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	<title>France Archives - The Loop</title>
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		<title>🔮 Can the populist radical-right National Rally win the 2027 French presidential election? </title>
		<link>https://theloop.ecpr.eu/national-rally-can-it-win-the-2027-french-presidential-election/</link>
					<comments>https://theloop.ecpr.eu/national-rally-can-it-win-the-2027-french-presidential-election/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[John Ryan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 10:40:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Featured]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Presidential Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[🔮]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eric Zemmour]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[French presidential elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Populism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jordan Bardella]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marion Maréchal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Rally]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[populist radical right]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[radical right-wing politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[radical-right parties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rassemblement National]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reconquête]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Steve Bannon]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://theloop.ecpr.eu/?p=26629</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A Jordan Bardella presidency would represent the most significant reconfiguration of executive power since the Fifth Republic’s founding. Even without a radical policy rupture, the symbolic impact on democratic norms and institutional trust would be profound, including significant risks for the EU, argues John Ryan </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/national-rally-can-it-win-the-2027-french-presidential-election/">🔮 Can the populist radical-right National Rally win the 2027 French presidential election? </a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="has-medium-font-size">A Jordan Bardella presidency would represent&nbsp;the most significant reconfiguration of executive power since the Fifth Republic’s founding. Even without a radical policy rupture, the symbolic impact on democratic norms and institutional trust would be profound. For the EU, says&nbsp;<strong>John Ryan</strong>, the risk lies less in immediate withdrawal or obstruction than in gradual divergence</p>



<p>France’s 2027 presidential election could mark a decisive break in the country’s postwar political settlement. In March 2025, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/176988bf-ed62-4a72-861e-6a27582a9dc1" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Marine Le Pen was convicted for misuse of EU funds</a> — resulting in a five-year ban from standing for office. This has accelerated a succession process within the far-right Rassemblement National (RN), or National Rally. The party’s president, Jordan Bardella, has positioned himself as Le Pen's successor. In first-round voting intentions, he currently polls at levels comparable to Le Pen herself.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The prospect of a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/176988bf-ed62-4a72-861e-6a27582a9dc1" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Bardella candidacy</a> raises&nbsp;urgent questions for French democracy and European politics. While the so-called 'republican front' has historically prevented the far right from winning national office, its durability is increasingly in doubt. Public distrust of mainstream parties, the erosion of traditional coalition norms, and the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/nana.13001?msockid=3a72dcfcab696a313870c8a0aa896bb8" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">normalisation of RN’s leadership</a> and discourse suggest that 2027 could become a watershed election.&nbsp;Here, I assess Bardella’s path to the presidency, the constraints he faces, and the implications for France, and Europe, should he prevail.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-macron-s-technocratic-approach-alienates-voters-nbsp">Macron’s technocratic approach alienates voters&nbsp;</h2>



<p>Since the early 2000s, French politics has relied on an informal <em>cordon sanitaire</em> to block the far right from power. This 'republican front' has functioned through tactical voting and cross-party alliances, particularly in second-round presidential and legislative contests. However, successive elections since 2017&nbsp;indicate&nbsp;that this mechanism is weakening.&nbsp;</p>



<p><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/93319f6d-9837-429c-9cb3-07361ca4c106" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Public perceptions of Macron</a> have played a significant role in this realignment. Critics increasingly associate his presidency with <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347437469_Technocratic_Populism_a_la_Francaise_The_Roots_and_Mechanisms_of_Emmanuel_Macron%27s_Success" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">technocratic arrogance</a>, limited empathy, and an inability to deliver on core voter concerns such as public order, immigration, and social cohesion. Over seven years, repeated episodes of unrest and persistent concerns about illegal immigration have fuelled dissatisfaction, strengthening the RN’s appeal as an anti-system alternative.&nbsp;</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>Since 2017, an informal cordon sanitaire has blocked the far right from power. This mechanism could now be weakening</p>
</blockquote>



<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61859881" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">President Emmanuel Macron’s failure</a> to secure a parliamentary majority in 2022 marked a turning point. <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/macrons-re-election-and-the-continuing-demise-of-the-french-fifth-republic/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">That election confirmed</a> the RN as a permanent force rather than a protest movement. The European Parliament and National Assembly elections of 2024 reinforced this trend, with the RN consolidating&nbsp;its position as the single largest party by vote share in several contests.</p>



<p>As trust in mainstream politics erodes, the 'republican front' appears less capable of mobilising voters against the RN. While it remains&nbsp;operational for now, its future effectiveness — particularly in a highly polarised second-round contest — can no longer be taken for granted.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-marine-le-pen-s-disqualification-and-its-political-effects-nbsp">Marine Le Pen’s disqualification and its political effects&nbsp;</h2>



