/">Poland got more divided without getting more extreme</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Poland’s democratic backsliding was not preceded by voters becoming more extreme, argue <strong>Maciej Sychowiec</strong>, <strong>Oliwia Szczupska</strong> and <strong>Marta Kołczyńska</strong>. Before democratic erosion took hold, Poles’ views were already becoming more tightly connected across issues, and more closely aligned with party choice</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When democracies begin to weaken, polarisation is often among the first explanations offered. The idea is familiar. Citizens split into opposing camps, compromise becomes harder, and checks on power start to look less like democratic safeguards than tools used by political opponents.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/poland-kaczynski-tusk-polarisation-party-conflict/">Poland</a> seems to fit this story. After <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/tag/prawo-i-sprawiedliwosc/">Law and Justice (PiS)</a> returned to power in 2015, it weakened the courts, the Constitutional Tribunal and public media. Many observers linked this democratic backsliding to a polarised electorate. But that explanation leaves something important unclear: had Polish voters actually become more extreme?</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If polarisation means radicalisation, we should look for voters moving toward the edges of individual issues</p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The answer matters beyond Poland. If polarisation means radicalisation, we should look for voters moving toward the edges of individual issues. If it means <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/what-identity-does-democracy-need-the-necessity-and-danger-of-political-polarisation/">political sorting</a>, we should look for something else: opinions on different issues travelling together and becoming easier to predict from party choice. <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41295-026-00496-1">Our recent study</a>, using Polish National Election Study (POLNES) surveys from 1997 to 2023, makes that distinction.</p>



<h2 id="h-poles-have-not-become-more-extreme" class="wp-block-heading">Poles have not become more extreme</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Across fourteen issues and 26 years, we find little evidence that Poles became more radical in their individual opinions. The spread of views on most issues barely changed between 1997 and 2023. On a few issues, views even became slightly less extreme by the end of the period. This means Poland's polarisation did not come from citizens simply moving to the extremes.</p>



<h3 id="h-the-change-was-in-how-views-fitted-together" class="wp-block-heading">The change was in how views fitted together</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What changed was the structure of public opinion. Positions on different issues became more tightly grouped. Someone’s view on EU membership increasingly told us more about their likely view on abortion, immigration or the role of the Church. Those views also became more closely tied to party choice. Knowing who someone voted for revealed more and more about what they thought on many issues.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Polarisation matters beyond elections, shaping protest, mobilisation and wider political conflict</p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/how-ideological-polarisation-drives-protest-against-covid-containment-measures/">But polarisation matters beyond elections, too, shaping protest, mobilisation and wider political conflict.</a> These patterns stayed broadly flat through the 1990s and 2000s, then rose sharply from around 2009–2011. Economic issues followed a different path. Views on taxation and the welfare state stayed only loosely linked to party choice, which points to a broad consensus on welfare provision.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-full"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="2560" height="1707" src="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-scaled.png" alt="" class="wp-image-29949" srcset="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-scaled.png 2560w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-300x200.png 300w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-1024x683.png 1024w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-768x512.png 768w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-1536x1024.png 1536w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/image-2048x1365.png 2048w" sizes="(max-width: 2560px) 100vw, 2560px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Estimated trends over time: how extreme people's individual opinions were, how closely opinions on different issues moved together, and how well party choice predicted those opinions. Poland, 1997–2023.<br>Source: <a href="https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DIVBSN">POLNES (Polish National Election Study)</a></figcaption></figure>
</div>


<h2 id="h-the-shift-came-before-the-backsliding" class="wp-block-heading">The shift came before the backsliding</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The timing matters. Poland's democratic backsliding is usually dated to 2015, when PiS returned to power. The sorting we identify started several years earlier, around 2009–2011. It emerged as Poland’s <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/party-system-closure-and-its-impact-on-democracy/">party system became more predictable</a>, structured around the rivalry between PiS and Civic Platform, (now <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civic_Coalition_(political_alliance)">Civic Coalition</a>). This does not prove that polarisation was caused backsliding by itself. Other factors mattered too. But the sequence is important.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A more 'sorted' electorate can make it easier for political elites to present checks and balances as tools used by opponents to block the government</p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A more sorted electorate can make it easier for political elites to present checks and balances as tools used by opponents to block the government. Similar dynamics appear <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/does-political-trust-strengthen-democracy/">in research on political trust</a>, where support for those in power can make democratic erosion easier to accept.</p>



<h3 id="h-why-this-changes-the-story" class="wp-block-heading">Why this changes the story</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Polish case complicates simple narratives about polarisation and democratic decline. Poles did not become a more extreme electorate. They became a more <em>sorted </em>electorate. Views on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/adversity-and-resilience-impact-of-anti-gender-politics-on-queer-and-feminist-activism-in-poland/">emotionally charged issues</a> became more closely grouped together and more closely mapped onto party choice.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The broader lesson is that polarisation is not only about extremism. It is also about how opinions fit together, and how closely they track party lines. In Poland, that quieter shift in public opinion began before democratic backsliding became the country's defining political story.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/poland-got-more-divided-without-getting-more-extreme/">Poland got more divided without getting more extreme</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
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