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		<title>Explaining Swedish exceptionalism in its pandemic response</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Orlaith Rice]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Mar 2022 09:17:00 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Swedish government’s strategy for addressing the Covid-19 pandemic sparked international debate about its hands off approach. Orlaith Rice points to Sweden’s institutional framework and high trust levels as two key components in understanding this country's unique pandemic response</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/explaining-swedish-exceptionalism-in-its-pandemic-response/">Explaining Swedish exceptionalism in its pandemic response</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
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<p class="has-medium-font-size">The Swedish government’s strategy for addressing the Covid-19 pandemic sparked international debate about its hands-off approach. <strong>Orlaith Rice</strong> points to Sweden’s institutional framework and high trust levels as key components in understanding this country's unique pandemic response</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-swedish-exceptionalism">Swedish exceptionalism</h2>



<p>Sweden’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic is one that has attracted global commentary. The country has been categorised as ‘<strong><a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_sweden_goes_it_alone_the_eus_coronavirus_exception/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">the EU’s exception</a></strong>’, a ‘<strong><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/world/europe/sweden-coronavirus-pariah-scandinavia.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">pariah state</a></strong>’. It has been labelled ‘<strong><a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/2021/08/03/anti-lockdown-sweden-nears-zero-daily-covid-deaths/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">anti-lockdown</a></strong>’, ‘<strong><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/swedens-anti-lockdown-experiment-flopped-now-it-faces-a-wave-of-pandemic-pain/2020/12/01/9e90ee28-3344-11eb-8d38-6aea1adb3839_story.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">experimental</a></strong>’, ‘<strong><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/25/what-lessons-can-europe-learn-from-sweden-covid-19-experience" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">light-touch</a></strong>’, and ‘<strong><a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/plus207038461/Schwedens-Corona-Sonderweg-Naives-Gefuehl-der-Unbesiegbarkeit.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">naïve</a></strong>’.</p>



<p>Since Covid-19 was first declared a <strong><a href="https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">pandemic </a></strong>in March 2020, Sweden has never imposed a national lockdown, enforced general quarantine rules, or introduced a mask mandate. Hospitality and retail <strong><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/apa.15582" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">continued to operate</a></strong> throughout the pandemic, and most schools retained in-person teaching. As of February 2022, Sweden <strong><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-declare-pandemic-over-despite-warnings-scientists-2022-02-09/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">has lifted</a></strong> most remaining Covid-19 related restrictions.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Executive response</h2>



<p>There has been no interruption to the workings of <strong><a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-occ19/law-occ19-e12" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Parliament and the Courts</a></strong> during the last two years. The Swedish government did enact over 100 pieces of legislation related to Covid-19 in 2020. However, these were mostly of a time-limited nature. For example, the government had not implemented the <strong><a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-01-21/sweden-new-covid-19-act-enters-into-force/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">temporary legislation</a></strong> brought in April 2020 by the time its provisions expired, in July 2020.</p>



<p>Despite this controversial, less invasive approach, evidence suggests high levels of compliance with recommendations in Sweden to limit the spread of Covid-19. Its citizens have been happy to maintain physical distance and to work from home where possible.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Constitutional restraints</h2>



<p>Many explanations of Sweden’s ‘exceptionalism’ fail to acknowledge that the Swedish strategy was, to an extent, predetermined by its institutional structure. As <strong><a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/sweden-stands-out-for-its-soft-approach-to-the-pandemic-but-the-jury-is-still-out-on-whether-it-will-work/">Oscar Larsson </a></strong>notes, the Swedish Constitution's fundamental laws <em>(Grundlagarna)</em> do not effect a state of emergency for public health crises. A state of emergency can only be declared in <strong><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0725&amp;from=EN" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">times of war</a></strong>. Thus, there was no option for the executive to <strong><a href="https://bppblog.com/2020/04/23/the-swedish-exception/?fbclid=IwAR3K5DXn7fD94-P0laRivYpJOUWf6bXn4bWR86W2LJqyK3Q08Jhx574-WoE" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">suspend rights and freedoms</a></strong>, such as freedom of movement, to curb the spread of Covid-19. A national lockdown to control an infectious disease was likely simply <strong><a href="https://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp20_11.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">not foreseen</a></strong> at the time the Constitution was written.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow"><p>The Swedish Constitution does not provide for a state of emergency during a public health crisis </p></blockquote>



<p>The Swedish Constitution does allow for <strong><a href="https://voxeu.org/article/sweden-s-constitution-decides-its-exceptional-covid-19-policy" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">limiting public gatherings</a></strong> during an epidemic. The government did implement this, at one point limiting such gatherings to a maximum of 50 people. For the most part, though, <strong><a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-occ19/law-occ19-e12" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">ordinary law</a></strong> regulates health emergencies in Sweden, particularly the <strong><a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-occ19/law-occ19-e12" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Communicable Diseases Act 2004</a></strong>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Softer than necessary?</h2>



<p>However, many other countries that similarly could not suspend rights outside of wartime did, nonetheless, introduce lockdown measures. They did this on the basis of the authorities' view that it was possible to do this in a way consistent with constitutional requirements of proportionality and due process (e.g. <strong><a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-occ19/law-occ19-e19?print=pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Ireland</a></strong>).</p>