<p>On 31 March 2025, Marine Le Pen was convicted for large-scale embezzlement of European Parliament funds. Her conviction represents&nbsp;a structural shock to French politics. The sentence —&nbsp;four years in prison (two suspended), a €100,000 fine, and an immediate five-year ban from standing for public office — effectively removes her from the 2027 race unless overturned on appeal.&nbsp;</p>



<p><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5a8316c6-ba80-4b1a-bc4f-04ce082743f3" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Jordan Bardella</a> represents&nbsp;both continuity and rupture.&nbsp;Closely associated with Le Pen’s leadership, he has&nbsp;demonstrated&nbsp;loyalty to her during the legal proceedings, denouncing the verdict as a 'democratic scandal'. Yet Bardella's profile differs markedly from that of the Le Pen dynasty which has dominated the far right for five decades.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Bardella is telegenic, media-savvy, and popular among younger voters. His recent <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/jordan-bardella-glitzy-book-tour-far-right-palace-coup-marine-le-pen-embezzlement/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">autobiography</a> is a bestseller; and he has invested heavily in cultivating relationships with business leaders and international actors. Elements of the conservative establishment increasingly view him as a figure capable of unifying the fragmented right. This, of course, has drawn explicit comparisons with Giorgia Meloni in Italy.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>Unlike Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella is media-savvy, and popular among younger voters. Could he unify France's fragmented right?</p>
</blockquote>



<p>For voters historically repelled by Marine Le Pen’s confrontational style, Bardella appears more palatable. In February 2025, following a controversial gesture by Steve Bannon,&nbsp;he cancelled an appearance at the US Conservative Political Action Conference. His decision reinforces attempts to distance himself from overt extremism and transatlantic illiberal networks.</p>



<p>However, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/may/01/a-paradigm-shift-will-jordan-bardella-finally-normalise-le-pens-far-right" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Bardella’s lack of executive experience</a> remains&nbsp;a significant vulnerability. He has never held ministerial office, and his authority within the party is&nbsp;not uncontested. The RN’s old guard continues to wield influence, and internal competition may yet&nbsp;emerge&nbsp;from within the Le Pen family. The likeliest candidate is Marion Maréchal, who could&nbsp;seek&nbsp;to reclaim her political inheritance after the collapse of Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête movement.&nbsp;</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-bardella-s-candidacy-and-the-second-round-problem-nbsp">Bardella’s candidacy and the second-round problem&nbsp;</h2>



<p>So, <a href="https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/12/why-polls-show-national-rallys-bardella-may-be-the-next-president-of-france/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Bardella</a> appears well positioned to reach the second round of the presidential election. But can he win it? French presidential elections are structurally different from parliamentary contests: personality, perceived competence, and coalition-building capacity matter disproportionately. Historically, the RN has struggled to broaden its appeal beyond its core electorate in second-round run-offs. Even at the height of Le Pen’s popularity in 2022, the 'republican front' proved sufficient to block her path to the Elysée. Whether Bardella can overcome this barrier&nbsp;remains&nbsp;uncertain.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Two factors work in his favour. First, the weakening legitimacy of anti-RN coalitions may reduce second-round mobilisation against him. Second, his generational and stylistic break from the Le Pen name could attract centrist or conservative voters seeking change without disruption. For European policymakers, this raises a dilemma: a Bardella presidency&nbsp;might pursue strategic discretion rather than outright confrontation with EU partners.&nbsp;This risks&nbsp;complicating collective foreign policy coordination rather than openly undermining it.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>Bardella's generational and stylistic break from Le Pen could attract centrist or conservative voters. But his lack of executive experience remains a significant vulnerability</p>
</blockquote>



<p>Jordan Bardella’s path to the French presidency is no longer hypothetical. Marine Le Pen’s disqualification has accelerated a generational transition within the RN, without diminishing its electoral strength. Significant obstacles remain, particularly in the second round. Yet the convergence of institutional distrust, party normalisation, and leadership renewal means that 2027 could mark a decisive turning point.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Whether Bardella&nbsp;ultimately wins&nbsp;or loses, his candidacy signals the end of the National Rally’s political quarantine in France. For policymakers in Paris, Brussels, and beyond, the priority must now&nbsp;be to understand — and respond to — the structural conditions enabling this shift, rather than assuming or hoping that inherited safeguards will continue to hold.</p>



<p><a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/?s=%F0%9F%94%AE">No.99 in a Loop series on the&nbsp;🔮&nbsp;Future of Populism</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/national-rally-can-it-win-the-2027-french-presidential-election/">🔮 Can the populist radical-right National Rally win the 2027 French presidential election? </a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
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