<p>For example, the <strong><a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-occ19/law-occ19-e12" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Communicable Diseases Act 2004</a></strong> provides for the use of quarantine in Sweden if deemed necessary. Despite this, the government did not bring in mandatory quarantine rules for infected persons. Sweden was unusual in its soft law approach, even accounting for the constitutional restraints that existed before 2020.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Decentralised power sharing</h2>



<p>Decentralised power sharing is also a key feature of the Constitution. It <strong><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5cc92d45-fbdb-43b7-9c66-26501693a371" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">gives a lot of power</a></strong> to independent bodies, such as the Public Health Agency <em>(Folkhälsomyndigheten). </em>The Swedish strategy relied heavily on non-binding recommendations coming from this agency and State Epidemiologist Anders Tegnell.</p>



<p>While the government <strong><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/apa.15582" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">can reject</a></strong> these recommendations, in practice it does not. Sweden’s <strong><a href="https://bppblog.com/2020/04/23/the-swedish-exception/?fbclid=IwAR3K5DXn7fD94-P0laRivYpJOUWf6bXn4bWR86W2LJqyK3Q08Jhx574-WoE" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">epistocratic </a></strong>and <strong><a href="https://www.proquest.com/docview/2491502993?pq-origsite=summon" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">technocratic </a></strong>governance structure facilitated a public health response led almost solely by public health experts, not politicians. Furthermore, the Social Democrats and the Greens have been in a minority government since 2018. This weak position, as <strong><a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/sweden-stands-out-for-its-soft-approach-to-the-pandemic-but-the-jury-is-still-out-on-whether-it-will-work/">Oscar Larsson noted</a></strong>, may have dampened any desire to enact extraordinary legislation which may have triggered a <strong><a href="https://www.proquest.com/docview/2491502993?pq-origsite=summon" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">vote of no confidence</a></strong>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">In accordance with scientific evidence and the rule of law…</h2>



<p>A previous Loop blog warned of <strong><a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-fragility-of-civil-liberties-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/">democratic backsliding</a></strong> in certain countries as a result of restrictive Covid-19 measures. In Sweden, however, the executive response was concerned with principles of necessity and proportionality, in accordance with the <strong><a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-occ19/law-occ19-e12" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">rule of law</a></strong>.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow"><p>Sweden's executive response was concerned with principles of necessity and proportionality, in accordance with the rule of law</p></blockquote>



<p>Moreover, the Public Health Agency is obliged to act in the interests of public health in a holistic way. Thus, its recommendations were not solely to prevent the spread of Covid-19 at the expense of other aspects of public health. Anders Tegnell characterised <strong><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5cc92d45-fbdb-43b7-9c66-26501693a371" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">his approach</a></strong> as sustainable. He has also cited the lack of existing scientific evidence to support lockdowns as a factor in his decision-making.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Relying on trust</h2>



<p>Other elements at play in shaping Sweden’s approach include Swedish <strong><a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_sweden_goes_it_alone_the_eus_coronavirus_exception/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">culture </a></strong>(as the joke goes, <strong><a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/social-distance-swedish-style/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Swedes were social distancing before Covid</a></strong>), a strong <strong><a href="https://voxeu.org/article/underpinnings-sweden-s-permissive-covid-regime" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">tradition of liberalism</a></strong>, and Sweden’s reputation as a high-trust state. Swedes have long had high levels of institutional and interpersonal trust. These are key factors when it comes to compliance with Covid-19 restrictions, voluntary or otherwise.</p>



<p>Trust in Sweden was strong even <strong><a href="https://ourworldindata.org/trust" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">before the pandemic</a></strong> struck. In early 2020, trust levels only increased amid a <strong><a href="https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-6765.12419" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">rally around the flag</a></strong> effect. A later study did find that interpersonal trust decreased somewhat as the pandemic progressed. However, institutional trust was unaffected and <strong><a href="https://www.proquest.com/docview/2619083703" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">remained high</a></strong>.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow"><p>Swedes have long had high levels of institutional and interpersonal trust – key factors in  compliance with Covid-19 restrictions</p></blockquote>



<p>Swedes also have high trust in <strong><a href="https://v-a.se/2021/12/coronavirus-in-the-media-swedish-study-highlights-high-public-confidence-in-researchers/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">researchers</a></strong>. Thus, the government response, which relied on trust and personal responsibility, <strong><a href="https://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp20_11.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">mirrored the norms and values</a></strong> held by the Swedish public. For example, after public support for the <em>laissez-faire</em> strategy waned following the first Covid-19 wave, the executive passed the <strong><a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-occ19/law-occ19-e12" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Covid-19 Act 2021</a></strong>. This Act restricted rights in a way that would likely have been socially unacceptable until that point.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Understanding a unique response</h2>



<p>The purpose of this blog piece is not to evaluate Sweden’s approach in terms of its public health outcomes. Instead, it aims to illuminate the institutional context of the response and the factors affecting compliance with restrictions not mandated by government.</p>



<p>Sweden’s constitutional framework set out a roadmap for addressing the pandemic long before it began. This can, at least partly, explain Sweden's largely voluntary approach, and the expectations by government of personal responsibility, throughout the Covid-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/explaining-swedish-exceptionalism-in-its-pandemic-response/">Explaining Swedish exceptionalism in its pandemic response</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
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